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ABSTRACT

During the past century there have been significant changes

in the economic and social structure that have resulted in
new forms of criminal opportunities.

Fraudulent

telemarketers are among those that have seized such

opportunities to defraud consumers out of billions of
dollars annually.

The purpose of this dissertation is to

determine the decision-making process of criminal

telemarketers and the means by which they commit fraud.

Data analysis draws from semi-structured interviews with 48

subjects who have been convicted under federal law.

First,

of criminal telemarketing enterprises are examined.

Next,

the organization, management, and accountability structure

the interaction process between fraudsters and victims is

explored from a social-psychological perspective.

The

subjects' backgrounds and criminal careers and the lure of
criminal telemarketing and the lifestyles it affords are

then provided.

Finally, the thought processes of

fraudulent telemarketers are analyzed in the context of
denial of crime, techniques of neutralization, and

organizational design, before a rational choice perspective
is applied.

The author concludes that fraudulent

telemarketers embrace the cultural goal of capital

accumulation, exploit ambiguity in the law, design diffuse
accountability structures in their organization to avoid

criminal responsibility, and ultimately "ascend n to the
status of marginalized middle-class persons.
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Chapter 1
BACKGROUND

Writing at the dawn of the 20 th century, Ross (1907: 3)
noted cogently that crime "changes its quality as society
develops."

Ross focused specifically on growing social and

economic interdependence and the variety of ways this
permitted both exploitation of trust and the commission of
crime at a distance from victims.

The transformative

social and economic changes that Ross noted gained speed as
the century progressed.

For instance, in the United States

and other Western nations, the middle decades of the
century saw the emergence and expansion of state policies
and corporate practices.
This development included a fundamental shift in the
state's public welfare functions, which had the effect of
expanding programs and subsidies for citizens across the
income spectrum.

One measure of this is the fact that in

1992, 51.7 percent of American families were receiving some
form of federal payment, ranging from Social Security,
Medicare and military retirement benefits to agricultural
subsidies (Samuelson, 1995: 158).

In constant dollars the

federal outlay for entitlement programs increased more than

1

1,900 percent between 1945 and 1995 - from $75 billion to
$1. 5 trillion (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and

Welfare, 1959; Social Security Administration, 1999).
Concurrently, goods that were either unknown or

unattainable decades earlier became readily available in

the domestic economy.

Houses, automobiles, refrigerators,

television sets and a host of other commodities now were

within reach of a growing segment of the population.

The

greater disposable income available to citizens allowed

them not only to purchase these commodities, but also to
obtain new comprehensive insurance policies offered by

insurance underwriters.

Increasingly, the middle-class

family was insured against major hazards to life, home and

business as well as loss of or damage to household items
(Clarke, 1990).

Additional changes occurred in the structure and

dynamics of economic relationships and in communications
technology (Adler, 1992; Lash and Urry, 1994).

Electronic

financial transfers among banks and businesses, automatic

teller machines (Hirschhorn, 1985), and home banking

increasingly came into use across the globe (Silverstone,
1991).

Of even greater significance is the widespread use

of telecommunications (Batty and Barr, 1994; Turkle, 1995),
2

electronic financial transactions, and consumer credit
(Tickell, 1996), which foreshadows a depersonalized,
cashless economy.

In this new world of personal computers

and virtual identities, individuals and organizations
conduct business with remote others whose credentials and
intentions cannot be determined easily.
There has been a parallel shift in the U. S.
occupational structure as well, with routine production
giving way to in-person services as the dominant mode of
employment.

According to Reich (1991), there are

essentially three broad categories of work emerging in the
United States: routine production services, in-person
services, and symbolic-analytic services.

Routine

production services entail the repetitive tasks of
producing finished products tradable in world commerce.
In-person services also involve repetitive tasks but their
services must be provided person-to-person.

They need not

have acquired much education and the servers are in direct
contact with the ultimate beneficiaries of their work.
"Their immediate objects are specific customers rather than
streams of metal, fabric, or data" (Reich, 199 1: 176).
By 1990, routine production work comprised about one
quarter of the jobs performed by Americans and the number
3

was declining.

That same year, in-person services

accounted for about 30 percent of the American labor force
and their numbers were increasing rapidly (Reich, 1991:
177).

Symbolic-analysts solve, identify, and broker

problems by manipulating symbols.

They rarely come into

contact with the ultimate beneficiaries of their work and
currently account for no more than 20 percent of American
jobs (Reich, 1991: 178-9).

Emergent Opportunities

While the nature of business transactions has been altered
fundamentally by transformations of economic relationships,
the capacity for credible oversight of emergent forms of
criminal lure has not kept pace.

The net result of these

political and economic developments was the provision of
new white-collar criminal opportunities (Taylor, 1999;
Grabosky, Smith and Dempsey, 2001).

The State and the

array of provisions it makes available to citizens and
organizations is a frequent target of fraud offenders, one
they need not leave home or office to exploit.

Federally

funded health care programs, for example, have given
physicians and hospitals access to new pools of tax revenue
4

for which oversight is so weak that it has been called a
"license to steal" (Sparrow, 1996).

The growth of health

insurance fraud, therefore, can be seen as "emblematic of
the emerging forms of white-collar crime that reflect the
changing economy of the late twentieth century" (Tillman,
1998: 197).

New criminal opportunities extend far beyond

healthcare.
For individuals, exploitation of these white-collar
criminal opportunities may be motivated by a variety of
circumstances and meanings, whether feelings of
entitlement, anger over past treatment by state
functionaries, or simple greed.

Occasional media reports

and research give reason to believe, however, that a
significant proportion of white-collar criminals approach
it with a spirit of calling (e.g. , Abagnale, 1980; Francis,
1988; Jackson, 199 4).

Little is known about these

vocational predators and how they compare with their
predecessors of earlier eras (Glaser, 1972 ).
While the investigation of professional thieves and
their pursuits has a long history in criminology, the canon
is replete with portraits of offenders who have passed from
the scene. However, for contemporary observers, "fraud
masters" (Jackson, 1994) deservedly command more attention
5

than "cut purses" (Tobias, 1967), "cannons" (Maurer, 1964)
and "good burglars" (Shover, 1973). Economic and social
change inevitably transform the worlds in which offenders
entertain options and organize for pursuit of criminal
income (Hobbs, 1997; McIntosh, 1975; Shover, 1983).

The

new entrepreneurial milieu is an enabling environment for a
great range and variety of money-making schemes (Ruggiero
and South, 1997).
The landscape of emergent criminal opportunities has
proven to be fertile territory for the growth of fraud
(Shover, 1996). Fraud is misrepresentation or deception
used to secure unfair or unlawful gain, typically by
perpetrators who create and exploit the appearance of a
routine transaction.

Fraud violates trust, it is non

confrontational, and it can be carried out over long
distance.

Its distinguishing characteristics, therefore,

stand in stark contrast to robbery, burglary and other
street crimes that require offenders to confront their
victims or to enter their homes or businesses.
Fraud varies immensely in organizational complexity
and reach, for example, from small vinyl siding scams to
international banking crimes that can destabilize national
economies.

The number of Americans victimized by fraud is
6

large and greatly exceeds the number victimized by serious
street crime (Titus, 2001).

A 1991 survey of U.S.

households found that compared to crimes of burglary,
robbery, assault and theft, fraud "appears to be very
common" (Titus, Heinzelmann, and Boyle, .199 5: 65).

A

national survey conducted in 1999 found that 36 percent of
American households had experienced fraud victimization in
the preceding 12 months (Rebovich and Layne, 2000).

Telemarketing Fraud

The rapid growth of telemarketing is one of several
consequential changes in the nature of economic
relationships in Western countries in recent decades.
Telemarketing is a unique vehicle in the service industry
as it enlists technology to expand pools of potential
customers and affords direct contact with them.

In 2000,

telemarketing sales accounted for $611.7 billion in revenue
in the United States, an increase of 167 percent over
comparable sales for 1995.
for the future.

Increased growth is predicted

Total annual sales from telephone

marketing are expected to reach $939.5 billion by the year
2 005 (Direct Marketing Association, 2 001).
7

The reasons for the growth of telemarketing are

understood easily in the context of the "general

acceleration of everyday life, characterized by

increasingly complicated personal and domestic timetables"
(Taylor, 1999: 45).

The need to coordinate personal

schedules and to economize time now drives many household
activities.

The daily schedule no longer permits either

the pace or the style of shopping that were commonplace a

few decades ago.

In search of convenience, sale of

merchandise via telemarketing has gained in popularity.

While telemarketing has become an important part of

the legitimate economy, fraudsters also have been quick to

exploit the criminal opportunities it presents.

Telemarketing fraud touches the lives of many citizens.

A

1992 poll of a national sample of Americans showed that 2

percent of respondents had been victimized by fraud in the

preceding six months (Harris, 1992).

This exceeds the

victimization rate for all Index crimes except larceny.

comparison of 1992 poll results with data from the 1992

A

Uniform Crime Reports shows that Americans were seven times

more likely to be victims of telemarketing fraud than
victims of robbery in that year (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 1993).

8

Estimates of aggregate annual financial losses to
telemarketing fraud range upwards of $40 billion, a toll
that exceeds the combined monetary loss from all street
crimes (U. S. Department of Justice, 2 000).

There are

countless variations on the basic telemarketing fraud
scheme, but typically a con.sumer receives a phone call from
a high-pressure salesperson who solicits funds or sells
products based on false assertions or enticing claims.
Callers offer an enormous variety of products and services,
and often they use names that sound similar to bona fide
charities and other reputable organizations (U. S. Senate,
1993).
The American Association of Retired Persons (AARP)
estimates that in 1996, there were some 140, 000
telemarketing firms in the United States and that up to ten
percent of them were fraudulent (AARP, 19 96a).

Elderly

persons are disproportionately victimized by telemarketing
fraud.

There are several reasons for this pattern.

The

elderly are more likely than younger citizens to have
disposable income and are more often at home.
Additionally, loneliness and diminished intellectual acumen
may increase their vulnerability.

This, however, does not

mean that the elderly alone are targeted by telemarketers
9

as people of all ages have fallen prey to telemarketing
scams.

Some victims of telemarketing fraud are harmed

severely by their experiences with it; it can erode both
financial savings and self-esteem (Shichor, Doocy and Geis,
·1996).

Repeat victimization is not uncommon, and elderly

victims, in particular, may be left with seriously depleted
fiscal resources as they are less likely to be employed.
The size, permanence, and geographic mobility of
criminal telemarketing organiza�ions can vary
substantially.

One segment of the criminal telemarketing

industry is made up of somewhat large enterprises.

"Boiler

rooms, " operations featuring extensive telephone banks and
large numbers of sales agents, have become less common in
recent years, largely because of the law enforcement
interest they attract.

There is reason to believe,

however, that criminal telemarketers increasingly are
locating operations in countries with little governmental
oversight and operating across international borders (e.g. ,
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2001).
On the other hand, some fraudulent organizations are
very small, consisting of only two or three persons (See
Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 2000), many of which are set

up and operate in a community for only a few weeks or
10

months before moving on.

They are commonly referred to as

rip and tear operations.

Doocy et al. (2 001) observe

simply that the telemarketers they studied "seemed to be
extraordinarily mobile vocationally" (p. 17).

Rip and tear

operators count on the fact that up to six months time may
pass before law enforcement agencies become aware of and
target them.

Research on this segment of the telemarketing

industry is exceedingly rare due to the fact that they are
moving targets.

This mobility also makes it difficult for

law enforcement agencies to investigate their operations.
Thus, there is reason to believe that some of these
criminal entrepreneurs may operate with impunity for years.
Sutherland's (1940} offender-based definition of
white-collar crime emphasizes as its essential
characteristic the status and power of those who commit it
(Albanese, 1996).

Viewed this way, telemarketing fraud is

not white-collar crime as the status and power of criminal
telemarketers is not recognized by legitimate society.
Offense-based definitions of white-collar crime, on the
other hand, highlight offenses with specific formal
characteristics without regard to the status of those who
commit them.

Wheeler et al. (1982: 642 ) defined white

collar crime as "economic offenses committed through the
11

use of some combination of fraud deception, or collusion."
Weisburd et al. (19 91), for example, used the criminal code
as the starting point for drawing a sample of white-collar
offenders.

The population from which it was drawn included

all persons who were convicted of or pleaded guilty to any
of eight statutorily defined crimes.

The distinction

between elite and ordinary white-collar crime is made by
Shover (1998).

Looked at through the lens of offense-based

definitions, telemarketing fraud indisputably is ordinary
white-collar crime.
Recent investigations on career criminals (e. g. ,
Blumstein, Cohen and Farrington, 1988) have mainly focused
on street offenders.

Investigators have found that most

street offenders hail from locations in the class and
social structure where the young generally do not acquire
the human capital requisite to success in the world of
well-paid and respectable work.

Additionally, a

constellation of risk factors predisposes some to unusually
early criminality, and a substantial proportion of males
reared in these circumstances will acquire arrest and court
records before reaching adulthood.

For most, however,

aging and the changes that accompany it eventually cause a
reduction in, or curtailment of, serious street crime.
12

When compared to the number of investigations into
lives and careers of street-crime offenders, the corpus of
research into the criminal careers of white-collar
offenders is small. The extant research on white-collar
offenders suggests that not all are one-time or accidental
violators_; some have histories of multiple arrests and
convictions.

Some investigators, for example, have found

that when samples of ordinary white-collar criminals are
examined, upwards to 21 percent have previous felony
convictions (Weisburd et al., 1991).

When offender-based

approaches to white-collar crime are employed, there are
substantially fewer previous arrests in the backgrounds of
offenders.
Research on former employees of a California-based
fraudulent telemarketing firm found that 30 percent of 162
sales agents had records of at least one criminal offense,
and another 16.4 percent had records of alcohol or drug
offenses (Doocy et al., 2002).

This suggests that the

backgrounds and criminal experiences of telemarketing
offenders in broad outline may not differ greatly from what
previous studies have suggested is characteristic of
ordinary white-collar offenders.

It also lends credibility

to the assumption that at least some telemarketing fraud is
13

committed by offenders for whom crime is a long-standing
pattern or vocation.

The fact that telemarketing fraud is

perpetrated in an organizational context facilitates the
moral transformation of others without prior criminal
records.
In addition to being organized, the criminal endeavors
of fraudulent telemarketers are entrepreneurial in nature.
This business-like approach to crime suggests not only that
criminal telemarketers embrace the societal goal of capital
accumulation but also they are suited to pursue established
pathways to success.

The pursuit of profit is a universal

goal of individuals in the United States as it is in other
capitalist nations.

In Crime and the American Dream,

Messner and Rosenfeld (2 001: 5) assert that "crime in
America derives in significant measure, from highly prized
cultural and social conditions."

Cohen (1955) contends

that "individuals are encouraged to pursue the somewhat
broader goal of middle-class status.

That is, individuals

are urged to seek the financial success, reputation, and
lifestyle associated with the middle class."

While it is

obvious that criminal telemarketers actively pursue
financial gain, whether they desire "middle-class status"
is unclear.
14

From all accounts, many of the larger fraudulent
telemarketing firms closely resemble legitimate business
firms.

Doocy et al.

(2001: 21) describe telescamming as an

"inventive offshoot of legitimate enterprise."

They

explain it in the context of the capitalist structure which
"encourages the accumulation by any tactic, but imposes a
penalty if the effort is illegal" (Doocy et al., 2001: 21).
As O'Connor (1973) points out, it is up to the state to
monitor both facets of this pursuit.

The state has an

obligation to create and maintain the conditions under
which capital accumulation is possible and it must
simultaneously create and maintain conditions of social
harmony, including protection of the public.
O'Connor goes on to suggest that there is serious
potential for conflict between these two obligations.
A capitalist state that openly uses its coercive
forces to help one social class accumulate capital at
the expense of other classes loses its legitimacy and
hence undermines the basis of its loyalty and support.
But a state that ignores the necessity of assisting
the process of capital accumulation risks drying up
the source of its own power, the economy's surplus
production capacity and the taxes drawn from that
surplus (O'Connor, 1973: 6).
That the state has not previously enacted unduly
restrictive measures on telephone sales has facilitated
criminal telemarketers pursuit of capital accumulation.
15

Despite the increased prominence of telemarketing in the
economy, however, practitioners are not permitted to
exploit its potential at the expense of the public.

Thus,

telemarketing fraud is defined in 18 United States Code
2325 as:
A plan, program, promotion, or campaign that is
conducted to induce purchases of goods or services, or
participation in a contest or sweepstakes, by use of
one or more interstate telephone calls initiated by a
person who is conducting the plan, program, or
campaign.
Although telemarketing fraud is defined in 18 U.S. C. ,
section 2325, most criminal telemarketers are charged under
the wire fraud statute {18 U.S.C. , section 1343):

Whoever,

having devised or intending to devise any scheme or article
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of
wire, radio, or television communication in interstate
foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures,
or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
Offenders may also be charged with mail fraud (18 U. S. C.,
section 1341), money laundering {18 U. S. C. , section 1956)
16

or crim inal consp iracy (18 U. S.C., sect ion 371).

It is

important to note that the law does not spec if ically
delineate what actions or behav iors const itute fraud.

As a

result, the prescr iptive aspect of the law is subject to
interpretat ion.

Research Problem

The crim inal dec is ion-mak ing of fraudulent telemarketers as
it perta ins to the law and possible ram if ications rema ins
largely unexplored.

Rational-choice theories of cr ime have

st imulated numerous invest igations of street-offender
decision-mak ing (e.g., Bennet and Wright, 1984; Feeney,
1986; Katz, 1988; Shover and Honaker, 1992; Tunnell, 1992;
Wright and Decker, 1997; Hochstetler, forthcom ing).

There

is remarkable cons istency in the results of these studies.
Burglars, armed robbers and other street cr iminals are
anything but the careful calculating actors sketched in
classical crim inological theory.

Age, the influence of

compan ions, mood, and drug altered states of consciousness,
whether singly or in comb ination, constra in severely the ir
rat ionality.

17

Although rational-choice theory has been extended to
white-collar crime by a number of investigators (e. g. ,
Paternoster and Simpson, 1993; Shover and Bryant, 19 93),
there are few tests of its explanatory and predictive
merits (Braithwaite and Makkai, 1991; Simpson and Koper,
1992).

Despite the fact that many believe white-collar

criminals may be among the most rational of offenders
(e. g. , Braithwaite and Geis, 198 2; Weisburd, Waring and
Chayet, 19 90), understanding of their decision-making lags
far behind what is known about the behavior of street
criminals.
Surprisingly little is known about the fraudulent
telemarketers who have stepped forward to exploit the new
white-collar criminal opportunities.

Their social origins

and characteristics, the attractions and compensations of
their work, the way they organize and manage their criminal
enterprises, and the process by which they perpetrate fraud
are largely unexplored areas of investigation.

The extent

to which white-collar criminals are aware of and take
account of the criminal justice apparatus and its threats
is unclear.

The extent to which answers to these and other

questions about the white-collar criminal decision-making
process would necessitate modifications of crime-as-choice
18

theory remains unclear as well.

From a policy standpoint,

it would be useful to understand the forces that cause them
either to extend or to terminate criminal participation.
This dissertation redresses this situation with analysis of
data on criminal telemarketing and offenders.

The approach

is both descriptive and interpretive.
The problem of telemarketing fraud cannot be addressed
adequately by exclusive focus on the individuals who
perpetrate it.

It generally is not committed by solitary

offenders for its operational challenges require the
coordinated efforts of two or more individuals (Francis,
1988; Schulte, 1995; Stevenson, 2000).

Therefore, it is

necessary to examine the organizational context through
which criminal telemarketers facilitate fraud.

It is

equally important to analyze the interaction process
wherein the fraud is actually perpetrated.
Doocy et al. (2001) suggest that �successful sales
talents are similar to those of a successful actor:

an

ability to convince others that you are what you truly are
not, and to have them [consumers] believe that the lines
you speak are truths."

In other words, sellers are given

wide latitude in making their sales pitches while it is up
to consumers to discern the actual value of products or
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services.

While this may be true of sales in general, it

contributes little to understanding the i�teraction process
wherein telemarketing fraudsters swindle funds from
unwitting victims.

To better comprehend the phenomenon, it

would be helpful to gain insight into the perceptions of
the "sellers ll and buyers ll that participate in fraudulent
transactions.
To explore fully the phenomenon of telemarketing
fraud, it is necessary to examine it at macro, meso, and
micro-levels.

This study examines how criminal

telemarketers exploit ambiguity at the legal,
organizational, and interactional levels.

By definition,

ambiguity is the state of being "ambiguous" - capable of
being understood in two or more possible senses or ways
(Merriam-Webster, 1997).

It is synonymous with vagueness,

uncertainty, haziness, doubt, and indistinctness.

For

purposes of this study, ambiguity in all its derivative
forms is explored in the context of the law, organizational
structure and management, and the interaction process.
Generally, how do fraudulent telemarketers organize
and manage their criminal enterprises to exploit criminal
opportunities?
the fraud?

What is the process by which they carry out

What are the backgrounds and criminal decision20

making processes of·fraudulent telemarketers?

This

dissertation analyzes the cultural and legal factors that
underlie criminal telemarketing, the social organization
and management of fraudulent telemarketing enterprises, and
whether organizational structure helps explain the
decision-making process of individual offenders.

It also

explores the interaction processes utilized to perpetrate
fraud and the backgrounds and decision-making of the
individual offenders.
More specifically:
1. What are the backgrounds, criminal histories, and
lifestyles of the sample subjects?
2 . How are fraudulent telemarketing firms organized and
managed?
3. What is the organizational routine?
4. What is the lure of criminal telemarketing to those
that participate in it?
5. How do criminal telemarketers perpetrate fraud
interactionally?
6. How do offenders and victims perceive the interaction
process?
7. What is the decision-making process of the offenders?
8. How do offenders rationalize their criminal actions?
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The methodology employed is detailed (Chapter 2 )
before the design, routine, management and accountability
structure - that is, the social organization - of criminal
telemarketing operations are examined (Chapter 3).

The

interaction process. between offender and victim is analyzed
from a social-psychological perspective (Chapter 4) and
then the backgrounds and criminal careers as well as the
lure of criminal telemarketing and lifestyles of the sample
subjects are provided (Chapter 5).

Next, the thought

processes of individual offenders are revealed.
Specifically, I consider the denial of crime, techniques of
neutralization, organizational design, and rational choice
perspective (Chapter 6).

The author's conclusion and

policy implications follow (Chapter 7).
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Chapter 2
METHODS

Research into telemarketing fraud does not have a long
history.

Few studies have been conducted.

In fact,

criminological research has been greatly limited prior to
the current study.

Most of the knowledge gained to date

has been gathered in a non-scientific manner by law
enforcement and regulatory agencies and victim advocate
groups.

Albeit unsystematically, the American Association

of Retired Persons (AARP, 1996a; 1996b) has provided
valuable information to educate victims about the existence
of criminal telemarketers while law enforcement and
regulatory agencies have produced enforcement statistics.
Doocy et al.

(2001) pursued knowledge about the

offenders themselves.

The investigators reviewed

background reports of 162 telemarketers who had previously
worked at a California-based fraudulent telemarketing firm.
The findings of this study were rather limited but did
produce age and criminal history statistics.

The

researchers also obtained a sole interview and eight
surveys from fraudulent telemarketers.
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While the study was

qualitatively limited, the relevant information is reported
later in this paper.
The current study uses qualitative interviews to fill
the gap in knowledge about fraudulent telemarketers.

In

this method of research, interviews are less structured
than survey interviews; researchers ask open-ended
questions and elicit specific responses but participants
are allowed and prompted to explain and clarify their
responses (Babbie, 1998; Cromwell, 2003).

It is a method

that allows access to participants' knowledge, experience,
and opinions in their own words (Reinharz, 1992; Rubin and
Rubin, 1995; Johnson, 2002; Warren, 2002 ).

The results of

qualitative interviews offer "deep" or "thick" descriptive
information and understanding of the activity being studied
(Johnson, 2002).
We know little about telemarketing fraud, hence the
need for qualitative interviews.

Understanding the

motivations behind participants' criminal activity is
central to this study because it allows the researcher to
go beyond common sense explanations (Babbie, 1998; Johnson,
2002; Cromwell, 2003).

"Effective crime control strategies

must take into account the factors that drive crime.

Field

research that allows offenders to speak for themselves is
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ideally suited to these studies ll (Cromwell, 2 0 0 3).

The

purpose of each interview is to uncover potentially
relevant data.

Therefore, "it is best not to structure

interviews too tightly, but rather to allow sufficient
space for other potentially relevant concepts to emerge and
to include conceptual areas brought to the investigation or
uncovered during the research process ll (Strauss and Corbin,
1990: 18 1-2 ).

Sample

Theoretical sampling was employed to research
telemarketing fraud and criminal telemarketers.

According

to Strauss and Corbin (1990: 177), the aim of theoretical
sampling is to sample events and incidents that are
indicative of categories, their properties, and dimensions.
In other words, the interest is in gathering data about
what subjects do; the range of conditions that give rise to
their actions and variations in action; and how conditions
change or stay the same over time and with what impact.
"Guiding theoretical sampling are questions and comparisons
that evolve during analysis that help a researcher to
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discover and relate relevant categories, their properties,
and dimensions" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 178).
Theoretical sampling ensures the noting of variation
and process, as well as of density.

"A certain degree of

flexibility is needed because the investigator must respond
to and make the most out of data-relevant situations that
may arise while in the field"
178).

(Strauss and Corbin, 1990:

"Sampling is open to those persons, places, and

situations that will provide the greatest opportunity to
gather the most relevant data about the phenomenon under
investigation"

(Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 181).

"The

researcher chooses the sites, persons, and documents that
will maximize opportunities for verifying the story line,
relationships between categories, and for filling in poorly
developed categories"

(Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 183).

In grounded theory research, the researcher pursues
generalizations by making comparisons across social
situations.

"It seeks theory that is comparable with the

evidence, that is precise and rigorous, that is capable of
replication, and is generalizable"

(Neuman, 1994: 32 3).

Decisions regarding the number of interviews depend upon
access, available resources, research goals, and time.

The

general rule in grounded theory research is to sample until
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theoretical saturation of each category is reached.
Theoretical saturation occurs when no new or relevant data
seem to emerge regarding a category, the category accounts
for all of the paradigm elements along with variation and
process, and the relationships between categories are well
established and validated (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 188).
Most of the data for this dissertation were gathered
in semi-structured personal interviews with 48
telemarketing offenders convicted under federal law.

Since

there are no lists of the names - sampling frames - of
criminal telemarketers, investigators interested in
learning about them and their activities cannot draw random
samples for study.

Sampling began with examination of

major metropolitan newspapers for the past five years and
approximately 75 web sites that contained information about
telemarketing fraud as well as names of convicted·
offenders.

Additional names were gathered from pre

sentence reports of interview subjects.

These search

processes yielded the names of 308 persons who were
convicted of telemarketing fraud in the period 1996 through
2000 in the U.S.

For reasons that never became clear, the

proportion of names that were matched with incarcerated
inmates was much lower than expected.
27

Of the 308 names

submitted to the Bureau of Prisons Office of Research and

Evaluation, only 74 were returned with indication they were

confined in institutions.

Interviews were completed with 25 of these.

Twenty

six (26) elected not to meet with the investigator, two

declined to be interviewed after hearing the presentation
of research objectives and methods, and seven had been

released prior to the investigators' institutional visit.

No attempt was made to contact or interview fourteen of the
incarcerated offenders, principally because there were no

other telemarketing offenders incarcerated in the

institutions where they were confined, and it would not

have been cost effective to travel there in hopes of
securing a solitary interview.

Under the terms of an agreement with the Federal

Bureau of Prisons, names were submitted to personnel in

their Office of Research and Evaluation, who reported the

institutional locations of those currently incarcerated.
Institutional wardens were then made aware of the

researcher's interest in interviewing these inmates.

warden or the warden's designee then presented to the

The

inmates the written description of the research and its

objectives and inquired if s/he was agreeable to meeting
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with the investigator when he v is ited the institution.

The

written description of the project is attached as Appendix
A.
The researcher later traveled to a number of
institutions to meet w ith inmates who responded
aff irmat ively, to describe and expla in the research
objectives and to interview those who elected to
partic ipate in the study.

Those offenders that agreed to

be interviewed were ensured of conf idential ity and were
asked to sign a consent form.
is attached as Append ix B.

A copy of the consent form

Twenty-f ive members of the

sample were incarcerated when interv iewed.

They were

conf ined in twelve federal prisons, from Oregon to Florida
and Massachusetts to Ar izona.
To ensure that the sample included a suffic ient
number of people with d iverse telemarket ing experience, as
interv iew ing progressed, the researcher also included some
offenders under federal probat ion superv is ion.

I reasoned

that their involvement in telemarket ing fraud probably was
not as lengthy or as serious as was the case w ith the
incarcerated subjects.

U. S. Probation Off icers and U.S.

Attorneys in f ive states provided the investigator w ith
names of potential interview subjects.
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I interv iewed 23

parolees and probationers, 15 in Las Vegas, Nevada, and 8
in other cities.

Las Vegas was an early hotbed of criminal

telemarketing, and it continues to be a home base for many
operations.

Data Collection

The final interview sample consisted of forty-eight
subjects.

Among them were thirty-six white males, six

African-American males, and six white females.

All

interviews followed an interview guide, which was revised
as data collection progressed and analytic insights were
developed and tested.

The original topical interview guide

is attached as Appendix C and the final revised guide is
attached as Appendix D.

The interviews explored a range of

topics, including subj ects ' background and criminal
history, their employment history, and the nature and
circumstances of their initial and subsequent participation
in telemarketing fraud.

The investigator also explored the

characteristics and operating procedures of the
organizations for which subjects had worked.

This

information provided an understanding of how fraudulent
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telemarket ing organizat ions operate and factors that may
expla in the ir differential success.
Interv iews lasted from 45 minutes to 7 hours ; however,
most lasted between one and one and half hours.

The

subjects confined in prison took cons iderably longer to
.interv iew as they were conducted during the early stages of
data collection and the subjects spent a s ign ificant amount
of time discuss ing their legal appeals .

Most of the

imprisoned subjects and the researcher met in visit ing
rooms at the respective prisons ; complete privacy was
prov ided although a few prisons kept a guard within v iew.
The majority of interviews with probat ioners and parolees
took place in probation off ices, three were conducted at
restaurants, and the remaining two were done by telephone.
In addit ion to interviews with telemarketing
offenders, I had access to pre-sentence invest igat ion
reports for 40 of the 48 sub j ects.

Exam ination of these

served not only as an independent check on the val idity of
information elic ited during the interv iews but also
provided a more complete picture of the subjects '
backgrounds and c ircumstances.

I also interviewed four

acqua intances who formerly worked as telemarketers at
fraudulent firms for short periods of time and f ive
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legitimate telemarketers, two of whom once held office in
telemarketing trade associations.

The purpose of these

interviews was to discern how fraudulent telemarketers
differed from legitimate telemarketers .
In addition, I interviewed four assistant U . S .
attorneys with extensive experience prosecuting
telemarketing offenders, four U . S . probation officers who
have supervised a large number of convicted telemarketers,
and a state official with the Nevada Consumer Affairs
Division .

The information gained from these interviews was

valuable as it provided a law enforcement perspective on
telemarketing.

I also examined eight depositions of

victims of telemarketing fraud made by law enforcement
personnel and three voluminous criminal trial transcripts
containing detailed descriptions of criminal telemarketing
organiza tions and operations .
Finally, I made site visits to five telemarketing
operations, two of which appeared to operate fraudulently .
The purpose of these visits was to examine the operations
in practice.

The similarities and distinctions between

legitimate and illegitimate operations that had been
verbalized in interviews became more clear as a result.
The researcher was able to observe aspects of the
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respective bus inesses that were not described during the
interview process .

For example, the differences in

professionalism and management techniques became visibly
apparent.

Field notes were made during visits to the

legitimate sites and immediately after departure from the
allegedly fraudulent sites and were later transcribed for
analysis.

Data Analysis

Interviews were tape recorded and later transcribed for
analysis using N-Vi vo , a software package for text-based
data (Richards, 1999 ) .

N-Vi vo allows the researcher to

code, recode and store ideas, concepts, categories and
themes relevant to the qualitative data being analyzed .
Databases are created and can systematically be retrieved
and managed.

Additionally, N-Vi vo offers the ability _to

ma intain information about cases by stor ing at tribute � and
information also can be exported to create spreadsheets and
databases.
N-Vi vo utilizes a classification system for relating,
categorizing, characterizing, coding, and manipulat ing the
concepts, topics, and ideas relevant to a qualitative
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research project (Richards, 1999).

It is necessary for the

researcher to generate the categories from data within the
documents.

Specific categories are used to code project

documentation where a particular topic occurs.

The

specific categories can then be grouped into any number of
sets, which can be studied for their features, contents,
themes, etc. (Richards, 1999).
The original research questions and field notes were
used as a guide to determine general themes for
exploration.

The investigator began formal analysis of the

data set by reviewing the interview documents and coding
passages according to content.

This required that a

specific category be designated - for each passage according
to its particular content.

As analysis continued, the need

to establish new categories lessened as subsequent passages
of similar content were fit within previously established
codes.
Upon completion of coding by specific content, the
investigator placed the various passages under broader
conceptual headings:

cultural influences, law, offender

backgrounds, social organization, social interaction, and
criminal calculus.

I then reviewed the passages within

each broad category in order to determine more specific
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At that point, I was able to group the specific

themes.

categories into sets and thus organize the data to address
the research questions.
I also conducted statistical analyses using the SPSS
computer software program for quantitative analysis.

I ran

cross-tabulations on several variables that had theoretical
relevance; eight of the tables are incorporated in the
paper.

Cross-tabulations provide the distribution of

frequencies of variables within cross-referenced
categories.

The tables reveal the within category and

within group percentages for the variables that are cross
tabulated.

This required that all variables utilized be

entered as categorical data, hence numerical data were
grouped as needed.
Age, number of marriages, number of children, years in
telemarketing, and income were entered as numerical
variables.

Race was entered as white and non-white; gender

was male and female.

Education was categorized as less

than �igh school, high school degree (including GED), some
college, college degree, and masters degree.

Parent 1 s

employment refers to the occupation of the head of the
household, usually the father; categories consisted of
laborer, managerial/ professorial, and business owner.
35

Prior record was a dichotomous variable of yes or no; and
the present status of the subj ect was listed as prison,
parole, and probation.

Telemarketing positions of the

subj ects were entered as sales agents which includes
closers, reloaders, managers, and owners.

Finally a

category was created for admission of guilt, which
consisted of yes, no and awareness.

Methodological Reservations

Criminologists have long voiced concern about the potential
shortcomings of research based on samples of offenders
known to the police or other criminal j ustice agencies.
The issues are well known.

To begin, known offenders and

their experiences may not be representative of the larger
population of of fenders :

their arrest and conviction are

prima fa cie evidence that they have been unsuccessful and,

therefore, may differ in important ways from offenders who
do not have official criminal records (Wright et al. , 199 2 ;
McCall 1978).

Known offenders also may not be honest or

forthcoming with investigators for fear of repercussions
from criminal justice agencies and personnel (Yablonski,
19 56).

Last, there is the problem of eliciting information
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about street- leve l dynamics and concerns when sub j ects, if
incarcerated, - are far removed from the free wor ld and its
constraints .
There are no simp le or straightforward so lutions to
samp le se lection problems and the use of known offenders.
Reason suggests, however, that some issues and topics
probab ly can be exp lored wel l using known offenders with
litt le fear of bias, even if this is not the case for a l l
areas of inquiry.

Lifesty les and careers, for examp le, are

one thing, decision -making is another (Shover and Honaker,
1992).

Almost certain ly, the former can be reca l led more

c lear ly and accurate ly than the detai ls of comp lex
cognitive or decision -making processes.

Simi lar ly, known

offenders may be forthcoming and candid about re lationships
with fami ly members, but they may be re luctant to divu lge
information on i l licit income if they fear it cou ld be used
by state officia ls to extract hidden income or monies.
There is no doubt that investigations of street crime
using samp les of known offenders have produced detai led,
accurate and usefu l data on a range of topics ( Shover and
Honaker, 1992 ; Shover, 1985 ; Feeney, 1986 ; Scu l ly and
Maro l la, 1984 ; Benson, 1985).

Put di fferent ly, research

using prisoners or other known offenders has demonstrab le
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va lue.

There is litt le reason, moreover , to be lieve that

the resu lts of these studies contradict or are inconsistent
with what has been learned from studies using active
offenders.

More important , despite misgivings about using

offenders known to crimina l justice agencies, there is
little hard evidence avai lab le on which to judge whether
they think , act and report information different ly than
free-ranging offenders .
This combined with its cost-effectiveness persuaded me
to use a sample of convicted telemarketers under
institutiona l or community supervision.

Simp ly, there is

no other way to access these offenders.

I acknowledge that

the precise relationship of this samp le to larger
populations of theoretica l and substantive interest is
unknown , but it does capture persistent te lemarketing fraud
o f fenders, the ob j ect o f considerable publ ic and o f f ic ial
concern .
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Chapter 3
THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF TELEMARKETING F RAUD

Criminal telemarketers generally do not act alone.

They

usually enlist the cooperative efforts of other
individuals, resulting in the need to organize and manage
their criminal enterprises.

Thus, I set out to explore the

structure and management of the subjects' criminal
organizations.

More specifically, I wanted to determine

whether or not the criminal firms are hierarchical replete
with a management and accountability structure.

I also

examined the recruitment and socialization processes and
the routines criminal telemarketers employ to perpetuate
fraud.

The subjects maintained a defensive stance with

respect to the inner-workings of their organizations for
the most part.

Explication required piecing together

information from a variety of sources.

It also was

instructive to determine whether or not criminal firms
differed significantly in organizational context from
legitimate operations.
The products and services offered by criminal
telemarketers span a wide gamut.

Examples of commonly

employed schemes include prizes and sweepstakes deals,
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magazine sales, credit card sales, work-at-home schemes,
advance fee loan offers, credit card loss protection
programs, buyers ' clubs, and travel / vacation offers.

A

high proportion of the companies represented by the
research subj ects promised that those who purchased
products from them were odds-on winners of a prize soon to
be awarded once other matters were settled.

Typically, the

products were either personalized or " cause of the day"
(e. g. , Say No to Drugs) items .

The prices of these items

were grossly inflated and the valuable prizes never
awarded.
Other subj ects sold private stocks that by definition
are not listed or traded on a stock exchange .
Telemarketers nevertheless are able to entice investors
with smooth talk and a promising prospectus.

Dependent

upon their salesmen for market reports, those who invest
soon discover that the non-existent stocks take a nose
dive, and they lose their investments.

The movie Boil er

Room (Warner Home Video, 2000) is an entertaining and
generally accurate depiction of these operations.
A couple of subj ects sold investment shares in cable
companies that were said to be on the cutting edge of
providing access to previously unreachable land areas.
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Naturally, the deal fell through in the end and the clients
absorbed the loss.

Another subj ect sold inexpensive

gemstones with fraudulent certificates of grossly inflated
value and authenticity .

The stones were sealed in display

cases such that purchasers would have difficulty getting
them appraised, particularly since they were told that if
they broke the seal, the value of the stones would decrease
and the certificate of authenticity would become invalid.
Some research subj ects solicited money for nonexistent
charities or for legitimate organizations they did not
represent.

These fraudulent telemarketers place calls to

unwitting victims and prey upon their good nature and
humanitarianism.

A

few more brazen firms simply told

victims that they had won a large sum of money.

To " cash

in" on the proceeds, the victims were required to send in
several thousand dollars to pay for alleged taxes and
origination fees.
higher the fees.

The higher the amount of the award, the
The fraudsters could afford to offer

awards allegedly worth millions of dollars since there was
never any payout.
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Struc ture and Routine

Larger fraudulent telemarketing operations commonly take on
the characteristics and dynamics of formal organizations;
they are hierarchical, with a division of labor, graduated
pay and advancement opportunities.

Established by

individuals with previous experience in fraudulent sales,
they generally employ commissioned sales agents to call
potential customers, to make the initial pitch, and to weed
out the cautious and the steadfastly disinterested.
Experienced telemarketers generally do not call individuals
randomly but work instead from lead lists (also known as
"mooch lists" ).

Individuals whose names appear on lead

lists typically are distinguished by past demonstrated
interest or participation in promotions of one kind or
another.
Lead lists are indispensable to criminal
telemarketers.

They are purchased from any of dozens of

businesses that compile and sell information on consumer
behavior and expressed preferences.

Lead lists usually are

generated by legitimate marketing firms that obtain
consumer information from sweepstakes entry forms and
purchaser questionnaires, such as those that accompany
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product warranties.

Owners may spend heavily on good

lists, often paying as much as $10 per name.
A 20 percent close rate on a lead list is considered a
"very good" resource, whereas owners can expect less than
10 percent on lists that cost $1 per name.

Telemarketers

that operate on an in-bound basis wherein consumers call
into the company, utilize lead lists with consumer
addresses.

These firms mail out attractive offers hoping

that the recipients will be enticed to call the business.
They are less expensive but also produce only about a 1
percent response rate.
When a person is contacted by telephone, the sales
agent generally works from a script.

Scripts are written

materials that lay out both successful sales approaches and
responses (rebuttals) to whatever reception sales agents
meet with from those they reach by phone .

Promising

contacts are turned over to a closer, a more experienced
and be tter paid sa les agen t .

A former owner told me :

I initiated a racetrack where I built all my
telemarketing booths in a circle, and then I built a
circle inside the circle . So there was a racetrack, a
path going all around the circle, and I used closers
that would [take over] as soon as they heard a buying
signal. As soon as they [sales agents] heard a buying
signal on the telephone they [turned it over] to
somebody else to close the deal. So I could use 25
people in a room and j ust have 5 closers, 5 people
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that could sell. And the other ones are j ust really
initiating the sale and trying to develop interest.

Reloaders are the most effective closers.

Much like

account executives in legitimate businesses, they maintain

contacts with . individuals who previously sent money to the
company (i. e., "purchased" from it) in hopes of persuading
them to send more.

As one subj ect told me:

I had it so perfected that I could get these customers
to buy again. . . . I made sure they were happy so I
could sell them again. It didn't do me, I didn't want
the one time. I didn't want the two-timer. I wanted
to sell these people ten times.

The organization of larger telemarketing firms and the

routine that employees follow when handling promising calls

explains why those who buy from them typically report
contact with multiple salespersons (AARP, 1996b).

Fraudulent telemarketers generally prefer to bill

their victims directly via credit card, but this process

creates the potential for charge backs and external review
by regulatory personnel and law enforcement.

Consequently,

customers usually are coached to write out a check during
the phone call and directed to send it by overnight mail.

Otherwise, the salesperson dispatches a courier to pick up
the check or cash.

Goods or services either are not

delivered at all, or they are substantially inferior to
what was promised.
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The subj ects of this study unstintingly employ the
rhetoric of legitimate business when describing their
operations and activities.

Accounts of their telemarketing

activities are replete with references to " customers, "
"purchases, " "account executives, " "premiums" and such.
When they talk, however, of

"customers" who "bought" from

their establishments, they are referring to victims who
sent them money and whom they hoped could be induced to
make additional "purchases" despite . receiving little of
value in return for earlier ones.

Throughout this paper,

the rhetoric employed by the subj ects is utilized in
descriptions of their criminal operations and activities.
The owners are the idea men.

They begin set up of the

operations by locating office space and obtaining telephone
services.

There is little financial risk, largely because

there is little overhead.

Although owners often are

required to post a bond with the state regulatory agency
prior to start-up, sales are on commission, and products
are provided by private contractors.

Whereas legitimate

marketing firms are enlisted by businesses to market their
products, criminal telemarketers enlist businesses to
provide products simply as reason to contact consumers they
wish to defraud.
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The goal of fraudulent telemarketers is to induce
consumers to pay substantially increased prices or fees for
products by promising awards to those who purchase.

For

example , they often enlist the services of a printing
company , to make personalized pens and other trinkets and
attach an exorbitant price to the products.

More brazen

owners may promise a product or cash award without ever
sending any out to the consumers and some simply solicit
donations for a non-existent charity.
The organizational flow chart [ Fi gure 3 . 1 ] provides
the basic hierarchical structure and routine of larger
criminal telemarketing firms.

Owners do not have direct

contact with clients , however they often develop the
scripts which the sales agents then follow.

While scripts

generally require approval by a state regulatory agency ,
the s a les agents deviate from the approved scrip t s dur ing
the sales transactions.

The owners then employ managers to

train the sales agents on how to present the script in a
more persuasive manner and to oversee the day-to-day
operations.

Managers stress the fact that individual

income is based on commission and encourage sales agents to
incorporate their own personal style when employing the
scripts.
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While closers technically are subj ect to the authority
of the manager, reloaders are set up as account executives
and maintain near complete autonomy in dealing with their
clients.

The transactions of sales agents and closers, on

the other hand, often are subj ected to review by the office
verifier, if there is one.

After a consumer agrees to make

a purchase, albeit based on false promises, s / he is placed
on the phone with the verifier allegedly for the purpose of
making sure that all the information is correct.

During

these tape-recorded conversations, it is "verified" that
the consumer is "aware" of the conditions of the purchase
and that no additional promises were made.

Naturally, the

consumer has been coached by the sales agent/ closer to not
reveal the "inside" information,

{ i.e., s / he ' s a "winner" ),

that has been provided, or risk "queering the deal. "
Criminal telemarketers usually count on the fact that
most victims will not take the time or effort to complain,
and they use verification tapes as their first line of
defense should a consumer initiate a complaint.

For

victims who are more persistent in their demand for a
refund, many of the fraudsters have developed ways to
satisfy and yet still rip off disgruntled consumers .
do this by setting up recovery rooms.
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They

Recovery rooms are based on the concept of legitimate
firms that provide a service representing consumers against
businesses by whom they ' ve been defrauded.

Criminal

telemarketers have one of their own employees call
dissatisfied customers and offer to represent the consumer
against the business.

Naturally, the employee proceeds

under the guise of an independent recovery company.

The

result is that the customer recoups a portion, usually
half, of what s / he lost, the complaint is abated, and the
company keeps the rest.

Sample Operation

Among the subjects of this research were some who
identified and located owners of vacant property, led them
to believe that buyers for the property could be found
easily, and then charged high fees to advertise it.

The

key to this scam is that the victims were made to believe
that the telemarketers had buyers interested in the lots
whereas there were, in reality, only a few buyers individuals that were interested in vacant lots generally.
Six (6) of the sample subjects worked for this particular
company, which provided additional insight into how the
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roles of the various positions are played out within an
organizational setting.

While the product/ service they

pedaled is somewhat unique, it does provide a deeper
understanding of fraudulent operations.
The Texas operation, hereafter referred to as XYZ
Company, w�s developed by two men experienced in real
estate sales .

A

silent partner, who also possessed prior

real estate experience, provided financial backing.

The

basic concept was to offer owners of vacant land the
opportunity to list their land for sale and be matched with
interested buyers.

The partners developed divisions of

labor with separate departments to handle: ( 1) potential
sellers,

( 2 ) potential buyers, ( 3) computer entry and

matching, and ( 4) accounting.

Over time, the company grew

to include approximately 30-40 employees per shift with a
total of about 250 employees during the 3 -year period in
which the business operated.
The two managing partners located the tracts of land
by researching title abstracts accessible to the public and
sent out postcards to the land owners, soliciting them to
call the business if they desired to sell their land.

The

sales agents fielded calls and entered the information into
the computer base.

Gullible sellers were required to pay a
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listing fee to have their land placed in the computer
listing service.
For the matching part, the fraudsters placed in
newspapers and other media sources general advertisements
stating that "land [ is ] available for purchase. "
Interested buyers were provided a toll-free number to call
XYZ Company and specify in what region they sought to
purchase land.

These requests were then " matched" with

parcels of land listed for sale by the sellers and a list
of matches were submitted to the potential buyers.
Interested buyers were not required to pay fees.
Although the sellers perceived that the company was .
actively engaged in selling their land, the subjects
defended that the service offered was solely listing the
properties.

In other words, the subjects alleged that it

was an advertising company as opposed to a real estate
sales operation.

The business did, in fact, compile a list

of land tracts for sale and advertised, albeit generally.
Nearly 30, 000 sellers were listed at the time of the
investigation and the company took in about $9 million
dollars in revenue over the three-year span.
required periodic renewal. )

(Listings

Approximately 2 00 tracts of

land were sold during the same period to a total of 30
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different buyers.
reduced prices.

These lands were generally sold at very
The managers and partners perpetuated the

myth that the service was doing well by talking in terms of
matching properties, which in reality meant that some
buyers expressed a general interest in land tracts,
although not necessarily any of those listed for sale.
They also boasted of actual sales made by soliciting and
posting testimonials from sellers who somehow were lucky
enough to sell their land.
The fraud was perpetrated through representations that
the company and its agents made to the sellers.

Upon

determining the owner of a tract of land, the company would
send a personalized postcard to potential sellers, listing
their specific tracts of land and asking them if they were
" interested in selling their land for cash today. "

If so,

they were directed to call the company " within the next 72
hours . "

When - a potential seller would call in, they were

given a sales pitch devised by the managing partners, that
implied that the company had " buyers interested in land
like [ yours ] already in the computer. "

This was done to

create the impression that a sale would be imminent.
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Recruitment and Soc i aliz ation

Criminal telemarketers need to recruit and replace
personnel, _ restrict the number of persons knowledgeable
about their criminal purpose, and hide assets (Shover,
1996).

These problems are solved in most criminal

organizations through specialized roles, spatial dispersion
of members, and strategic ignorance of operations (Katz,
1980; Reuter, 1983) .

Etzioni (1961, 1964) identifies two

concepts central to the professionalization process selectivity and socialization.

"Selectivity, or

recruitment, involves the active search for the right
person for a particular j ob" (1964 : 68-69).

Organizational

socialization consists of "the processes by which the
beliefs, norms and perspectives of the participants are
brought into line with those of the organization" (Etzioni
1961 : 142 ).
While Etzioni (1961 : 158-159) contends that "each
concept could substitute partially for the other, "
presumably the best organizational results are obtained
when both selection and socialization are high.

"When

selectivity is low . . . organizational socialization is
expected to adapt the personnel to the needs of the
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organization" ( Winfree et, al. , 1984 : 209 ) .

According to

organizational theory, "the organization can compensate for
' failures' in the . . . recruitment process by increasing

its control over new recruits, and subsequently initiating

organizational socialization" ( Winfree et, al. , 1 984: 222 ) .
Requiring no formal education and only limited

training, telemarketing provides employment opportunity to
a wide array of individuals, providing an attractive

breeding ground for modern day con artists.

The

individuals that are drawn to telemarketing generally do

not have substantial education and they generally lack

prior professional work experience.

( The educational

backgrounds of the subjects are provided in greater detail
in Chapter 5. )

As a result, criminal telemarketing firms

recruit from a pool of untrained individuals who often lack
business sophistication.

None of the subjects said that as children they

aspired to a career in telemarketing.

Some had previous

sales experience before beginning the work, but most did
not.

Their introduction to it was fortuitous; while still

in high school or, more commonly, while in college, they

either responded to attractive ads in the newspaper or were
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recruited by friends or acquaintances who boasted about the
amount of money they were making.
[ A former acquaintance ] . . . looked me up, found me
and said "you gotta come out here.
. We're gonna
make a ton of money. " I went out for three weeks -
left my wife back home. And I got on the phones, and
I was making a thousand dollars a week. I'm like,
"Oh, my God, Jenni, pack the stuff, we're going to
Arizona. " . . . He [ the acquaintance ] was like, "man,
you're, you're a pro at this shit. " And I just, I
don't know what it was. I was number one. . . . I
don't know, I loved it.
Since selectivity in the recruitment process is virtually
non-existent and the recruits are inexperienced, the
socialization process is both emphasized and effective.
Generally, new agents are provided with a script and a
list of responses (rebuttals) to consumer resistance and
immediately placed on the phones.

Although some companies

provide training, it is usually iri the context of being
coached during the initiation process.

The managers hold

daily sales meetings to inspire the sales agents.
Sometimes, inspirational speakers such as Zig Ziegler and
others are brought in to help train the sales agents to be
more effective closers.

In reality, owners and managers

emphasize that the recruits are being paid on commission,
which acts as a form of self-motivation.

In other words,

they need to find a way to close the deals in order to get
paid.
55

The execution of the pitch does not begin and end with
the scripted pitch.

Rather, the sal es agents are given

latitude to use their own unique skills.

Often, the

managers suggest that newer sales agents observe some of
the more experienced and successful agents.

It is known by

management, albeit unacknowledged, that the exemplary
agents deviate from the script in order to get resul ts.

As

noted by Hobbs (1995) and Winlow (2001), the infl uence of
others is remarkably similar in criminal telemarketing to
what is known about the criminal careers of street
criminals, particularly those who go on to pursue crime
with a high degree of skil l and success.

Having received

guidance from successful closers, the sal es agents soon
learn to act on their own initiative and employ a more
personal style in order to increase sales.
Managers of criminal firms motivate their sales agents
in other ways as wel l.

Law enforcement officials, for

example, have said that,
sel lers often have mirrors in the cubicles in
which they work. They are told to look into the
mirror and see the face of a hot-shot
sal esperson. Sometimes there wil l be a motto on
the wal l, such as : "Each No gets me closer to the
Yes I want. " Boiler room owners and managers . .
. may put large bil ls on a bul letin board and say
that the next sa le or the highest total for the
day wil l qualify for this extra reward. Often
the sales people have to stand up when they
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consummate a transaction, so that the boss can
note them and they can take pleasure in the
achievement (Doocy et al. , 2 002 : 171 -72 ).
Sales agents not only receive recogni tion for
successful transactions from management and colleagues
but also develop a spirit of competi tion.

Several

agents referred to their competitive nature as a
driving force.

As one subject told me,

You could be selling a $10 thousand ticket, you
could be selling a $49. 95 ticket. And it's the
same principle, it's the same rules. I t's the
same game. I like to win. I like to win in all
the games I play, you know. And the money is a
reason to be there, and a reason to have that
job. But winning is what I want to do. I want
to beat everybody else in the of fice. I want to
beat that person I am talking to on the phone.
Several of the subjects said that use of cocaine and
other drugs increases their hunger for money and makes them
less concerned about how they get it.

Owners sometimes

encourage drug use by their employees because this causes
the lat ter to run through their earnings quickly,
necessitating a return to the telephone :
You know, i t's a weird philosophy I have on sales, and
you probably won't like it. But I'm intelligent
enough to know that i t works. And I - - the best
salesmen in the world are compulsive people that are
easily addicted. To be a great salesman you can't be
complacent. You can't be comfortable in your
surroundings. I started to realize the best salesmen
were the salesmen that got paid on Friday, that had
that money spent on Monday.
' Cause they would perform
Monday through Friday. I f the guy saved his money and
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was like me, I didn't l ike him because eventually he
wasn't gonna work for me, he was gonna work for
himself. So I either have drugs or girls around, a
lot of women that would make sure these guys went
through their money, you know, those type of girls.
Do you understand what I'm saying?
The principle upon which criminal telemarketers stimulate
their members to work is a reflection of what occurs in
thelarger society; they encourage their members to funnel
their "earnings" into the "economy" and the resulting debt
requires a commitment to work.

Management and Accountability

To the unsuspecting, the day-to-day activities of a
criminal telemarketing operation may be indistinguishable
from a legitimate business.

Therein lies a major reason

for its criminal potential, its success, and its appeal;
criminal telemarketing lends itself easily to respectable
constructions of organizational and individual activities.
Both its illicit nature and individual culpability can be
managed behind an organizational front and shared
rhetorical scripts.
During the interviews, most of the subjects continued
to hide behind these scripts as they expressed awareness
only of their particular positions and responsibilities.
58

The sub jects denied personal respons ib il ity and asserted
that any potent ial wrong-doing must be the fault of others
in the organizat ion.

Generally, the owners stated that the

managers were in charge of oversight while the sales agents
claimed near-complete ignorance of the operat ion.

The

managers , pr imarily respons ible for ensuring that the
company made money, contended that the sales agents must
h ave dev iated from the scripts w ithout the ir knowledge.

Criminal Operations

Figure 3 . 2 depicts the management and accountab ility

structure of larger cr iminal telemarketing f irms.

The

solid lines denote direct superv is ion wh ile the broken
lines indicate direct communication w ithout str ict
accountability.

The owners enlist the serv ices of managers

to run the organization and implement their cr im inal plans.
The organizational des ign not only fac il itates fraud for
prof it and at the same time s·erves to protect indiv iduals
The accountab ility structure

against cr im inal implication.

of their organizat ions is suff ic iently diffuse to allow the
var ious part icipants to deny personal respons ib ility for
wrong do ing and deflect blame.
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Generally, the owners g ive full responsibil ity for the
organ ization to the managers, providing them with a s ingle
controll ing mandate:

maxim ize prof it.

While the owners

secure lead lists and are involved in the development of
scr ipts and " inspirational " devices, interv iews and s ite
visits reveal that they are less involved in the daily
act iv ities of the operation.

Having hired someone to

oversee the employees, the owners can lay claim that they
are not personally responsible for the actions of
ind iv idual workers.
The managers ' primary respons ibility is to train and
motivate the sales agents.

They accomplish this task by

pressur ing the sales agents, recogniz ing those that "sell, "
and creating a culture of competit ion as d iscussed above.
Although the managers are technically in charge of all of
the sales agents, they give more latitude to closers and
exerc ise v irtually no control over reloaders and recovery
agents.

In fact, the managers promote agents that produce

results and have little need for d irection.

The verifiers

in cr im inal organizations also are not superv ised by the
managers; their role is to get the customers to deny on
tape that any false prom ises were made by the sales agents.
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While on the surface it appears that the managers and
sales agents would be held strictly responsible for any
wrong doing, thus shi elding the owner, the structure
permits the sales agents to deny accountability as well .
The sales agents are provided with substantial discretion
on how they decide_ to employ the scripts .

They are

encouraged by the manager to inj ect sales pitches with
their own personal styles and pick up tips by watching
other agents .

The manager's endorsement of the sales

agents ' "creativity, " however, is off the record.

The

managers defend that they simply cannot listen in on every
call and thus, it is up to the agents not to cross the line
between good salesmanship and deceit .
For their part, the sales agents contend that they
simply work from the scripts provided and suggest that if
the company is produc ing the products they are pedaling,
then there is no wrong doing .

Meanwhile, closers deal with

consumers that have already expressed an interest in the
product or service and reloaders engage with repeat
customers with whom they have developed a personal
relationship .

As a result, the closers and reloaders are

less likely to have complaints as their clients .

The

repeat customers are even less li kely to complain as
62

evidenced by their continued commitment to the company.
Likewise, recovery agents receive few complaints as they
set out to satisfy aggrieved customers and actually fulfill
their promises, although still defrauding them .
While a few individuals admitted guilt, most of the
research subjects hid behind the organizational front and
limited their knowledge and responsibility to their
particular positions in the operation.

The interviews of

subjects working for XYZ Company referenced above exemplify
how the scenario is played out within an organization.
Interviews were conducted with a managing partner, silent
partner, sales manager, closer, and two sales agents.

From

top to bottom, they all asserted that they were providing a
viable service.

The managing partner and sales manager

defended the system and placed any blame for the alleged
fraud on the sales agents. The silent partner also felt
that fault would have to lie with the agents as he
" believed" that the business itself was legitimate in
concept.
The sales agents and the closer, nicknamed " The
Hammer, " defended the service as ardently as the managers
and placed blame on the consumers.

In other words, it was

the fault of the "sellers" if they misinterpreted what the
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service provided.

The sales agents contended that i f there

were problems with the business, it would have to be the
responsibility o f the owners and manager .

In other words,

they were doing nothing other than presenting the scripts.
However, the agents maintained the legitimacy o f the
service and their practices suggesting that they were j ust
doing what sales people do every day in society.

It is

interesting to note that the silent partner was convicted
under the concept of willful blindness.

Willful blindness

is a legal concept that suggests that a person knowingly
turns a blind eye to the wrong-doing of others under his or
her control .
In order to see the organizations in practice, I made
visits to three legitimate telemarketing firms and two
allegedly illegitimate firms .

An acquaintance that had

been in t e l emarketing for 18 years a l l owed me to observe
her company ' s operation and set up on-site interviews for
me with the owner and manager of two additional legitimate
firms.

I also had the opportunity to visit two

telemarketing firms that authorities suspected were
fraudulent and speak with a manager and some o f the
employees.

The owners of the two presumably criminal

operations advertised in the local newspaper.
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I wanted to

see how legitimate telemarketers handled the potential for
fraud and whether or not the fraudulent operations were
transparent .
The first business site was in a seedy area of town
and was located near a strip club and sex shop .

. The

windows on the outside of the office were shaded with cheap
material akin to that of inexpensive shading wrap that
teenagers sometimes place on the windows of cars .

The

reception area was noticeably separated from the phone room
itself .

The receptionist summoned an assistant manager, a

young female, to talk to me.

I asked the manager if it

would be all right to see the operation and she escorted me
to the sales room.
We sat down in her cubicle and she immediately began
to explain the sales agent positions and pay structure.
She stated that the agents "make $15 on the first sale of
the week, $2 5 on the second, $50 on the third, $50 + $100
bonus on the fourth, and then $50 for each sale
thereafter. "
$1, 000 a week.

She went on, '' [ G ] ood salesmen make about a
There are 3 reloaders which make triple

that, but someone has to die before you can move into one
of those positions. "

They also had an order verifier.

manager explained that it was a mail-out operation where
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The

consumers receive a postcard from the company notifying
them that they have won an award.

Upon calling in, the

consumers were told that they won one of our prizes, which
included a car, a trip, an entertainment system, and a
$ 1500 cash award.

This allowed the sales agents to make a

pitch for the products they were selling.
In addition to the owner, the organization had 2
managers, 1 secretary, and about 40 employees.

The owner

was usually on site from 7 am to 2 pm (in his private
office) but was on one of his twice-daily runs to the post
office during the time I visited.

The products they were

selling included magnetic business cards, key rings, and
pens at a cost of $ 498.50 (per package of 100).

Products

were delivered and checks received within 72 hours via
overnight mail.
want.

The manager stated, " [ D ] ress however you

You never have to meet with the clients.

wil l meet with them if necessary."

The owner

She looked at me and

stated, " I can see that you are a positive person.

You

would make a lot of sales."
The cubicles were very small and had what appeared to
be plywood make-shift walls covered . with a carpet-type
material .

The desks also were made of plywood propped up

on the walls with slanted two-by-fours holding them in
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place.

Each cubicle had a phone and whatever items the

sales agents placed within them.

There was music playing

and constant talk between the workers while those actively
on the phone took orders from customers that had called in
response to the postcard naming them as award winners.
Some of the employees voluntarily approached me to
talk about the job.

One male agent with long hair and a

beard told me how easy it was, "I took half a dozen orders
in 15 minutes. "

Another with glasses and a dirty shirt,

smiled and nodded in agreement as he ate some pizza.

A

third male agent, who appeared unkempt, walked out of his
cubicle and broadly declared, \\ [ M ] aking money.

That's what

I'm all about. "
The agents appeared to have control over the hours
they worked.

For instance, an older male came out of his

cubicle and announced that he decided that he was done for
the day.

"Gonna get a [ motorcycle ] ride in. "

During the

entire time, the sales agents listened intently for their
phones to ring and somehow were able to determine when it
was the distinctive ring of their particular telephones.
Several of the female agents remained in their cubicles for
the most part and did not engage in conversation, but
livened up when the phone rang.
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The manager proceeded to provide more information

about the operation.

She told me that the agents work from

a script and there is a four- hour training session,

" [ S ] omeone assists you on the phones during your first

morning. "

"And," she continued, "don ' t worry, you ' ll learn

all ot the rebuttals.

Like if a guy says, ' I ' ll have to

Well, would your wif e be upset with you if

ask my wif e. '

you won $1,500 ? "

I asked her how they could afford to

give away so many prizes and she explained that the trips

are the most common prize and "the packages were purchased
for $30 each as some promotion for the vacation industry. "

The owner did not return during my visit so I left my cell

phone number for him to contact me.

He never did.

At the second site, the employee in the reception area

appeared a bit more guarded and although she talked to me
about the operation, she did not allow me to enter the

sales room.

She spoke in terms of the positions available

(sales agents) and stated that good agents often made over

$1,000 a week.

The operation consisted of marketing

products for several diff erent companies, which were not
named.

The employe e simply ref erred to it as a customer

service based enterprise.

She emphasized the need for

"good communication skills and the ability to deal with
68

rejection, yet maintain persistence. "

The interview was

cut short as the owner finally entered and suggested that
he did not have time to meet with me.

I provided him with

my cell phone number so that he could reschedule at a time
more convenient, but he never contacted me.
Outside of the office, I had the opportunity to speak
with some of the sales agents.

One engaged me in

conversation, asking where I was from.

I told him that I

was a graduate student from Tennessee.

He went on to tell

me that he was in college but dropped out and was thinking
of returning, but just has not found the time or desire.
He proceeded to tell me that he was presently working and
"just partying for a while.

. making some money, trying

not to work too hard, you know. "

I asked him how he liked

working in telemarketing and he replied, " [ N ] ot bad
I

Don't gotta answer to anybody, and the money's good. "
then inquired if it was a pretty nice place to work.
responded, "Hell no, it's a shit-hole, man. "

He

He stated

that he comes outside just to get out of his cubicle for a
while.

I mentioned that it looked nice in the front and he

went on, "Yeah, it's pretty fuckin' sweet, but we don't
hang up front.

That's for the big man. "
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By th is time two others came out of the bu ild ing and
j o ined in the conversation.

They started talking about

work and one of them asked me if I was interested in
getting a j ob .

I told him that I never really thought

about working in telemarketing.

The other agent then

echoed the comments of the f irst agent, stating that the
work is easy and the money is good .
is it that you do ? "

I asked, "What exactly

He repl ied, " You just call people up

and tell them you have th is really good fuckin ' deal, sell
' em some sh it, and they say ' okay ' and you get a 2 5 percent
cut of the check. "

When I asked what they were sell ing he

replied , "A bunch of sh it; pens, key chains, sh it like
that. "

I inquired, " You guys make a lot of money ? "

same agent responded,
bucks . "

The

" Fuck yeah, last week I made 1, 500

The first guy nodded his head and simply sa id, "We

do al l right. "

At that point, they started ta lking about

some "chick " that just started working there and whether or
not she was "hot. "

At that po int, I dec ided to leave to

get to my next appo intment .
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Legit i mat e Operat ions

The management and accountability structure of legitimate

telemarketing firms stood in stark contrast to that of the
criminal operations.

One of the five legitimate

telemarketers I interviewed was the President/CEO of a

large network of telemarketing firms.

He provided me with

a model of his entire organization; the section of the flow
chart that applies to call centers is replicated in Figure
3.3.

There are several other aspects of this operation

that supply services and products, develop advertising, and

take care of other corporate matters.

When asked how he avoids fraud, the CEO replied, "I

do not try to avoid fraud purposely, but rather I do not
provide the incentives that would lead to f raud. "

He

contended that criminal telemarketers "are set up for

fraud.

. They use an outbound calling approach and

hire anyone off the street interested in making money. "

His company works on an inbound basis only where agents do

not cold call consumers, but rather the company advertises

and interested consumers call into the business.

It is a

consumer-based business that provides services and products

such as hospitality packages and cell phones, using
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catalogues and infomercials "to stimulate consumer
interest. "

He stated that it is important to avoid

"miracle drugs" selling.

In other words, his company does

not sell "worthless products based on false promises. "

He

added, " [ W ] e're not selling widgets here . "
The CEO wants the operations to last, whereas "raucous
firms with insincere personnel will only last 6 to 8 months
and then break up before resurfacing under another name. "
He believes the inbound approach provides a more consistent
and stable environment, which will lead to longevity of the
firm.

He also purposely sets up call centers in small

towns where there is an increased "quality of labor" due to
the lack of other economic opportunity.
The CEO asserted that to be successful, " [ M ] anagement
needs to set up an incentive policy to get results but not
to create temptation. "

He continued, " [ T ] he more sales an

agent makes, the more monitoring [ s / he ] receives. "

When I

asked him if the fact that his sites are somewhat remote
creates an oversight problem, he contended that it does not
"as long as [ they ] employ decent management and provide an
appropriate base salary with little variable compensation. "
The CEO also stressed the importance of non-material
considerations.

" [ T ] his is not done just to prevent fraud
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but rather to develop lasting working relationships with
the employees by balancing their lifestyles. "

He noted

that the company draws from a completely different employee

base as "small town citizens are generally content with a
base salary, benefits , and job stability. ll

Although he

asserted that he has never had any problems with deception
by his employees, he admitted that there have been three

cases of credit card fraud, which were immediately reported
to the police.

The sales agents are directly managed by coaches , mid

level supervisors.

Each coach is in charge of ten customer

service representatives (sales agents).

The agents make

$7 . 25 an hour ($22,000 annually) and the coaches make a

base salary of $9 an hour ($25,000 annually).

The

supervisors oversee the coaches and monitor the number of

cal ls per number of agents and draw a somewhat higher

salary.

The sales agents are trained by an independent

team of individuals, trainers who do not have a direct

pecuniary interest in the outcomes of transactions.
The call center managers are responsible for

overseeing the entire local operation, which includes a

human resources department and administrative and technical

staff.

The call centers fall under the authority of the
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vice president of the business unit and the site managers
report directly to that office.

Additionally, corporate

executives visit the call centers often for the purpose of
stimulating interest, motivating the employees, and
auditing the center for quality.

In the end, there is no

uncertainty with respect to the responsibility of
individual actors.

There are several layers of oversight

as well as open communication at all levels of the
operation.
When I asked the CEO about regulations, he stated that
"regulatory agencies do not have much of a presence .
least telemarketers are not aware of it.
what makes sense. "

At

. We just do

He suggests that the regulations might

be too stringent and indicated that he would be curious to
see if his company was in compliance if he had the time.
The CEO also stated that he is astonished about how much
fraudsters know about regulations as evidenced by the fact
that they hire attorneys.
fence. "

" They have to be riding the

He suspects that criminal telemarketers hire

attorneys at the outset in order to have the attorneys
suggest that they appeared legitimate should they get
caught.
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As noted above, I visited the operations of three
legitimate telemarketing firms.
large corporate business center.

The first site was in a
The operation consisted

of outbound phone sales, marketing a wide variety of
products on behalf of business clients.

The managers ran

the entire operation and reported to regional executives.
The extensive phone room was spacious and contained
approximately 50 semi- private cubicles.

The employees '

individual work areas were nicely furnished and
personalized and provided sufficient privacy to conduct
business.

The operation did not have "closers " but did

have two assistant managers and five verifiers on site at
all times.

While the assistant managers spent most of

their time on the floor with the sales agents, the
verifiers continually monitored sales transactions from
thei r o f f ices.
The managers and other supervisory staff had glass
offices that surrounded the sales floor and I noticed
several sales agents walk into and out of these offices.
There appeared to be open communication between sales
agents and the supervisors.

The agents were nicely dressed

and had access to a semi- lavish lounge to socialize during
breaks.

Although I did not have the opportunity to
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interview the manager at length, she related an approach
similar to that of the CEO cited above, stating that there
were multiple tiers of supervision and accountability.
The second site visit was to a company that conducts
business with other businesses with total transactions per
company ranging from $15, 000 to $10, 000, 000 annually.

It

was located in a business development that was not as large
as the corporate center of the first site.

The owner

stated that he started selling on his own while a student
in college and eventually had too much business to handle
alone.

As a result, he asked friends if they wanted to .

help out and then built up the business over the next six
years.

By the age 31, his company was making $1, 4000, 000

in profits annually.

While it was not as large, nor as

elaborate as the large firm, the owners "take care of [ our ]
employees by providing them with stability, benefits, and
comfort."

The cubicles were filled with employees '

personal items , which according to the owner, "suggests
that they plan to stay."
The agents are paid to find other businesses to
purchase liquidator assets.

That is, they generate leads

and attempt. to sell the assets of smaller businesses to
larger ones.

The product is a lead report and its value is
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based upon whether or · not the agents can make a viable
connection between liquidating business and potential
purchasers .

The owner contended that agents need to be

well aware of all aspects of the businesses in order to
make a sale.

All calls are tape-recorded and clients may

listen to the tapes should they have any questions about
the sales transaction.

About half of the sales agents have

baccalaureate degrees.

The owners search for employees

with "inquisitive minds and good communication skills. "
The organization is hierarchical, consisting of
owners, directors, managers, senior associates, and
associates.

There are approximately 33 employees in the

sales department with 9 support staff, providing an
approximate 1 to 3 support to sales ratio.

The owner

asserted that the large support to sales ratio creates more
effective communication because it helps keep the
associates abreast of the necessary information.

According

to the owner, " [ F ] raudsters generally provide no support
because they don't market a real product and don't want to
deliver anything of value. "
The owner suggested that fraudsters "try to convince
victims to buy when they don't need the products, " whereas
the associates in " [ his ] company are more like detectives
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trying to f igure out who needs the products . "

In other

words , his agents are not sellers , but rather reporters of
the facts .

He asserted that " if they [ fraudsters ] really

had a v iable product, then they would have more support and
commun ication . "

The owner believes that the h igh ratio of

support staff to associates in his f irm "provides qual ity
assurance , helps w ith superv ision of the operat ion , and
. increases retention of employees. "
Associates make from $26, 000 to $32, 000 as well as
bonuses and benef its .

The informant promises h is employees

"good working conditions rather than money only . "

He

contends that th is nets a staff w ith " more commitment to
the company and less potential for fraud . "

The owner

continued , " [ I ] t ' s necessary to create an honest culture
and use screen ing as a constra int against potent ial fraud .
Prov iding money as the only incentive is in itself an
incent ive to commit fraud . "

He stated that h is company has

re ta ined its c l ient base as we l l as 9 5 % of the employees
over the years .

When I asked him if he adheres to

regulations , the owner admitted he was not wel l informed
about them , but suggested that "regulations can be too
str ict at times such as the fact that you need the consent
of two parties to record calls . "
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The third site visit was to a relatively small
telemarketing firm that was located in a relatively remote
area still in the process of development for use by other
The office was very plush with an attractive

businesses.

lounge that the employees used both for business meetings
and daily socializing.

The top section of the employees '

cubicles were made of glass on one side purportedly to "aid
in the flow of communication . "
The main product is documentary videos that are
educational about increasing production in the workplace .
The videos are based on the fish philosophy, which is the
brainchild of a fish company in the Northwest that
emphasizes good working conditions and rapport with
customers.

The workplace is very comfortable and sociable,

reflecting the philosophy of the products the agents sell .
The company made approximately $15 mill ion in 2 000 after an
increase of about 50% annually during the prior three
years.

There are 40 people in the company and only 11

sales people.

The manager stated that they are very

selective about who they choose to interview for positions
with the company and only 5 to 7 interviews are conducted
every three months .
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Accord ing to the manager, sales agents make upwards to
%50, 000 and also rece ive benef its, j ob stab ility, and good
work ing condit ions.
It would be easy for employees to make other cho ices
and make more money, but they won ' t because they en joy
the qual ity of life that we provide them. The goal is
to up-sel l, but they [the agents ] are not selling
someth ing that they don ' t be i ieve in. I would have to
know it has value. . . . It is important to mainta in
who they are as a person [ of integr ity ] when engaged
w ith cl ients.
This last comment echoed that of another leg it imate
telemarketer I interviewed.

He claimed that he "did not

like who [ he ] became when he was a pol ice off icer for 8
years, but did l ike who he was as a telemarketer because he
believed in what he was doing. "
When I asked the manager if ma intain ing th is type of
organ izational culture would slow prof its, she responded,
Our sales are based on in tegri ty sel l ing versus frauds
who are all about money. . . . We have even cont inued
to exper ience an increase in prof it after 9 -11
because we emphasize qual ity of l ife rather than
money. . . . We also put money back into the company
and employee benefits rather than spend it on drugs
and cars like them [ frauds ] .
The manager went on to suggest that integrity is an
aberration in sales but that "9-11 [terrorist attacks ] has
consumers reth inking the process. "

She also stated that

the company was adverse to the label sales.
are not sales agents but rather i dea agen ts. "
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" Our agents

The manager as serted that the variou s divi sion s in the
company are "fully integrated and in con stant communication
so that each person is fully aware of the other s '
re spon sibilities. "

When I asked about the importance of

regulatory agencie s to thi s field , she replied , " I am not
very aware of any regulatory agencie s.
pre sent. "

They are not really

She stated that she doe s not feel the need to

educate organizational employee s about regulation s becau se
"we believe we are following whatever regulation s may exi st
and we ' re doing okay. .

[ S ] o it ' s better to gain

forgivene s s than permi s sion. "

However , she admitted that

they would be more reactionary if they were audited.

Contextual Comparison

Criminal telemarketer s do not deve lop model s of their
operation s for external review.

In order to illuminate

more fully the management and accountability structure of
crim inal telemarketing firms , it i s helpful to draw a
comparison between legitimate and illegitimate
organization s [Figure 3 . 4 ] .

As noted in Chapter 1 , change s

in the structure of economic and social relation ship s
greatly influence the type of busine s se s that emerge.
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Like their legitimate counterparts, telemarketers organize
their enterprises for profit maximiz ation and are subj ect
to governmental regulation.
Both legitimate businesses and criminal telemarketing
firms have organizational drivers or goals and obj ectives
that act as mechanisms, which shape the design of their
respective organiz ations .

These goals necessitate the

development of an organizational culture - the totality of
formal and informal practices that guide the actions of
employees - designed to fulfill the firms' obj ectives.
Ultimately, the success of the enterprise depends upon the
performance of individual actors and requires an
appropriate incentive structure - individual drivers.
There is a significant difference from the outset :
one entrepreneur desires to conduct a legal business while
the other desires to shield his criminal actions from
detection.

Legitimate organizations not only strive for

profit and growth, but also desire to develop a reputation
as a leader in their chosen fields and garner the respect
of those with whom they do business and the community at
large.

They are likely to comply with regulations, if

aware of them and not cost prohibitive, and plan to
maintain the business for the long term.
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Criminal

telemarketing firms , on the other hand { are in brazen
pursuit of profit and growth is only important if it is
necessary to increase profits.
Although criminal organizations are not respectable ,
they desire the appearance of respectability in order to
better persuade potential customers and perhaps to enhance
their statuses as successful businessmen.

Likewise ,

criminal telemarketers seek to avoid regulatory
constraints , although they comply to the extent that it is
necessary for a potential legal defense.

While the owners

would like to carry on their criminal enterprise until
their greed is satiated , they are content with making as
much money as possible in the present before moving on.
As a result of the difference in the organizational
drivers of legitimate and illegitimate firms , especially in
light of criminal telemarketers ' additional goal of
avoiding criminal responsibility , their respective
organizational cultures are easily distinguishable.
Legitimate firms have a strict authority structure and thus
its members are held accountable according to their
position in the established hierarchy.

The discretion that

employees may exercise is limited by their specified roles ,
which are often detailed in writing.
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The owners and

managers encourage employees to take pride in working for
the organization and provide non-material as well as
material benefits, such as nice working conditions and
health insurance.
By contrast, criminal telemarketing firms have a loose
authority structure where the liability of each employee is
set according to his or her position.

No one is held

strictly responsible for others allowing the participants
to deny accountability for others' actions despite the fact
that they are acting in furtherance of organizational
objectives.

Wide discretion is purposely awarded to

members in the operation so that they can pursue the single
goal of increasing profit.

There is no pride in working

for the firm but rather individual achievement is
acknowledged, often resulting in competition between the
agents within the organ i zation.

F inal ly, a person ' s

success is determined by how much money s /he makes and
there are no non -material incentives .
As a result of the dif ference in organizational
cultures established by the two types of firms, the
interests of the individual workers vary substantially .
Employees in legitimate operations desire job security,
financial stability, health benefits and other perks (e. g. ,
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vacation and retirement), and quality working conditions.
They also take pride in their performance on behalf of the
company with the intent of being recognized and moving up
in the organization.

By contrast, fraudulent telemarketers

are primarily interested in financial gain, potential for
moving into more lucrative positions, and limited personal
They do not work on behalf of the firm but

restrictions.

instead compete against co-workers for individual
recognition.

In fact, many of the owners interviewed went

into competition with their previous employers.
While criminal telemarketers set up operations to
mirror legitimate businesses, the inner workings of the
fraudulent organizations differ significantly in their
management and accountability structures.

Their

similarities begin and end with the goal of making a
profit.

The fraudsters are organized with the dual goals

of maximizing profit and defending themselves against
criminal responsibility.

The specialized roles in criminal

organizations, including management, are developed for the
sole purpose of making money rather than supervision and
accountability.

The interconnectedness of its constituents

is purposely diffuse to promote the use of each
individual's criminal ingenuity toward enhancing profits
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and, at the same time, guarding against individual
responsibility.
It is apparent that criminal telemarketers design
their organizations to facilitate large- scale fraud .
However, the actual fraud committed upon the public is
carried out via person-to- person interaction .

As the next

chapter reveals, there is more to fraud than " puf fery" and
" pushing the envelope" in sales transactions.
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Chapter 4
THE INTERACTION PROCESS

Although a product of its organiz ational design, the crux
of telemarketing fraud occurs at the interpersonal level.
Thus, it is important to analyze the interaction process

between the offenders and victims from a social

psychological perspective.

The extant literature on script

theory informs as to the underlying process upon which

people interact in social situations.

Generally, script

theory proposes that individuals act and react in social

situations within the context of sets of expectations based
on a learned way of doing things over time.

Criminal

telemarketers operate within the general framework of

common societal scripts and then manipulate the process in

order to perpetrate fraud.

By creating a definition of the situation based on

deceit, fraudsters capitalize on the inherent ambiguity in

stranger-to- stranger interactions by casting the victim in
a desired identity.

As a result, the "relationships"

discussed in this section are all based on deception
although terms similar to sincere relationships are

utilized.

The interview data, victim depositions, and
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trial transcr ipts reveal how offenders and v ict ims interact
and how they perce ive one another during sales
transact ions.
Social Psychology of Interaction

In examin ing the negot iated order between two or more
individuals in interact ion , Thomas (1928) developed the
construct of "the def in ition of the situation. "

He

contends that subject ive def initions of s ituations must
enter into any account of human behavior because ident ical
situations do not always lead to the same behav ior (Thomas ,
192 8 )

In other words , situations do not merely exist in

static form , but rather are defined by the ind iv iduals in
the interaction process.

Consequently , var iat ion in the

outcomes of situat ions results from indiv idual variat ion in
the defin it ions situations and subsequent adjustive
efforts , which ult imately leads to dec is ions on act ion
( Stryker , 1980) .
Script theorists suggest that the human mind is
analogous to a computer that processes a great deal of
social informat ion in the most eff ic ient manner possible
(Abelson 19 76 , 1981).

Because indiv iduals are cont inually

inundated w ith social information , they are selective in
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what is notic ed, remembered, or inferred from a variety of
situations (Backman, 1985 ; Markus, 197 7 ).

This leads to

the development of cognitive structures and scripts that
provide frameworks for the interpretation of situations or
events that are based on general knowledge of human action
and knowledge of specific events (Abelson, 1981).
Cognitive scripts are based on the variety of
experiences of an individual, which are learned as
vignettes that are integral to efficient decision -making
(Abelson, 197 6).

Individuals draw on cognitive scripts to

interpret social situations by selecting a script ·
representative of the present situation and adopting a
particular role from the script that is consistent with his
or her expectations of situational outcomes .

Script

selection and role taking provides individuals with
cognitive frameworks for behavioral decision -making, while
requiring less cognitive effort than original framing for
each situation ( Abelson, 197 6).
Goffman (1959) suggests that people assign one another
categorical identities, based on past experience, one
another ' s appearance and conduct, and the setting where
they interact .

Couch (198 9) refers to these

categorizations as functi onal i den ti ti es or typi fi ed
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ac t i ons that suggest what will be expected of each per�on
and what they can expect from one another during th e
interaction.

To the extent that those expectations are

fulfilled, people engage in recurrent patterns of
int eraction and construct lasting forms of social
relationships .

The assignment of categorical id entities

serves to activate social relationships, however activation
is not automatic, nor inevitable.
Goffman (1959 ) likens the actions of individuals to
performances in a drama .

He contends that individuals seek

information about others during int eraction in order to
better define and negotiate situations .

Pertinent

information is based on ob j ective characteristics such as
indicators of status and sub j ective characteristics that
are verbally communicated .

This enables th e individual to

bet t er form h i s or her percep t i on of the interac t i on and to
anticipate responses in the situation .

The interpr etation

of information is based on prior experiences with similar
individuals and th e consistency or inconsistency of the
present information with those prior experi enc es (Goffman,
1959 )
Couch (19 89 ) suggests that individua ls '
identifications of on e another may not correspond and
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consequently the results may lead to confusion and
conflict.

Even when the identifications do correspond,

confusion and conflict can result from different
perceptions of the form of the relationship under the
attending circumstances.

Also, individuals may alter their

identities and thus the form of the relationship.

As a

result, social relationships are as flexible and fragile as
the interactions that perpetuate them (Cahill, 1995).
Some scripts may be used to meet the needs of an
individual, rather than to interpret or negotiate the
situation generally (Schank and Abelson, 197 7 ).

In this

instance, the individual may act to invoke scripts that are
personalized, less stylized and may lead to difficulties in
interpretation for others in the interaction (Schank and
Abelson, 197 7 ; Ross and Nisbet, 1991).

The discontinuity

between accepted scripts may be used as techniques of
manipulation to lure individuals into an interaction that
they do not recognize as deceptive (Schank and Abelson,
197 7).

Such use is deceptive because participants in

situations where personal scripts are used often are not
aware of their role in the scripted situation (Abelson,
1981).

While the personal scripts have a similar structure

to the general situat ional scripts, they are based solely
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on the experiences of the individual who typically has used
these techniques to meet similar past needs (Schank and
Abelson , 1977 ) .
Impression management is one of the key elements for
success in sales.

During the interaction , the salespersons

must convey confidence in the definition of the situation
they present in order to facilitate the perception of
reality in others (Goffman, 1959 ) .

This confidence must be

presented in the front stage region of the interaction ,
which necessitates the use of props (e.g., expensive
clothing, briefcases , and mannerisms ) .

Thus, the

presenters need engage in high levels of impression
management based on cultural stereotypes (Goffman, 1959 :
28)
The management of doubt is another important dynamic
in many soci al settings, especi ally sales.

Wiley ( 19 9 8 )

contends that salespersons actively attempt to influence
customers into suspending their doubt about their need for
some product in order to make a sale .

In other words, the

salesperson attempts to reduce the suspicions held by the
customer and draw him into a commodity drama.

As a result ,

the customer is faced with the need to express some type of
identity with respect to the purchase.
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In essence , how he

proceeds becomes a self-defining moment.

In an attempt to

get the customers to put off their doubt about the
purchase, the salespersons point out the potential rewards,
which must include appeals to some need of the consumer
(Wiley, 1998) .

Telemarketing Sales

One of the interview subjects stated that when he was
initially recruited, he read the script and asked, " [ H ] ow
do you tell people this story and get them to buy over the
phone when you have never met them?"

Advancement in

technology, specifically telecommunications, not only
permits telemarketers to reach countless potential
consumers, but also facilitates manipulation in the
interaction process.

Communicating with someone over the

telephone helps to remove certain barriers to making a
connection that otherwise would prove problematic in
person.

For example, telemarketers need not present an

impressive personal appearance or business setting.
Most important, contact via telephone allows a
salesperson to create an identity of his or her choosing,
which facilitates control of the communication between the
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part ies.

While it takes more time and effort to develop a

strong rapport over the phone, there is also the benef it of
the fact that other stimul i, wh ich may serve to d istract
the actors, are blocked out.

This allows the participants

to have more int imate commun ication and thus ult imately
develop a stronger bond.

Compliance Techniques

The pr imary goal of salespersons is to ga in the
compl i ance of consumers.

Compliance cons ists of yield ing

to direct, expl icit appeals meant to produce certa in
behav ior or agreement with a part icular point of view.
Whereas the pressures on a person to conform are generally
implicit and not in the form of direct requests or demands,
compl iance pressures are more overt ( Feldman, 200 1 ) .
According to Feldman, there are four major methods of
fac il itating compl iance in soc ial interaction.
In the foo t-in- the-door techni que, a person is f irst
asked to agree to a small request, but later is asked to
comply with a more important one.

If the person agrees to

the f irst request , compliance with the later, larger
request is cons iderably more l ikely {see Freedman and
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Fraser, 19 6 6).

This method is often successful due to the

commitment of the person of whom the request is made, that
person's self-redefinition, or because the requests make
norms of conduct relevant (Renno, Cialdini, and Kallgren,
1993).

Additionally, if agreement to the requests permits

the attainment of significant personal goals, compliance is
more likely (Gorassini and Olson, 1995).
The door-in-the-face technique is a procedure in which
a large request to which refusal is expected, is followed
by a smaller one.

The belief is that the initial, large

request makes people more receptive to the subsequent
smaller request (see Dillard, 199 1).

This strategy is

often effective due to the exchange of reciprocal
concessions between the person making the request and his
or her target, self-presentational factors (Pendleton and
Batson, 1979), or the existence of perceptual contrast.
The contrast occurs due to the fact that initial exposure
to a very powerful stimulus, causes a subsequent stimulus
to appear less potent than it would if presented by itself
( see Shanab and O'Neill, 1979 ; Cantrill and Seibold, 198 6).
In the process of low-balling, an initial agreement is
reached, but then the seller reveals additional costs.
This usually works because people tend to emphasize the
97

advantages of the deal in order to justify their initial
decision (see Cialdini, 1988) or because a sense of
personal commitment to the salesperson may act to persuade
the person to accept the deal (Burger and Petty, 198 1) .
The that ' s-not-all technique occurs when a customer is
offered a deal at an initial inflated price, and just after
making the offer, the salesperson offers an incentive,
discount, or bonus to clinch the deal (see Burger, 198 6;
Pollock et al. , 1998). As a result, the buyer feels that
s / he is coming out ahead in the transaction .

Fraudulent Transac tions

As social actors, consumers are quite familiar with
the foregoing techniques.

While upon realization they may

dislike that the techniques have been successfully served
to gain their compliance, the consumers can at least place
them in their repertoire of cognitive scripts.

This allows

them to call upon these experiences during similar social
situations in the future.

Unfortunately for consumers,

fraudulent telemarketers have developed their own unique
methods ·of gaining compliance, and as a result these
cognitive scripts are of little assistance.
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Instead of merely employing sales techniques at the
product level, criminal telemarketers begin by manipulating
the societal scripts at the very foundation of social
interaction.

In doing so, criminal telemarketers embrace

certain roles for themselves and cast the victims into
coinciding counter-roles, thereby attributing a desired
identity to the victims [ Figure 4 . 1 ] .

Through this act of

al tercas t ing the victim, the fraudsters successfully

manipulate the script, which facilitates a transaction
ultimately based on fraud and deceit (see Weinstein and
Deutschberger, 1963).
Fraudulent telemarketers initially utilize general
societal norms and values to lay the foundation for a
"relationship" with their victims .

Recall that throughout

this chapter references made to " relationships " and " bonds"
between the fraudsters and victims are based on deception
and thus are not to be interpreted in the true sense of the
words used to describe them.

As the social relationship

advances, the newly created bond requires an advanced set
of norms, which allows the fraudsters to dictate the
For example, norms of

reciprocity of the consumers.

politeness will cause a victim to stay on the phone and are
generally enhanced when the participants become "friends . "
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embrace

Figure 4 . 1 :

Values

( sa l i ent )

The Soc ial Psychology of Fraud

Criminal telemarketers attempt to define and redefine

the situation in order to maintain communication with the

victim as the victim attempts to ascertain the potential

value of participating in the transaction .

Herein lies the

poignancy of the motto articulated in Doocy's ( 200 1) study,
" Each No gets me closer to the Yes I want. "

What the

author of the phrase means is that as long as s/he keeps
the victim on the phone, s/he can redefine the situation
until s/he forges the relationship.

In order words, s/he

continually adjusts the definition of the situation to the

point that the victim perceives its reality, thus adopting

a desired identity and yielding compliance .
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Before they even pick up the phone, however, cr iminal
telemarketers need to select their targets.

They acqu ire

lead l ists that contain names of consumers that have
exp ressed an interest in part icipating in promot ions of one
kind or another in the past.

During the in it ial stage of

the interact ion, fraudsters rely upon norms, such as
pol iteness, wh ich prompt the victims to hear them out.
They act qu ickly in def ining the situat ion by us ing their
best profess ional voice and a name, often a pseudonym, that
sounds soph ist icated.

In furtherance of this impress ion

management, they ident ify themselves as representat ives of
a reputable -sound ing organ izat ion, which g ives the
appearance of legitimacy.

At t imes, criminal telemarketers

will go a step further and try to d ist inguish themselves
from classic telemarketers, usually by making a negative
reference to the latter.
Add itionally, fraudulent telemarketers often will
distance themselves from the company for wh ich they work by
prov id ing " inside informat ion" to the v ict im.

Fo r example,

a fraudster will say someth ing to the effect of, "Accord ing
to company rules, I ' m not supposed to tell you th is, but I
l ike you. "

Th is creates the impress ion that the

telemarketer is sid ing with the vict im aga inst his or her
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own company, which tends to form an al liance between the
fraudster and the victim .

As a result, a greater bond is

formed between the participants and the commitment to
shared norms and values is enhanced .
At some point, the fraudsters take on the role of
beneficent actors, tel ling the victims that they are the
lucky recipients of a remarkable deal.

This is effective

in al tercasting the victims, placing them in the role of
beneficial recipients.

Consequently, the victims

internalize the coinciding norms and continue in the
interaction.

More important, providing gifts to the

victims creates the impression that they owe the
telemarketers a debt.
In furtherance of their criminal pursuits, fraudsters
often wil l attribute some quality to the victim in order to
properly cast him or her into a desired identity.

For

instance, relying on the fact that people are socialized to
take advantage of a good deal, a fraudster may say, " [ N ] ow,
you ' re an intel ligent person.
when you see one, right?

You would know a good deal

Of course you would. "

Consumers

pursuing high self-concept are incl ined to embrace such a
characterization.

In the end, creating a sense of urgency

is the fraudulent telemarketers most potent tool.
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The use

of the telephone helps to ensure urgency as a decision must
be made before the conversation concludes.
time to reflect.

There is no

Otherwise, the victims would have time to

gain relevant information that would allow them to reassess
the script and ultimately the transaction.
Once a fraudster is suc cessful in altercasting the
consumer, creating a sense of debt, and enhancing the
commitment to norms of interaction, s / he may further
develop commonalities with the victim.

This will allow the

fraudster to form a lasting relationship and make similar
contacts with the victim in the future.

In other words,

s/he can call upon the victim and present additional
propositions from time to time in the future .

This will be

perceived as loyalty to the victim resulting from their
new�y created friendship.

Reloaders, for instance, often

will call victims just to chat without talking about any
offers.

This practice allows the fraudsters to further

gain the con fidence of the consumers, plac ing them in line
for repeat victimization.

Criminal telemarketers are most

suc cessful with elderly victims who are isolated and
possibly have diminished intellectual acumen, which
prevents them from reassessing the scripts and sales
transactions .
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The Pitch

One of the subjects who was on parole agreed to assist me

at a presentation to local law enforcement and senior

citizen agencies on telemarketing f raud.

I had him enter

the room before the audience and stay behind a screen so
that he could make a pi t ch to one of the participants.

used telephones as props to make it more realistic, yet

We

both actors spoke out loud so that all in attendance could

listen.

While the purpose of the exercise was to have the

seminar participants assess the caller's character, the

pitch he gave exemplifies the techniques used by fraudulent

telemarketers.

The pitch is paraphrased here.

I have

the technique .

The seminar attendee's responses are

placed comments in brackets to point out various aspects of
italicized.

Good afternoon, Mrs. Smith [ personalized ] , I am
Richard Johnson [ respectable ] with National
Distribution Enterprises [ legitimacy ] . How are you
today? Okay. Good, well your day is about to get
better. Now hold on to your seat because what I have
to tell you is going to make you smile so wide that
you'll be able to eat a banana sideways. You've
probably heard about those telemarketing firms that
got in trouble for not giving away prizes. Well,
we've been commissioned to give away those awards
[ beneficent actor ] and you've been selected to win one
of these valuable prizes [ beneficiary - debt ] .
And last but not least $10,000. Now let me ask you,
if you drew a bad straw and won the last prize on the
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list - the $10, 000 - would you be upset with that?
No. O f course not, what intelligent person would
[ reinforce identity ] ?
Now, Myrtle, may I call you
Myrtle [ relationship advances - enhanced norms ] ? Yes ,
sure. Myrtle, I like you and I hope you don't end up
with just the $10, 000 [ alliance - enhanced loyalty ] ,
but let's see what would happen if you did. And all
you need to do in order to receive your award is to
send $5, 000 for which you will receive a complete set
of professionally crafted personalized items [ the
catch ] � By the way Myrtle, a portion of the proceeds
of these items will be contributed to programs for
inner-city children in your name [ appeal to
humanitarianism ] . Now, let's, well why don't you do
the math? I want you to write this down. Have you
got a pen? Yes . Write down $10, 000 - got that ?
Okay. Now write underneath that $5, 000. Now subtract
what you would send for this worthy cause from the
$10, 000 award. What does that leave you with ?
$5 , 0 0 0. Not bad, huh? Now, all we ask in return is
that you allow us to take a picture of you with the
$10, 000 check.
Notice that very little time is spent talking about
the sale itself.

From an obj ective standpoint it is

difficult to imagine that these pitches work. Of course,
the victim must trust that the caller is going to send the
award.

There is a certain amount of risk decision-making

that the victim engages in, but the sense of urgency does
not give him or her the time to properly analyze the
situation.

Naturally, there are variations not only in the

scheme, but also in the responses of the victims.

That is

why sales agents are often provided with a list of
rebuttals.

They are encouraged to memorize the rebuttals
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so they use them instinctively.

By do ing so, they are

constantly able to adjust and redefine the situat ion.
While fraudulent telemarketers may not understand the
soc ial -psychologi cal underpinnings of the ir pract i ce, they
do know that the techni ques work.

The suc cess of criminal

telemarketers depends upon the individual sk ills of the
sales personnel to manipulate soc ietal scripts in order to
def ine and redefine the situat ion.

As an as ide, the

educated audience stated that the telemarketer beh ind the
screen was a tall, good-look ing, well-dressed, educated man
in his fort ies.

He was none of these.

In fact, he was not

even well-spoken when respond ing to quest ions from the
seminar parti c ipants.

To protect the subject, I stated

that he was not a criminal telemarketer but rather an
acqua intance who was fam iliar with the ir pract i ces.

The Bargain

The products cr iminal telemarketers sell are l imited
only by the human imaginat ion.

They could include magnets

w ith company logos, fad bumper st i ckers, sept i c tank
deodorant, · or widgets.

It really does not matter.

they are really sell ing are the premiums.
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What

Premiums are

prizes that the customer may be awarded if s / he agrees to
purchase a host of "Say No to Drugs" bumper stickers or
whatever product the caller is pedaling.

The customers are

told that they will be awarded a valuable prize, whose
value turns out to have been grossly overestimated, such as
a boom box described as a home entertainment center.
Consequently, the customers are really bargaining for
the awards.

In essence, they are somewhat complicit as

they are trying to get something of greater value than the
money they spend.

The consumers are playing the odds but

the odds are deceiving.

Often, the booby prize is listed

before a more tangible prize that is announced as "last but
not least, " such as the $10, 000 in the above example.

It

is not until the package arrives at their home and that
they realize that they've been taken, yet often the victims
fall for another pitch later on down the line.

Some of the

telemarketing firms hit the victims up for another purchase
before sending the awards and often do not send anything
until the customer calls in to complain.

One victim

recounted her experience when she stated,
[ H ] e called me just about every day during the past
year. We just talked about things we were both
interested in most of the time. Once in a while he
told me that I needed to send more money and that's
why the prize hadn't arrived yet .
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The victim was an 80 -year-old invalid who was taken for

nearly $50,000 and never received anything of real value .
Obviously, the relationships that criminal

telemarketers develop with their victims are not sincere,
nor are they usually long-lasting .

Most sales agents are

primarily interested in completing the present fraudulent
transaction and getting their cut of the check.

While they

often pursue consumers who have been duped in the past by
other companies, it is the victim who sends out signals

about his or her willingness to engage in future
transactions .

This stands in stark contrast to family

businesses that operate on the premise of developing

lasting relationships with their customers and retailers
that develop working relationships that are akin to
acquaintanceships .

In this context, telemarketers may be

described as pl ayers looking for a one - night stand.

Reloaders are the most eff ective players as they are known

for their ability to make a "booty call " to the same

victim (s).
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Subj ec ts ' Perspec tives

The ability to manipulate customers was one of the primary
rewards that the fraudulent telemarketers suggested kept
them attracted to telemarketing.
It was the money, but it was [ also ] the ability to
control people, to be able to say over the phone,
"John, go pick up your pen and write this down." And
you write it down ! · You do exactly like a robot - 
they would do exactly what they were told to do. And
they would do it pleasingly, they would do it without
hesitation, because, again, they had enough confidence
and faith in you to believe that you were gonna do the
right thing about it.
Most of the interview subj ects took similar delight and
pride in their ability to control their victims.

They were

extremely confident in their ability to make the sale.
Several commented that they were "the best."

While

questioning one of the interview subj ects about any
dislikes of the business, I suggested that daily rej ection
might be one.

She stated that she does not deal with

rej ection on a daily basis.
sales. I don ' t let them. "

" People do not rej ect my
Another referred to himself as

a "verbal assassin."
While fraudulent telemarketers all have their own
unique talents and beliefs as to what makes them good at
sales, there is a consensus that good sales require the
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ability to " push the envelope " between creative
representation and blatant misrepresentation.
referred to as the gray line and puffery.

This was

The subjects are

under the impression that it is okay to be creative as long
as they do not state a blatant lie .

For example, interview

subjects that worked for the XYZ Company referenced
earlier, contended that suggesting they "have buyers
interested in property just like that of the seller" is
different than saying that they " have a buyer for the
seller ' s property. "

The subjects also defended the use of

urgency - interested sellers must call within 72 hours - as
simply "good sales practice. "
Several agents suggested that it was their job "to
convince the consumer of what [ s /he ] needed. "

One of the

subjects suggested, however, that there is a difference
between dealing with businessmen versus housewives .

"For

businessmen, I merely present their options and let them
make a decision.

They are holding all the cards. "

Whereas

with housewives, he stated that it is his " job to convince
them. "

The subject was unable to articulate the difference

in profile, but alluded to a perceived difference in
intelligence, which might reflect gender biases.
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The subj ects also contend that creating the impression
that customers are getting a great deal for relatively
little in return is simply good sales practice.
subj ects put it this way:

One of the

" [ T ] he key is to have the

customer step over the line without actually having to say
the dirty words."

During subsequent interviews, I posed

the question as a moral issue and most of the subj ects
reflected only briefly before concluding that it is " the
way of business" in our culture.
In addition, and in defense of their actions, the
fraudsters fault the victims for blindly participating in
the transactions.
If these people can't read, so be it. Screw them, you
know. It [ doesn't say ] everybody ' s gonna get the
diamond and sapphire tennis bracelet. They're dumb
enough not to read, dumb enough to send me the money,
I really don't care, you know. I'm doing what I have
to do to stay out of j ail. They're doing what they
have to do to fix their fix. They're promo j unkies,
and we're gonna find them and get them, and we're
gonna keep getting them. And they're gonna keep
buying. And, you know what I used to say, " they're
gonna blow their money in Vegas, they're gonna spend
it somewhere. I want to be the one to get it.
The fact that they could so easily distance themselves from
the victims is perplexing, even if it is over the
telephone.

Although a few subj ects expressed remorse over

taking the money of their victims, they suggested that they
experienced remorse only they got caught and had time to
111

reflect.

All but one of the few were no longer

incarcerated and the other subject was about to be paroled .

I suspect that it was partially the result of the fact that

the subjects needed to express some modicum of remorse in

order to appease their probation officers .

An offhand comment by the subject who assisted me with

the seminar perhaps provided the most enlightening insight

on the issue of how they perceive their victims.

I housed

him the night before the seminar, and he insisted that I

meet him at a strip club .

Sometime before 3 A . M . , I asked

him why so many of criminal telemarketers frequented strip

clubs and dated strippers .

we're just alike .

The subject replied, " [ B ] ecause

. We're all about the money . ll

I

asked him to elaborate and he stated, ,"We sell a dream . ll

He then spoke about how the strippers make men think that
there is a chance that they could actually keep company

with the strippers, which explains why they "invest ll their

money in them .

I asked the subject why he never looked the strippers

in the eye when he went up to the stage.

The subject

pointed out that strippers do not look directly at their

clients and it is an unwritten rule that the men are not
supposed to look directly at them .
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"You're paying for

their bodies and they don't want you to think that they are

part of the deal. "

I took this to mean that they try to

distance themselves from the "transaction. "

I took this to

mean that the dream is their body and the entire illusion

is that of the client.

The strippers share no

responsibility for any misperceptions about the
transaction.

Sweet and Tewksbury (2000 ) noted that central to the

interactional strategies used by strippers to maximize

their monetary gain is the cynical performance, which

creates counterfeit intimacy (see Goffman, 1959 ; Siguwade,

1995).

The notion of cynical performance is used to

describe a social actor with little belief in his or her

performance, but who nonetheles s us e s the performance and

elicits responses to achieve other ends
Tewksbury, 2000: 137 ).

(Sweet and

This concept is consistent with the

way criminal telemarketers blame the victim and avoid

feelings of remorse.

In es sence, fraudulent telemarketers

make dealing with victims a moral non-dilemma, and refuse

to deal with the is sue directly.
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Victims ' Accounts

It is important to note from the outset that the victims'
accounts to which I had access were from elderly people who
The reason for this is

had been victimized repeatedly.

that the government sought out senior citizens as they were
the most aggrieved group, which allowed the state to better
establish a pattern of deceit.

Younger consumers and those

who are scammed only once or twice are much less likely to
file a complaint.

They are also harder to locate.

Elderly citizens are the segment of the population
that is most victimized by telemarketing fraud and with
whom society needs be most concerned.

While they recognize

that it is acceptable to hang up the phone, they are
initially prone to listening to what the pitch is about
(AARP, 1996b) .

This leaves them open to the manipulation

techniques of criminal telemarketers.

They also are less

likely to report their losses to family and friends because
they fear being embarrassed (AARP, 1996c) and having to
give up control of their affairs.
The individuals who provided accounts of their
interaction with criminal telemarketers, although advanced
in age, vehemently denied any diminished mental capacity.
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They also acknowledged that they have entered other
sweepstakes and promoti ons, but pointed out that they knew
they had a " one in a mill i on chance to win " these types of
contests.

It is obv i ous from the v ict ims ' descripti ons of

the ir relat ionsh ips with telemarketers, that the fraudsters
man ipulated the societal scripts and cap ital ized on the
newly created bonds.

As one v ict im put it, "Well he - he

was a smooth talker, yeah.

From the f irst time he called

me I had conf idence in him. "
Some fraudsters had to work a l ittle harder to ga in
the v ict im ' s trust, but not much harder.

One of the

victims noted how the fraudster appealed to her values.
Yes , I was a little bit worr ied at f irst and then he
says, well, he says, " [ Y ] ou ' re a man of your word,
aren ' t you. ? " And I says, " [ Y ] es s ir, " I says. And
he - he more or less told me that his mother and
father ra ised him to be honest with people. And I
said, well, I sa id, " [ T ] hat ' s the way I am. "
Another victim simply said, " I had bu ilt a bond to him or a
friendsh ip with him , that I thought he was a good honest
boy. "
One of the cr im ina l te lemarketers not on ly bu ilt trust
with his v ictim, but empl oyed the techni que of distanc ing
himself from class ic telemarketers to do so.
Because he had earned so much of my trust in him in
the d ifferent days that he had called me and talked to
me. And he ' d talk to me about other compan ies that I
115

should stay away from and all . It seems as though he
had knowledge of what was go ing on in the whole
telemarketing bus iness.
Even after being warned by friends and ne ighbors, one of
the victims gave her personal telemarketer the benef it of
" I have been told by local people that I was

the doubt.

being scammed from the very beginning, but I didn ' t believe
it because I bel ieved J. T. was telling me the truth about
everything. "
When developing repeat vict ims, it is necessary for
the cr im inal telemarketers to establish a deeper
relationsh ip with the v ictims .

One of the fraudsters went

to great lengths by engaging in daily communication w ith
his vict im in order to strengthen the bond and thus the
victim ' s obligations in the relationsh ip .
Well, we became so friendly over the phone that he
reported to me every morn ing about his dating and all
the night before and we j ust had conversat ions l ike
that most of the t ime, not about business. It ' s j ust
every once in a wh ile he would br ing in about the
bus iness part of it.
Other relationships became even more advanced .

One v ict im

reported that, " [ I ] looked on him more or less as a son or
a nephew or someth ing and we would just discuss d ifferent
th ings of interest to both of us . "

Another victim st ill

ma inta ined loyalty to her cr im inal telemarketer at the time
of trial .

"Mr .

[Name ] was always very courteous and if we
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chose up sides , I would have said he was on my side against
[ Telemarketing Company ] . "
In their dealings with criminal telemarketers, victims
stated that they believed that they were already winners of
a major prize.

As one noted, " [ T ] hey give me the

impression that I'm rather special. "

When asked how he

first became involved with the telemarketing company ; one
gentleman's response typified the lure.
I don't know why I got duped into this situation. I'm
not at all sure. But all of a sudden this happened.
You get a call and the, well, I've been retired since
1980 and my wife had been ill and I've just been here.
So for interest you begin to listen to something and
you come up with this $2 50, 000. 00 and that's not too
bad, you know, especially at my age. So I begin to,
I ' d listen to him and they were rather convincing
people. You know liars can be the best folks in the
world.
The victims all agreed that they were hopeful of paying a
sum of money and getting something of more value in return.
One simply stated, "I have to admit that I was tempted by
those four possible awards. "

Victims who were involved in on e in four promotion

scams stated that they were never told by the telemarketers
that there were 3, 500 of the booby prizes.

They believed

there were only four prizes total and that it was between
them and three other people as to who gets which prize.
One of the victims thought in terms of her chances of
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hav ing bad luck, rather than good luck.

" So this company,

it was def initely that I would get one of those four
awards.

Only question from my po int of view was, four, and

one of them was someth ing that I had no interest in.

Would

I have the bad luck to receive that ? "
Most of the vict ims thought that the money they sent
to the company was for taxes or that the products they
received were merely to create an invoice to protect the
company.

When asked what she rece ived from the company ,

one v ictim told a story s im ilar to others,
Well, those usual invoices that all these compan ies
seem to expect and I ' ve questioned it. Somet imes,
they ' ve expla ined that th is is necessary to convince
the U.S. government that I ' m not a relative - or a
favored person in some way that - it ' s more business
like and the first one was - was money clips and
brass letter openers and - and pens and an emergency
surv ival kit.
Additionally , several of the v ict ims felt grateful when the
telemarketer would "get the okay " from his boss to reduce
the fee.

A couple of the vict ims felt fortunate to rece ive

the "sen ior c itizen discount. "
When asked what they thought they paid the money for ,
one woman said pla inly what all of the v ict ims had
expressed.

"Well, obviously for one of the ma j or awards. "

Two of the victims thought only about the award and d id not
pay much attention at all to the taxes.
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When asked if she

was told what she would have to do in order to "see that

one million dollar check," one of the victims stated, "Yes,
I was supposed to have a picture taken of me and have my

social security and driver's license and I was to pay a

certain amount of money as that would cost tax wise. "

When

asked the same question, another victim only mentioned the

photo and had to be prompted to recall that she also was

required to pay a substantial amount of money.

Of course, the big awards were never given out, but

that did not stop the fraudsters from repeatedly defrauding
the victims.

When questioned as to why they would continue

to contribute, most of the victims stated that they f elt
they were already too involved to quit.

One of the award

winners stated, " [ B ] ecause I had already put in $1,000 and

then if I didn't - didn't send more then it was definite

that I was not gonna get anything. "
for new prizes with greater odds.

Another victim went

They had a program going on later on. The second one
that I had entered and they convinced me that their
awards were much more valuable than they were in the
first program that they had. And I sent them a check
[ third time ] I had sent them a
for $3,500.
check for $4,000 because their awards were so much
greater and the person that I had talked to on the
telephone told me that since I had entered previous
programs that there was a better chance of me winning
than someone just entering the program.
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The male subject quoted earlier sent money on seven
different occasions in pursuit of the same award.

"I'm

still trying to keep active this $2 50, 000 that I'm chasing
in the wind. "

Others were looking to make up for their

past losses.
Several of the victims felt encouraged when they
received calls from different telemarketers from the same
company.

They beleived that the new person would be able

to "make things right. "

They also were duped into thinking

that failure to receive a major award was a problem with
the company rather than the individual telemarketer.

Thus,

the victims were receptive to the same agent when s / he
changed companies.

In the end, it was the sense of urgency

that the criminal telemarketers created that made the scams
effective.

All of the victims reported that they

dispatched checks through courier (UPS and FedEx) or
Western Union.

One recounted that the courier was at his

doorstep "within an hour. "
Victims continue to get involved with telemarketers
for the same reason most people in our society are prone to
enter contests

They are socialized to take advantage of a

"good deal" when they see it.

Criminal telemarketers build

up the dream from the outset to entice the victims, but
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also must convince the victims of their legitimacy and the
reality of the "great deal. "

In addition to the "greed n of

gullible consumers and the bond that the criminal
telemarketers create with them, repeat victims are also
susceptible to throwing good money after bad.

Their

investments are similar to individuals who constantly put
money into a problematic car.

Once the victims place a

certain amount of money into something, it is difficult to
stop as they cannot accept that the initial outlay is
irretrievable.

In other words, they are trying to recoup

their losses by winning the big prize, eventually.
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Chapter 5
INDIVIDUAL OFFENDERS

Unlike most street crime, telemarketing has legitimate as
well as illegitimate contingencies.

It would inform to

determine the demographic pool from which the offenders

hailed and to assess whether or not the subjects had any
significant criminal histories.

Due to the entrepreneurial

and organizational nature of their criminal endeavors, it

is important also to examine what factors influenced the

subjects to pursue and persist at fraudulent telemarketing

and what kind of lifestyle their criminal pursuits afforded

them.

Of all those who begin employment in telemarketing,

some quickly discover it is not their cup of tea; they

dislike it or they do not perform well at it.

Others find

the work attractive and rewarding but see it only as a
means to other life and career goals.

Most, therefore,

pursue telemarketing work only temporarily.

Some, however,

discover they are good at telephone sales, and they are
drawn to the income and the lifestyle it can provide.

On

average, the members of the interview sample were employed

in telemarketing for 8 years.

Their ages when interviewed

ranged from 26 to 69 years, with a mean of 42.2 years.
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The

sample included thirty-five (73%) white males, six (12 . 5%)
African-American males, six (12 . 5%) white females , and one
Hispanic male.

Offender Bac kgrounds

Although much less is known about white-collar offenders
than about street criminals, evidence suggests they are
drawn from offender pools with quite different social
characteristics.

As a group , they are older, better

educated , and include a higher proportion of whites and
females.

According to Weisburd et al .

respected in their home communities.

(1991) , many are
They are less likely

to come from disadvantaged sectors of the population, and
they are more likely to have records of well-paid
legitimate employment.
An enormous body of research on street criminals has
shown that many are products of disadvantaged and
disorderly parental homes.

I was interested in determining

if the homes in which the subjects were reared reveal ·
similar or functionally equivalent criminogenic
characteristics.

Overwhelmingly, the members of the sample

describe their parents as conventional and hard-working and
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family financial circumstances as secure if not
comfortable.

They were reared in families whose parents

prided themselves on how well they provided for their
families and whose conversations and admonitions stressed
the importance of financial mat ters and taking care of
business .
Nearly all of the subj ects reported coming from
middle- class neighborhoods.

Their parental families were

gender- traditional, with the father providing the main
source of income.

Although the fathers ' reported

occupations ranged from machinist to owner of a chain of
retail stores, thirty- four were business owners (37.5%) or
held professional / managerial (33%) positions.

All but one

of the remaining fathers (n = 14) maintained steady
employment ; of those, half held sales positions and two
were career mi l i tary personnel .

On ly one father had no

reported occupation and had spent time in prison.

One-half

of the mothers were employed outside the home as well.

The

significance of this is that a substantial proportion
(70.5%) of the subj ects were exposed to or acquired
entrepreneurial perspectives and skills while young.
Although I questioned the subj ects at length about
their early and adolescent years, their responses reveal
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little that distinguishes them from others of similar age
and class background.

Certainly, the disadvantages and

pathologies commonplace in the early lives of most street
criminals are hardly in evidence here .
noted is no less true of these subjects :

What others have
"One searches in

vain for early precursors or early hints of trouble in the
life history of the typical white-collar offender.

For

[ t ] heir crimes do not appear . . . to be

most,

deeply rooted in a troubled social background" (Benson and
Kerley, 2001 : 133).
If the subj ects' early years reveal few clues to
their later criminality, there also are few signs that
they distinguished themselves in conventional ways.
Their educational careers , for example , are
unremarkable.

Eight (17%) dropped out of high school,

although most (83%) graduated and five of the eight
drop-outs obtained a GED.

Twenty-nine (60%) attended

college, but on average they invested only two years
in the quest for a degree.

Only five (10%) claimed a

baccalaureate degree with one of the subj ects going on
to receive a masters degree.
The subj ects also were not very successful in
their personal relationships.

Nearly all (87. 5 %) had
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been married at least once and a third (31% ) of those
subj ects had been married more than once with several
( n = 6) reporting three or four marriages.

Despite

the percentage of subj ects who did marry , only a few
of the subj ects were married at the time of the
interviews.

While some asserted that it was the

criminal trial process that caused them to separate,
most suggested that their relationships had dissolved
prior to any charges being brought.

Most (75 % ) have

children, although a maj ority of these subj ects
indicated that they were not actively engaged in their
childrens 1 lives .

Criminal Careers

What about the subj ec t s 1 criminal his tories ?

Inf ormation

el icited in the interviews and a review of information
contained in the subj ects 1 pre- sentence investigation
reports shows that thirteen (27% ) of the subj ects had
previous criminal records, seven (14 . 6% ) for misdemeanors
(e . g . , petty theft and drugs ) and six ( 12 . 5 % ) for fe lonies .
Of those with felony records , three were convicted
previously of telemarketing offenses.
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Overall , th is level of prior cr iminal ity is somewha t
be low wha t is reported by o ther inves t iga tors of ord inary
wh ite-collar crim inals generally and cr im inal telemarketers
specif ically (Benson and Kerley, 2001 ; We isburd, War ing and
Chayet, 2001 ; Doocy et al . , 2002).

St ill, a s izeable

number "are no t s trangers to the crim inal j ust ice system "
(Benson and Kerley, 200.1 : 131) .

For members of the sample

who have previous arres ts, the age of onset for crim inal
ac tivity is cons iderably higher than for stree t crim inals.
The da ta do show that some subj ects appear to
have had recurren t trouble with the law and, like
street cr im inals, they are pers isten t users of alcohol
and other drugs .

In fact, some of the subj ects were

at trac ted to the work because it suppor ted the ir
addict ions.

As one former bus iness owner told me, " I

had an alcohol problem at a young age, and to be able
to suppor t the alcohol and drug habit w i th the kind of
money tha t we were mak ing seems to go hand in hand. "
When inv ited to reflect upon how they d iffer from
their siblings or peers, many repor ted they were aware
of an in teres t in money from an early age.
subj ect told me:

As one

" I had ·cer tain goals when I was a

teenager, you know.

And I had a picture of a Mercedes
12 7

convertible on my bedroom mirror for years . "

Another

subject said, " [ Y ] ou know, I do have a major
add ict ion, and I don ' t think I ' ll ever lose it .

And I

don ' t th ink there ' s any classes [treatment ] for it.
And it ' s money.

It ' s Ben Franklin . "

Typ ically, they

began work ing for pay while young and ma inta ined
employment throughout their adolescent years .

Criminal Lure

In Crime and the Ameri can Dream, Messner and Rosenfeld
(2001: 5) assert that "crime in Amer ica der ives in
s ignif icant measure, from highly prized cultural and soc ial
condit ions. "

They go on to state:

. . . the American Dream itself and the normal soc ial
conditions engendered by it are deeply impl icated in
the problem of cr ime . In our use of the term "the
Amer ican Dream, " we refer to a broad cu l tura l ethos
that enta ils a commitment to the goal of mater ial
success, to be pursued by everyone in soc iety, under
cond itions of open, indiv idual compet ition . The
Amer ican Dream has both an evaluative and a cogn it ive
dimension associated with it . People are soc ial ized
to accept the desirabil ity of pursuing the goal of
mater ial success, and they are encouraged to bel ieve
that the chances of realiz ing the Dream are
suff ic iently high to justify a continued commitment to
this cultural goal (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2001: 5-6).
Mat za and Sykes (1961) state that delinquents from all
social classes tend to pursue certa in values that are
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conducive to delinquency; they may also have a disdain for
hard work and a desire for quick, easy success.

In his

theory of middle-class delinquency, England (1960) states
that delinquents reject such values as hard work, thrift,
study, and self-denial.

Miller (1958) makes a similar

point in his discussion of lower class culture.

At the

same time, however, delinquents have grandiose dreams of
quick success.

They desire much money and all the luxuries

money can buy.

Entrepreneurship appealed to many of the

subjects:
You're always pursuing more money, most of us are.
We're raised that way, we are in this country. And
that's the way I was raised. But I also wanted to do
my own thing. I wanted to be in business for myself,
I wanted the freedom that came with that.
"Crime, of course, would have an obvious appeal to someone
who places a low value on hard work and a high value on
money and pleasure" (Agnew, 2 0 0 0: 359).
The sample subjects were aware that there are ways of
earning a good income that do not require hard work and
subordination to others.

As one subject put it:

You know, I was, I've never been a firm believer
[ that ] you got to work for a company for 30 years and
get a retirement. Like my dad thinks. I'm all about
going out [ and ] making that million and doing it,
doing it very easily. And there's a lot of ways to do
it.
12 9

For the sample subjects, many of whom were previously
foundering on conventional paths, telemarketing was a
godsend .

In the words of one of the subjects,

"Telemarketing was a salvation to me as a means of income .
And being able to actually accomplish something without an
education . "

Aware that failing parental and self

expectations would be unacceptable, it came along at a time
when they needed to show that they could make something of
themselves.

It was the reason some reported for dropping

out of college:
[ Telemarketing ] was just something I picked up as
a part time job, when I was sixteen . . . . When I
was in college, my second year in college,
[ fellow students ] were talking about finishing
their four years of college and making $2 8, 000 or
$30, 000 a year . And I was making $1, 000 a week
part time, you know . . . . And I just couldn't
see doing it . I mean, I wound up, after the end
of my second year of college, I never went back.
I was making too much money . It just seemed so
easy .
Indeed, success in the field of criminal
telemarketing does not require a formal education.

A

cross-tabulation of educational background and
telemarketing position [ Table 5 . 1 ] suggests that
failure to obtain a degree does not constrain one's
"status" in the business .

Although none of the three
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Tabl e 5 . 1 :
Posi tion

Cross-Tabulation of Educ ation Bac kground and TM

OWner
Le s s Than
High School

High School
Degree/GED

Some
Col lege

College
Degree

Graduate
Degree

Manager

Count
Wi thin
Education
Wi thin
Pos i t ion
Count
Wi thin
Educat ion
Wi thin
Pos i tion
Count
Wi thin
Education
Within
Pos i t ion
Count
Wi thin
Educat ion
Wi thin
Pos i t ion

Sales
Agent

Total

2

1

3

66 . 7%

33 . 3%

100 . 0%

28 . 6%

9 . 1%

6 . 3%

8

1

3

4

16

50 . 0%

6 . 3%

18 . 8%

2 5 . 0%

100 . 0%

33 . 3%

16 . 7%

42 . 9%

3 6 . 4%

33 . 3%

14

2

2

6

24

58 . 3%

8 . 3%

8 . 3%

25 . 0%

100 . 0%

58 . 3%

33 . 3%

28 . 6%

54 . 5%

50 . 0%

2

2

4

5 0 . 0%

5 0 . 0%

1 0 0 . 0%

8 . 3%

33 . 3%

8 . 3%

1

1

100 . 0%

100 . 0%

16 . 7%

2 . 1%

Count
Wi thin
Education
Wi thin
Pos i t i on

Re -Loader

13 1

sub j ects with less than a high school degree ascended
to the posit ion of owner or manager, eight ( 50%) of
those with only a high school diploma or GED d id rise
to the level of bus iness owner .

In that group were

three sub jects who obta ined the ir degree by taking the
GED.

A ninth ind iv idual in the high school only

category became a manager.
In the some col l ege category (no degree obta ined),
fourteen ( 58.3%) became owners and two (8.3%) held
manager ial pos itions.

Of the four who obta ined college

degrees, two were bus iness owners and two were managers,
while the one sub j ect with a masters degree did not surpass
the management level.

In the end, twenty-two (91.6 %) of

the owners and three ( 50%) o f the managers in the sample
had only a high school degree or some college.
While the ab il ity to ach ieve some th ing wi thout an
education was a fundamental reason for entry into cr im inal
telemarketing, the fact that the sub j ects could make a
large amount of money was by far the greatest lure.
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Income

Overwhelmingly, the subjects told me they got into and
persisted at telemarketing for "the money. "
it pay ?

How well does

Only one subject reported earning less than $1, 000

weekly, and most said their annual earnings were in the
Seven told me their annual

range of $100, 000 to $250, 000.
earnings exceeded $1 million.

To conduct further analysis,

cross-tabulations were run on income by position,
education, age, and years in telemarketing.

The income

categories were designated as l ess than $99 , 0 0 0, $1 0 0 , 0 0 0
to $2 4 9 , 0 0 0 , $25 0 , 0 0 0 t o $99 9 , 999 , and 1 Mi l l i on and above .
All of the millionaires {n=7) were owners of criminal
telemarketing firms and only one owner made less than
$99, 000 [ Table 5 . 2 ] .

The owners also made up 63. 6% {n=7)

of the $250, 000 to $999, 000 income category {n= l l).

The

remaining 37. 5% {n=9) reported earning from $100, 000 to
$ 2 49, 000 annually.

Only one manager stated that he

received an annual income over $250, 000, while four {66 . 7% )
were in the $100, 000 to $249, 000 category.
manager reported an income of under $99, 000.
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The remaining

Table 5 . 2 :
Cross-tabulation
Income Category

of

TM

Position

Le s s 10 0 , 0 0 0 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 Mi ll ion
and
to
Than
to
9 9 , 0 0 0 24 9 , 0 0 0 9 9 9 , 9 9 9 Above

OWner

Count
Within
Po s i t i on
Wi thin
Inc ome

Manager

Coun t
Wi thin
Po s i t i on
Wi thin
Income

Re loader

9

7

7

24

4 . 2%

37 . 5%

29 . 2%

2 9 . 2%

100 . 0%

2 0 . 0%

36 . 0%

63 . 6%

100 . 0%

50 . 0%

1

4

1

6

1 6 . 7%

66 . 7%

16 . 7%

100 . 0%

2 0 . 0%

16 . 0%

9 . 1%

12 . 5%

6

1

7

85 . 7%

14 . 3 %

100 . 0%

24 . 0%

9 . 1%

14 . 6%

3

6

2

11

27 . 3%

54 . 5 %

18 . 2%

100 . 0%

6 0 . 0%

24 . 0%

18 . 2%

2 2 . 9%

Count

Count
Within
Po s i t i on
Wi thin
Income

Total

1

Wi thin
Po s i t i on
Wi thin
Inc ome
Sales
Agent

and
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Annual

Almost all (85. 7%; n=7) of the reloaders fell within
the $ 100, 000 to

$ 2 49, 000 income range while the other

reloader garnered between $ 2 50, 000 and $999, 000.

The

closers and sales agents were collapsed into one category
based on the fact that closers are more experienced sales
agents and work under similar circumstances using the same
pool of consumers.

Of the eleven -sales agents in the

sample, 2 7. 3% (n=3) made less than $99, 000, whereas more
than half (54 . 5%) reported annual earnings of $100, 000 to
$ 2 49, 000.

The two remaining sales agents (18.2 %), both

closers, made over $ 2 50, 000.
Obviously, it pays to be a business owner, but that
does not necessarily mean that one needs a college
education to profit from criminal telemarketing [Table
5.3] .

In fact, subjects with a high school degree or GED

made up 57 . 1% (n=4) of the millionaires and 2 (12 . 5%)
earned between $ 2 50, 000 and $999, 000.

Of the subjects who

dropped out of high and did not obtain a GED, one reported
making between $ 2 50, 000 and $999, 000 while the other two
had an annual income of $ 100, 000 to $ 2 50, 000 .
The remaining millionaires (n=3) and 63. 6% (n=7) of
the subjects that earned $250, 000 to $999, 000 per year
attended some college but never obtained a degree.
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Table 5 . 3 :
Category

Cros s - tabulat ion of Educ at ion and Annual Income

Les s
Than

High School
Degre e / GED

Some
Col lege

249 , 000

999, 999

2

1

3

66 . 7%

33 . 3%

100 . 0%

8 . 0%

9 . 1%

6 . 3%

10

2

4

16

62 . 5%

12 . 5%

25 . 0%

100 . 0%

40 . 0%

18 . 2%

5 7 . 1%

33 . 3%

4

10

7

3

24

16 . 7%

41 . 7%

29 . 2%

12 . 5%

100 . 0%

80 . 0%

40 . 0%

63 . 6%

42 . 9%

50 . 0%

College
Degree

1

2

1

4

25 . 0%

50 . 0%

2 5 . 0%

100 . 0%

2 0 . 0%

8 . 0%

9 . 1%

8 . 3%

Graduate
Degree

to

Count
Wi thin
Educat ion
Wi thin
Inc ome
Count
Within
Educat ion
Wi thin
Income
Count
Wi thin
Educat i on
Wi thin
Income
Count
Wi thin
Education
Wi thin
Income
Count
Wi thin
Educ at ion
Wi thin
Inc ome

Total

250, 000

99, 000

Le s s Than
High School

Mi ll ion
and
Above

100 , 000

to

1

1

100 . 0%

100 . 0%

4 . 0%

2 . 1%
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41. 7% (n= l O) of the subjects in this category reported
income between $100, 000 and $2 49, 000 and four earned less
than $99, 000; one garnering the least amount reported of
$2 8, 000, equal to the projection of college graduates
quoted by a subject in Chapter 3.

College graduates fared

similarly as 50 % (n=2 ) received an annual income of
$100, 000 to $2 49, 000 while another made over $2 50, 000 and
the last taking in $60, 000 (the second lowest reported
income in all categories).

The one subject with a

master's degree reportedly earned between $100, 000 and
$2 49, 000.
The data also reveal that subjects were able to make a
lot of money relatively early in their careers.

In order

to run cross-tabulations on income by age [ Table 5 . 4 ] , the
subjects' ages were co�lapsed into three categories
signifying different stages in life.

The 3 9 and under

category included those subjects in their twenties (n=2 ),

wi th the other two categories designated as subjects for ty
to for ty-nine and fi fty or ol der.

Three (12 . 5%) of the subjects in their thirties were
making a million or more and four (16. 7%) others topped the
$2 50, 000 mark.

A similar number (n=4) made less than
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Table 5 . 4 :
Category

3 9 and
Under

Cross- tabulation of Age and Annual Income

Count
Wi thin Age
Cat egory

Wi thin
Income
40 to
49

10 0 , 0 0 0
to
24 9 , 0 0 0

250, 000
to
999, 999

4

13

4

3

24

16 . 7%

54 . 2 %

16 . 7%

12 . 5%

100 . 0%

80 . 0%

52 . 0%

36 . 4%

42 . 9%

50 . 0%

6

3

4

13

46 . 2 %

23 . 1%

30 . 8%

100 . 0%

24 . 0%

27 . 3 %

5 7 . 1%

27 . 1%

1

6

4

11

9 . 1%

54 . 5 %

3 6 . 4%

100 . 0%

2 0 . 0%

24 . 0%

36 . 4%

22 . 9%

Count
Wi thin Age
Category

Wi thin
Income
50 and
Above

Count
Wi thin Age
Category
Within
Income

Mi ll ion Total
and
Above

Les s
Than
99, 000
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$99, 000, but most (54. 2 % ; n=13) reported an annual income
of between $100, 000 and $2 49, 000.

Forty-somethings made

the most money on average as four (30. 8 %) made a million or
more and three (2 3. 1%) others made over $2 50, 000.

The

remaining six (46. 2 %) garnered $100, 000 and $2 49, 000 in
annual income.

While no subject fifty or older made a

million, 36. 4% (n=4) made more than $2 50, 000.

Most (54. 5% ;

n=6), however, reported earnings between $100, 000 and
$2 50, 000 ; the remaining elder received less than $9 9, 000.
Additionally, the subjects were able to make a
substantial annual income without having to first work long
in the field [Table 5 . 5 ] .

For this analysis, the subjects'

years in telemarketing were categorized as 5 and under, 6
to 1 0 years, and 1 1 or more years.

Three (42 . 9 %) of the

millionaires had been in criminal telemarketing for less
than five years, while two others had six to ten years
experience ; the remaining two fell in the eleven or more
category.
Those subjects reporting annual incomes of $2 50, 000 to
$999, 000 were divided rather equally among the 5 and under
(36. 4% ; n=4), 6 to 10 (36. 4% ; n=4), and 11 or more (27. 3% ;
n=3) categories.

Those with 5 or fewer years in

telemarketing made up 32 % (n=8) of subjects in the $100, 000
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Table 5 . 5 :
Category

5 and
Under

6 to 10

Cross-tabulation of TM Years and Annual Income

Count
Wi thin
TM Years
Within
Inc ome
Count
Wi thin
TM Years
Within
Income

11 and
Above

Count
Within
TM Years
Wi thin
Income

Les s
Than
99, 000

100 , 00 0
to
24 9 , 0 0 0

250, 000
to
999, 999

Mi ll ion
and
Above

Total

3

8

4

3

18

16 . 7%

4 4 . 4%

22 . 2%

16 . 7%

100 . 0%

60 . 0%

3 2 . 0%

36 . 4%

42 . 9%

37 . 5 %

2

12

4

2

20

10 . 0%

60 . 0%

20 . 0%

1 0 . 0%

1 0 0 . 0%

40 . 0%

4 8 . 0%

3 6 . 4%

2 8 . 6%

41 . 7%

5

3

2

10

5 0 . 0%

30 . 0%

2 0 . 0%

100 . 0%

2 0 . 0%

27 . 3 %

28 . 6%

20 . 8%
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to $249, 0 0 0 income category compared to 48% ( n=12 ) of those
with 6 to 10 years experience, and 2 0 % ( n=5 ) of the
subj ects 11 or more years in the business.
Only three subj ects with less than 5 years and two with 6
to 10 years in the business made less than $99, 0 0 0.

Personal Succ ess

As important as the income it yields and the casual
approach to employment it permits, criminal telemarketing
appeals to many who persist at it for reasons of career and
identity.

Despite class and parental expectations, most of

the subj ects had not previously settled upon promising or
rewarding occupations .

Asked what he liked about

telemarketing, one subj ect ' s reply was typical:
obviously, it was the money. "

Immediately, however, he

added that " it gave me a career,
salvation. "

" Well,

[ and ] to me it was my

As with this subj ect, criminal telemarketing

enables fraudsters to own their own business despite their
unimpressive educational background, their limited
credentials, and the absence of venture capital.
A comparison of the positions to which the subj ects
eventually ascended in telemarketing to the occupational
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positions of their fathers, reveals that there also were no
relative limitations on their occupational mobility [Table
As a result, many subjects were able to surpass

5. 6 ] .

their parents' occupational status by becoming business

owners.

62. 5% (10 ) of the subjects whose parents held

prof essional/managerial positions and 50 % { n=6 ) of those

with parents listed in the laborer category did so.

Of the

sixteen subjects whose fathers held prof essional/managerial

positions, ten { 62. 5% ) became owners of criminal

telemarketing firms, and three { 1 8. 8% ) were managers.

Likewise, six { 50 % ) of the subjects whose fathers were

laborers also came to own their own business; none became

managers.

The sons and daughters of business owners did not

attain as much "success. "

Of the eighteen subjects whose

parents were business owners, eight ( 4 4. 4 % ) eventually

became owners and three { 16. 7% ) held managerial positions.
The fact that these particular subjects exhibited less
upward mobility is hard to explain.

Overall, during the

interviews, the subjects with prof essional/managerial

parents expressed much more disdain about working for
somebody else, often as a result of observing their

fathers' situations.

In general, the subjects from
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Table 5 . 6 :
Position

Bus iness
OWner

Profe ssional /
Managerial

Laborer

Cross-Tabulation of Parent Occupation and TM

OWner

Manager

Re Loader

Sales
Agent

Total

8

3

2

5

18

Wi thin
Parental
Wi thin
Pos i t i on

44 . 4 %

16 . 7%

11 . 1%

27 . 8%

100 . 0%

33 . 3%

50 . 0%

28 . 6%

45 . 5%

37 . 5%

10

3

1

2

16

Wi thin
Parental
Wi thin
Pos i t ion

62 . 5 %

18 . 8%

6 . 3%

12 . 5%

100 . 0%

41 . 7%

50 . 0%

14 . 3%

18 . 2 %

33 . 3%

6

2

4

12

50 . 0%

16 . 7%

33 . 3%

100 . 0%

25 . 0%

2 8 . 6%

36 . 4%

25 . 0%

Count

Count

Count

Wi thin
Parental
Wi thin
Pos i t i on

Mi l itary

Count
Wi thin
Parental
Wi thin
Pos i t i on
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2

2

100 . 0%

100 . 0%

28 . 6%

4 . 2%

business owner homes, were less concerned, but perhaps were
more aware of the headaches of owning a business.

Additionally, there is a lot of money to be made on the
sales end and less perceived liability.

The subjects were also able to become business owners

relatively early in life.

Nearly half ( 45.8%; n= l l) of the

business owners started up their own firms before the age
of 39; their average age was 35.

The average age of all

business owners was slightly under 42.

Taking into account

that ages used in the analysis were the subjects ' ages at
the time of the interviews, this figure is even more
impressive.

Although only seven of the sample subjects were

minorities, there appears to be no constraints on their

status mobility such as exist in the general population.

66. 7% ( n= 4) of the African-American subj ects were business

owners and another was a manager.

The same equal

opportunity was not seen for females ( n=6), as 66.7% ( n= 4)

were sales agents, one was a reloader, and only one was an
owner.

Even the one female who was an owner told me that

she did not aspire to ownership, but rather was placed in

the position by her fianc� to serve as a " front. "

Although

I did not spend much time exploring the gender issue, some
144

of the interview subjects did suggest that a glass ceiling
does, in fact, exist and females were mainly used to make
initial contacts.
For those who persist at it, success at criminal
telemarketing brings a strong sense of personal mastery,
which gives rise to self-attributions of distinction and
desert .

As president of their own corporation, their

position in telemarketing provides both outward
respectability and an income sufficient to maintain the
"good life. "

It is the vehicle that permits them to lay

claim to being talented and successful.
This mode of deviant exploitation also offers the
intrinsic emotional reward of "sneaky thrills" (Katz,
1988).

Seduced into the deviant activity primarily by

their desire for easy economic gain, fraudulent
telemarketers soon discover that employing their persuasive
skills to exploit gullible victims provides feelings of
power and contro l.

The deviant work is "a kind of game

. that produces a clear winner and loser" (Katz 19 88 : 67).
Duffield and Grabosky (2 001) have commented on the
importance of this dimension of the payoff from fraud.
Characteristically, the subjects believe they are
outstanding salespersons; they are supremely confident of
145

their ability to sell over the telephone by overcoming
whatever resistance they encounter.

Doing so successfully

gives a sense of competitively earned distinction and
power.
[ I ] sold the first person I ever talked to on the
phone. And it was j ust like that first shot of
heroin, you know. I'm not a heroin addict. .
I've only done heroin a couple of times. But it
was amazing. It was like, "I can't believe I
j ust did this ! " It was incredible. It was never
about the money after that. . . . Yeah, it was
about the money initially, but when I realized ·
that I could do this everyday, it was no longer
about the money. It was about the competition,
you know. I wanted to be the best salesman, and
I want to make the most money that day. And then
it became j ust the sale. It wasn't the money. I
didn't even add the figures in my head anymore.
It was j ust whether or not I can turn this person
around, you know, walk him down that mutual path
of agreement, you know. That was exciting to me.
It was power, you know; I can make people do what
I wanted them to do. And they would do it.
Another subj ect said simply that the work "gives you power.
It gives you power. "
To make such large amounts of money and do so without
incurring restrictive responsibilities adds to the
attractiveness of the work.

The subj ects find appealing

both the flexible hours and the fact that it requires
neither extensive training nor advanced education.
employers impose rigid rules or strictures.

Few

Generally

there are neither dress codes nor uniforms; the work can be
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done in shorts and a tee shirt (Doocy et al . , 2 0 0 2 ) .

In

addition to the money and the success it provides, criminal

telemarketers also find other aspects of the work
attractive .

Mobility

Employment mobility by criminal telemarketers is

common; individuals move from one firm to another, with

some eventually taking managerial positions (Doocy et al. ,
2001) .

After gaining experience, former managers told me,

they were confident that they knew enough about the

business to strike out on their own .

They did so expecting

to increase their income substantially .

As one put it:

" [ I ] n my mind I believed I was smarter than the owners of

these other companies that were making millions of dollars.

And I just said, ' I can do this on my own. '"

Typical ly, defectors lure productive personnel from

their current employer with promises of more money, and on
the way out they are not above plundering the business's
files and lead lists :

file.

I took it all .

"I downloaded every lead in his

I opened up . . . my own office,

took all those people and said ' now, watch me . ' "
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Based in

part on the widely shared assumption that the market is
never saturated, they generally open a company based on
similar products and sales approaches.

Others enjoyed the

mobility without the responsibility of organization.

As

one rip and tear artist told me:
Hell, I would go on vacation to New Orleans , or
whatever, and work out of a hotel room for a few days.
4 or
They probably tracked me down through couriers.
5 of my buddies would do the same thing.
When I asked what his parents thought, the subject replied,
"Hell, at the time my parents were glad because I was
successful. "
One subject summed up well not only the reason why
most enter this type of work, but also the varied options
available to them.
I' ve done many things. I can' t even remember all the
things . I don' t think I' ve worked steady ever up
until I was 35 years old maybe. I just, you know, I
could never keep a j ob. I could never, nothing can
hold my interest that long until telemarketing. Cause
then you didn' t have to keep a job. You just got to
work for the next company.
There was like 3 or
4 of us that started together and we would branch out
into different companies you know or we' d make our own
companies or whatever, you know , and nobody wanted to
do it at this time . And because I didn ' t really want
a job and I was a salesman. I started ripping and
tearing out of hotel rooms and stuff you know just,
you know, 5, 10 grand a week or something, just to
keep me out of trouble.
Asked if he ever considered changing his vocation, he
replied, "All the ti me, all the time.
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So fuckin often the

things were more commonly criminal in nature.

Still,

wouldn't go get a job, you know. "

Lifestyles

Telemarketers generally distinguish between working
hard and "working smart. "

When asked, therefore, how he

viewed those who work hard for modest wages, one replied " I
guess somebody ' s gotta do it. "

By contrast, work weeks of

20-30 hours are common for them, and even for owners and
managers, the need for close oversight of operations
decreases substantially once things are up and running.
The short work-week and their ample income provides
considerable latitude in the use of leisure time and in
consumption patterns.
The lifestyles of criminal telemarketers vary by age
and the aspects of the work that employees find most
appealing, but conspicuous consumption is common to all.
The young, and those attracted to the work and leisure it
permits, live life as a party.

This is "enjoyment of good

times with minimal concern for obligations and commitments
external to the . . . immediate social setting" (Shover,
1996: 93).

Use of cocaine and other illicit drugs is
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common among this segment of the telemarketing workforce.

One of the subjects recounted how the business accommodated

his lifestyle.

The hours were good. You'd work, sometimes, from
about 9 to 2, 9 to 3, sometimes from 12 to 4.
Basically, we set our own hours. It was freedom.
The money was fantastic. . . . You got the best
of the girls. For me, it wasn't really about the
job, it was a way of life. . . . I had an alcohol
problem at a young age, and to be able to support
the alcohol and drug habit with the kind of money
that we were· making seems to go hand in hand.
And then you've got the fast lifestyle, . . . up
all night, sleep all. day, you know. So,
everything kinda coincided with that fast
lifestyle, that addictive lifestyle.

Asked how he spent the money he made in telemarketing,
another subject responded saying :

Houses, girls, just going out to nightclubs. And
a lot of blow [ cocaine ] .
. Lots and lots of
blow, enormous amounts. And other than that, you
know, I look back, I get sick when I think about
how much we spent, where the hell I put it all .
I'm making all this money [ but ] I don't have a
whole hell of a lot to show for it, you know.
That lifestyle didn't allow you to save.
Gambling and ostentatious living are commonplace.

subject said that they � would go out to the casinos and

blow two, three, four, five thousand dollars a night.

was nothing - - to go spend five grand, you know, every
weekend.

And wake up broke ! "

One
That

Commenting on one of his

employees, a subject said that the man
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had a Porsche Speedster after he sold his Porsche
911 . He had· a Dodge Viper, he had a Ferrari 348,
he had a Lexus LS400, he had a BMvv 8 50i, he had a
Jeep Grand Cherokee . He liked his cars . Now, he
didn't have all these at one time, but he ran
through them, you know . He traded the Dodge
Viper . . . in for the Ferrari . He always had a
Porsche .
There was usually little money to be found when these
subjects were investigated and it is assumed that most of
it was lost in the process of conspicuous consumption .
However, there is also evidence that the subjects spent the
money to avoid detection .

As one subject put it:

Well I had to say my lifestyle, you know, we
couldn't have bank accounts, you know . I didn't
even have a driver's license for 10 years . We
couldn't, we couldn't keep our money anywhere .
We couldn't declare it anywhere, so you know I
guess hotel rqoms, cars, drugs, clothes,
girlfriends . You know money's really easy to
spend . And we gambled too . We did just about
everything that you would expect a criminal to do
with their money. It was just a great lifestyle,
man .
What I learned about the lifestyles and spending habits of
criminal telemarketers differs little from what is known
about street criminals .

It also confirms what has been

learned about the relationship between easy, unearned
income and profligacy:

"The way money is acquired is a

powerful determinant of how it is defined, husbanded, and
spent" (Shover, 1996: 104) .
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The lifestyles of telemarketers change somewhat as
they get older and take on more conventional
responsibilities :
I started to realize that, as I was getting older
in the industry, it was affecting my children and
my relationship with my wife. To the point that
it wasn't what I wanted. I wanted more of a
home-type of family, where I got home at six
o'clock and have dinner and spend time with my
wife and children. And with that industry, it
doesn't really do that.
My lifestyle? Play golf, go to the lake, you
know. I had a family, but . . . I was also, you
know, making good money. And I wanted to party
and that kind of thing. So, I did that a lot.
We got together and partied a lot and went here
and there and went to, you know - - nightlife -
go out to clubs occasionally, but, when you're
married and have kids, it's limited. It changes.
It changed a lot over those years.
For older and more experienced telemarketers, the
lifestyle centers around home and family and impressing
others with signs of their apparent success:
I played some golf.
[ In the Summer ] , water
skiing, fishing. I'm real heavy into bass
fishing, me and my dad and my brothers. Hunting.
Doing things with my wife and kids. I spent a
lot of time with them. Evenings, maybe just
walking the golf course, or whatever. Watching
the sunset.
Another subject told me that after he moved up in the
telemarketing ranks:
lot of golf.

"My partner and I played, we played a

The office was right down from the golf
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course.

We'd go to the golf course and play two or three

times a week. "

Except for the unrestrained hedonism of

their lives when young and still new to criminal
telemarketing, the broad outlines of their occupational
careers, particularly for those who went on to form their
own businesses, resemble the work careers of more
conventional citizens.
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Chapter 6
THINKING FRAUD

Whereas rational street criminals generally conduct
only a primitive cost-benefit analysis, the decision-making
of fraudulent telemarketers involves several dimensions.
An average burglar acting alone, for example , knowing his
or her actions are a blatant violation of the law, will
assess the possibility of getting caught as well as the
potential for obtaining goods of value from an unoccupied
building.

Criminal telemarketers, on the other hand,

largely deny that their actions are criminal.

They employ

a wide range of techniques of neutralization in their
defense.

Matza ' s (19 6 4) application of this concept

questions whether techni ques of neutral ization come before
delinquent acts ( see also Bal l, 196 6) while others ( e . g.,
Hamlin, 1988) suggest that these techniques are motives
that neutralize guilt after the fact.

In this chapter, the

techniques are viewed as one of several circumstances in
the offenders ' criminal decision-making.
The subj ects also claim that the law covering business
transactions is vague and as a result they should not be
held accountable.

Questioned about an alleged violation,
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fraudulent telemarketers tend to suggest that they are not
accountable and other members of the organization are to
blame.

Applying a rational choice perspective, this multi

level analysis reveals that fraudulent telemarketers are,
in fact, rational criminal decision-makers.

Denial of Crime

In writing about newly emerging forms of criminal
opportunity, Ross (1907) coined the label criminaloid to
refer to those individuals that exploit them.

He noted

that despite their criminal conduct, these offenders
refused to see their acts as crimes.

In the decades that

followed, others reported similar findings (e. g. , Cressey,
1953; Geis, 19 67; Sutherland, 1983).

In more recent years,

Jesilow, Pontell and Geis (1993) found that physicians who
engage in Medicaid fraud typically define their violations,
both in private and to others, in benign terms.

Likewise,

Doocy et al. (2 002 : 173) remark that the fraudulent
telemarketer they interviewed "conveyed the assured
appearance of a most respectable entrepreneur" as well as
"no hint . . . that what he was doing might not be
altogether legitimate. "
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Benson (1985 : 602) notes that a tendency to reject the

criminal label was characteristic of fraud offenders he
interviewed and that they "were more likely than other

offenders to completely deny committing any crime at all. "
(see also Willett et al . , 20 0 1 ) .

research are no different.

The sample subjects in my

Notwithstanding the fact that

all were convicted felons, most reject the labels criminal
and crime as fitting descriptions of them and their

activities .

They instead employ a range of mitigating

explanations and excuses for their offenses, although

claims of ignorance figure in most of their explanations

(Sykes and Matza, 1957 ; Scott and Lyman, 1968; Katz, 1980 ) .
Some former business owners reported, for example,

that they set out to maintain a legitimate operation,

emulated the operations of their previous employers and

assumed, therefore, that their activities violated no l aws.

Others said they were guilty only of expanding their

business so rapidly that they could not properly oversee
day-to-day operations.

Some said that indulgence in

alcohol and illicit drugs caused them to become neglectful
of , or indifferent toward, their businesses .

Few of the subjects acknowledged culpability.

Only

six admitted candidly that they were aware from the outset
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of the criminal nature of their activities.

Ref lecting on

his experiences in criminal telemarketing, one subject

remarked :

I had no respect for telemarketing, you know,
companies that would come in and try to act like this
is real cool, "we're gonna get away with it," because
we have an attorney here, or we paid this bond, or
whatever. After a few years • it was like, you know,
what the fuck. This is, I know what we're doing :
" we're taking as much money as we possibly can.
That's what we ' re doing. " I'm a very black and white
individual, you know. I just, I'm a straight-line
man, I go right to it. And as much as a lot of people
in our industry try to legitimize it and had all these
excuses and stuff, I was always the one that sat back
and said, " No, let's go stealing, you know. Let's
make some money. " . . . I mean, you had to have, I
understand that the owners had to have some aura of
legitimacy, ' cause they were running ads in the paper.
They were getting young people in there, . . . and
they had to make it look real good. But me, I knew
what was going on early on, and just attacked it with
a vengeance.

The appearance of legitimacy and respectability makes it

easy for criminal telemarketers to manage culpability :

You just,
. I mean, you see so many rich people in
that business. I mean, these are guys that come to
work in a suit and tie everyday. And they have kids.
You've been to lunch with these guys, you've been to
dinner, you've been over to the house. They look like
everyday, normal, average Americans. . . . By the time
you get good enough to do it along with them, then you
find out, " okay, hold on, there's something not so
right about this. " But these are great guys, who pay
the taxes, you know. They're not criminals. These
are the type of guys that don't get pulled over by the
police.
. So you don't really look at what they do
as crime, ' cause they don't look like criminals. It
just doesn't compute. Now once you go on down the
road,
. yeah, you start to understand that okay,
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look, you know this is a shaft [ scam ) .
. I never
worked anywhere in anything I've done and not come
into my office in a shirt and tie, you know. I left
my house, you know, my neighbors all said every young
man in the block should be like him. But that's what
takes that edge off it, because you're a businessman.
You are. It's still a business.
Although less than a third (n=15) of the subj ects

admitted culpability (12. 5%) or some awareness of

criminality (18. 8%), a cross-tabulation of years in

telemarketing and admission of guilt [ Table 6 . 1 ] reveals

that the amount of time an individual spends in the

business has an effect on his or her willingness to

acknowledge the criminal nature of the enterprise.

The

subj ects were placed in categories of less than 5 years , 6

to 1 0 years , and 1 1 or more years.

It appears that the

subj ects became more enlightened as they spent more time in
the industry.

Of the subj ects with 5 or fewer years experi ence , only

two (11. 1%) admitted guilt and three (16. 7 %) reported some

awareness for a total of 27 . 8% of that category.

Comparatively, nearly twice the number of subj ects with 6
to 10 years of experience (n=9; 47 . 4% ) admitted guilt
(21 . 1%) or some awareness (26. 3%).

Those subj ects in the

11 years or more category, however , were the most adamant

in their denial of criminality as only one subj ect stated
158

Table 6 . 1 : Cross-tabulation of TM Years and Admission of
Guilt

5 and
Under

6 to 10

Count
Wi thin
Years
Cat egory
Wi thin
Admi s s i on
Count
Within
Years
Cat egory
Wi thin
Admi s s i on

11 or
More

Count
Within
Years
Cat egory
Wi thin
Admi s s i on

No

Yes

Awarenes s

Total

13

2

3

18

72 . 2 %

11 . 1%

16 . 7%

100 . 0%

40 . 6%

33 . 3%

3 3 . 3%

38 . 3%

10

4

5

19

52 . 6%

2 1 . 1%

2 6 . 3%

100 . 0%

31 . 3%

66 . 7%

5 5 . 6%

40 . 4%

9

1

10

90 . 0%

10 . 0%

100 . 0%

28 . 1%

11 . 1%

21 . 3%
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that s/he had some awareness of criminal activity.

This

pattern implies that the subjects were hesitant to see the
business as fraudulent in the beginning and determined to

label it as non-criminal once they decided it was going to
be their life ' s occupation .

Techniques of N eutraliz ation

As with many categories of those who live at the margins or
outside of the law, criminal telemarketers adopt

perspectives that guard against self - blame and moral
rejection.

Their perceptual and belief systems include a

range of techniques of neutralization and accounts ( Sykes

and Matza, 1957 ; Scott and Lyman, 1968 ) .

To explain

offenders ' justifications for engaging in criminal

activity, Sykes and Matza ( 19 57 ) , start with Sutherland ' s

theory of differential association, which asserts that

criminal or delinquent behavior involves the learning of
( a ) techniques of committing crimes and ( b ) motives,

drives, rationalizations, and attitudes favorable to the

violation of law.

They state that such neutralizations

include the denial of responsibility, denial of injury,
denial of victim, condemnation of the condemners, and
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appeal to higher loyalties.

In expla ining the ir

involvement in crime , almost all of the sub j ects employed
one or more of these neutralization techniques.
Fraud offenders typically j ustify their activities on
the grounds that their crimes cannot succeed without
acquiescence or cooperation from their victims.

Unlike

victims of burglary and robbery , those who fall prey to
fraud sometimes are willing , if halting or confused ,
participants in their own victimization (Goffman , 1952).
The tendency of fraud offenders to see the ir victims as
deserving of what befalls them was noted by Maurer (1940)
more than six decades ago , and it remains true of
contemporary telemarketing criminals.
Chief among the legitimating and defensive
"vocabular ies of mot ive " (Mills 1940 ) of telemarketing
criminals is belief that "the mooch is going to send his
money to someone , so it might as well be me " (Sanger 1999:
9).

In other words , customers are thought to be so greedy ,

ignorant , or incapable that it is only a matter of time
before they throw away their money on something impossible.
In one sub ject ' s account , " [ T ] hey know what they ' re doing.
They ' re bargaining for something , and when they lose , they
real ize that they were at fault. "
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These subjects had

neither concern nor sympathy for their victims.

As with

convicted rapists (e. g. , Scully and Marolla, 1984),

telemarketing criminals selectively seize upon aspects of

their victims' behavior and point to these as justification
or excuse for their crimes.

Several told me they relied on the advice of their

business lawyers.

In effect, they "pinned" the

justification for any wrong doing on erroneous legal

advice.

While. most of these s ubjects denied criminal

responsibility, some also acknowledged they were left
ambivalent:

I believed it was okay, but a part of me said it ·
can't be okay. You have this, you ' re divided. .
. . But the lawyer says it t�at's it's okay. Why
would you not believe, you know, a lawyer?
You're paying him for that reason. And the other
part of you is saying "look at it . Look at it
for what it really is. It can't be okay. " And
you have this fight inside of you . . . like the
devil in you saying "you know it's okay you can
do it. " And the other part of me is saying "I
don't care what the attorney says, you can't be
doing this you know. " But then you - you give
into the fact that here's a man who has a degree
in law, who knows what you're allowed to do and
what you're not to do. And if you're paying him,
you know, big dollars to give you the truth, well
why don't we rely on what he has to say. Just
like in any court case you would have, if you
hire an attorney to take care of things for you.
You would assume he knows what he's doing and
rely on his judgment .
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Ensconced in the ir outwardly respectable and self 
indulgent l ifestyles, it is both easy and typical of
criminal telemarketers to imagine they can continue the ir
act iv ities indef in itely .

Most sa id they believed that if

trouble developed they faced nothing more severe than a
f ine, an adverse civ il judgment or a requirement that they
make restitut ion .

When asked what he thought was the worst

that would happen if he lied in the sales pitch, one
sub j ect echoed others ' responses :
compla in on me .
back a check . "

" Somebody ' s gonna

That was the worst case .

I ' d have to send

They claim the entire problem more

appropriately was a "civil matter " and "should not be in
cr im inal court . "

As one put it: " If you have people that

are not satisfied, we would be happy to g ive the ir money
back . "
The trappings of a legitimate off ice and business can
make difficult and t ime consum ing the task of investigat ing
their operations .

As a result, when telemarketers are the

focus of law enforcement, generally it is by federal -level
cr im inal j ustice off ic ials .

Most attr ibute the ir arrest

and prosecut ion to out-of-control or polit ically ambitious
prosecutors, and they generally bel ieve the punishment they
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received was both unwarranted and excessive (see Willott et
al. , 200 1).

As one subject put it:

I think they should stop this crap, . . . coming
in with the strong arm, and, you know, making
these white-collar people, little people, look
like big-time criminals or something like that. .
. . They have no . mercy. They don't care, you
know. They ' re not out there to help any victims,
they're out there to put numbers on the board. .
. . And then they make a big business of the
prison industry. That ' s all it ' s about, you
know. Yeah, put violent people away that belong
in prison. But don't put people there that are
nonviolent people, that can be out there and
working a job. . . . Maybe they did do something
wrong, but give them another chance.
The subjects also stated that they were unaware
of the enhanced penalties statutes such as the

vulnerabl e vi c t ims and mon ey l a undering provisions of

the sentencing guidelines.

Similar to others, one

subject, in contesting the vulnerable victims statute,
asserted, " [ H ] ell, I would take anyone's money.
not going after the elderly. "

I'm

Others claimed that the

money laundering enhancement is wholly inapplicable to
telemarketing.

"How is it money laundering?

I paid

salaries and paid for the costs of the business with
most of the money.

This is a legitimate business;

money laundering was intended for the drug business
which is obviously illegitimate. "
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A recurrent theme in the subjects ' responses was the
claim that they were doing nothing different than
conducting business.

They maintained that they were not

victimizing their customers but engaging in a routine sales
transaction, no different than a retail establishment
selling � shirt that is marked up 50 0 percent.
I mean, and I used to say, " [ H ] ey, I went and bought
this shirt over at whatever. You know this shirt
costs a dollar to make for the manufacturer but I paid
50 [ dollars ] at the store. " So am I getting screwed
here ? Oh yeah, technically I guess I am, but I ' m
paying a markup. How is it illegal for me to do the
same thing ? That ' s free enterprise.
Even those who admitted their criminal wrongdoing held on
to this notion.

"In society it seems like implying,

insinuating and lying is just the way things are."
While a third of the subjects eventually admitted
wrong doing, most suggested that they did not realize it
until after the fact.

Still, they asserted that it was

more immoral than illegal .

Telemarketing fraud is

therefore construed by its practiti oners as perfectly in
tune with mainstream commercial interactions:
"subculture of business" { Ditton, 19 7 7 : 17 3).
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a

Organiz ational Buffers

It is difficult to accurately determine the calculus of

fraudulent telemarketers solely from self - reports of their
individual involvement.

Criminal telemarketers collaborate

with others and design their organizations to shield

themselves from detection.

Thus, it is helpful to examine

the subjects' motives and actions within the organizational
context of their criminal enterprises.

Organizational

buffers are part of the design implemented by fraudulent

telemarketers to avoid personal responsibility and deflect

blame .

Both the hierarchy of authority and the division of

labor in telemarketing organizations facilitate denial of
crime .

The management and accountability structure of

their operations is diffuse.

Unlike at legitimate firms,

unf ettered discretion is given to those at the bottom of
the hierarchy - the sales agents.

This allows the owners

and managers to blame rogue sales agents for any fraudulent
or deceptive activities .

As one owner put it :

are trying to do the right thing.

the wrong people.

They ' re just attracting

It's the salesmen. "
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"The owners

The owners never attribute the fraud perpetrated to
the intentionally deceiving scripts written or approved by
them.

As one owner stated, "The scripts are drafted to

enhance sales but we deliver on everything we promise. "
They dismiss the fact that the sales agents are commission
driven and deny encouraging the agents to do whatever is
necessary to make a sale.

This is reminiscent of the

observation by Ross (1907: 52) that the criminaloid "must
have responsible agents as valves to check the return flow
of guilt" from his or her criminal proceedings.

S / he

"shows them the goal, provides the money, insists on
results, but vehemently declines to know the foul methods"
that they employ.
The owners' method of operation may be likened to that
of large-scale drug dealers.

They have sales agents

conduct their dirty work just as dealers use pushers to
make transactions on the street to avoid direct attention.
The owners may even deceive their own employees with
respect to the legitimacy of the business.

The owners of

the XYZ Company referenced earlier, for example, placed
testimonials from "satisfied" customers in the employee
meeting area.

In the end, blaming sales agents for the
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decept ive practices they masterm ind while they s it back and
claim ignorance , is their primary line of defense.
Cr im inal telemarketers also build other defense
mechan isms into the organizat ional structure.

The

ver if ication process in wh ich the customers are taped
stating that no false promises were made during the sales
transact ion , for instance , is later used as ev idence that
the sale was legit imate.

Naturally , these tapes do not

reveal the fact that the sales agents coach the customer to
deny the inside information - the false prom ises - lest the
deal be queered.
More innovative owners also set up the ir own recovery
rooms.

Th is allows them not only to ma inta in a s ign if icant

portion of the proceeds from complain ing victims , but also
acts to deter compla inants from report ing the ir act iv ities
to cr iminal justice agencies.

The use of courier serv ices

to pick up victims ' checks also sh ields the owners from
de tection by law enforcement.

In addit ion , it ensures that

less time is ava ilable for the victim to reflect on the
transact ion.
Sales agents have the ir own lines of defense when
faced with cr im inal responsibil ity.

Most of them contended

that they were conv icted of practices that are common in
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everyday life. According to them, puffery is used- in sales
all the time and the good salesperson knows how to "push
that envelop to the gray line. "

The subjects suggested

that it is incumbent on the government to make more clear
the boundaries of sales transactions.

In other words, the

state needs to let them know what is wrong before pursuing
criminal action.
Additionally, sales agents use the organizational
structure to claim that the owners and managers kept them
in the dark about the business and its criminal nature.
They viewed themselves as just carrying out orders with the
belief that any criminal responsibility would befall the
owners.

One subject, for example, told me that he felt

insulated from responsibility as long as he wasn't an
owner:
You're just a worker, man. You're getting paid well,
but you're just a worker. If anything happens, you
got to plead ignorance -- the worst case scenario.
But once you start running the whole show, now goes
the shi t. Cause you collected the money, cause you ' re
writing that check.
The sales agents were more prone than owners and
managers to maintain their innocence.

A cross-tabulation

of telemarketing position and admission of guilt is
provided in Table 6 . 2 .

Eighty percent (n=12 ) of those who

admitted guilt or some awareness of criminality were either
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Table 6 . 2 :
of Guilt

OWner

Cross-tabulation of TM Position and Admission

Count
Wi thin
Pos i t i on
Wi thin
Admi s s i on

Manager

Count
Wi thin
Pos i t ion
Wi thin
Admi s s i on

Re loader

Count
Wi thin
Po s i t i on
Wi thin
Admi s si on

Sales
Agent

C ount
Wi thin
Pos i t ion
Wi thin
Admi s s i on

No

Ye s

Awarene s s

Total

15

3

6

24

62 . 5 %

12 . 5 %

25 . 0%

100 . 0%

46 . 9%

5 0 . 0%

66 . 7%

5 1 . 1%

3

2

1

6

50 . 0%

33 . 3%

1 6 . 7%

100 . 0%

9 . 4%

33 . 3%

11 . 1%

12 . 8 %

5

1

6

83 . 3%

1 6 . 7%

100 . 0%

15 . 6 %

11 . 1%

12 . 8%

9

1

1

11

81 . 8%

9 . 1%

9 . 1%

100 . 0%

28 . 1%

16 . 7%

11 . 1%

23 . 4%
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owners or managers .

Thirty-seven and a half percent of the

owners acknowledged the fraudulent nature of their
businesses, while 12 . 5% (n=3) admitted guilt, and 35% (n=6)
stated that they were aware of some potentially illegal
activity .

Half (n=3) of the managers also stated that

either the business itself or some aspects of it were
fraudulent.

By contrast, only three (17. 6%) of the sales

agents / reloaders acknowledged criminality in the business.

Rational Choic e

Clarke and Cornish (1985; 1986) expanded on the rational
choice perspective on crime .

The central assumption is

that
offenders seek to benefit themselves by their criminal
behavior; that this involves the making of decisions
and of choices, however rudimentary on occasion these
processes might be; and that these processes exhibit a
measure of rationality, albeit constrained by limits
of time and availability of relevant information"
( Cornish and Clarke, 1986: 1).
Not all crimes are carefully planned and systematically
evaluated using a cost-benefit analysis.

Street criminals,

for example, typically give only some consideration to the
benefits and costs before making a hurried decision on
whether or not to engage in the criminal activity .
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In contrast to the morally ambi guous relat ionsh ips and
recreat ional worlds of street offenders, many white-collar
citi zens are reared, live and work in worlds structured to
promote, mon itor, and reward prudent and del iberate
decision-making .

This is one reason that white-collar

offenders generally are sketched as being more rational
than street cr iminals (e . g . , Paternoster and S impso�,
1993).

Few invest i gators, however, have used interv iew

data to explore the fit between rational-cho ice theory and
the behav ior of white-collar offenders (Braithwa ite and
Makkai, 1991; Simpson and Koper, 1992; Willett, Griff in and
Torrance, 2001 ) .

As a result, understand ing of white 

collar cr iminal decis ion making lags behind what i s known
about the ir street -crim inal counterparts
The ir disincl inat ion to see telemarket ing fraud as
crime, means that the subj ects found it diff icu lt to
respond to quest ions about their awareness and calculation
of possible cr iminal penalties.

Since they do not commit

crime, most deny engaging in criminal decision-making.
They are susta ined in this moral stance not only by
qualities of the work and the organi zat ions that employ
them but also by the way the work is structured and carr ied
out.
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Telemarketers generally do not make calls to
individuals residing in the state where their operations
are located.

This keeps victims at a safe distance and

also contributes to offenders 1 belief that somehow they are
unreachable.

They assume that local police and prosecutors

have little interest in protecting persons outside of their
jurisdiction, and they know that few victi ms are likely to
complain in any case.

They distinguish their offenses from

common street crimes:
I mean, in that business, . . . you don 1 t actually
think of it as a crime while you 1 re doing it. Because
it just happens so easily. It 1 s not like you 1 re
putting a gun to somebody, it 1 s not like you 1 re
robbing poor people. I mean, it 1 s not even -- all you
do a lot of times is just making up, telling stories.
And then it graduates. Because at first you 1 re not
selling stories, you 1 re selling something real. But
it 1 s devalued already. And I mean they [ "customers 11
don 1 t know that. You know that, [ but ] there 1 s no way
they can tell that . .
And then it gradually goes
on to 100 percent. But, you know, that 1 s down the
road.
]

Willot et al. (2 00 1) had similar findings.
Likewise, when asked why so many people in the
business believe it is not criminal and they will not get
caught, one subject responded:
Because it 1 s a different type of, it 1 s a different
type of crime, you know. It 1 s, you 1 re on, you 1 re
using the phone, you 1 re not seeing these people. You
don 1 t know what they look like. I mean, I don 1 t know
how it is with other guys who may scam, like, life
insurance. These people [ victims ] , man, these are
173

people that you can call one day - - this guy was
sending me a $ 1 0, 0 0 check on Wednesday, and you call
the next Monday, he ' s forgotten your name already.
And you know, 20 months, they forget all about me. He
won ' t remember me at the end of the year, then he ' ll
j ust write it of f.
They believe, moreover, that they need do nothing more than
comply with the regulations of the state where the business
is set up.

In addition, most believe they are not at risk

from the law as long as they maintain financial resources
suf ficient to cover their obligations.
When criminal telemarketers do come under scrutiny
from law enforcement, the initiative usually is taken by
federal-level of ficials.

Most of the subj ects claimed that

police attention came as a complete surprise.

As a result,

few of fenders are prepared for the criminal process.
Nevertheless, several of the subj ects stated that they were
aware of businesses , sometimes their own, being
investigated but indicated that the money was too good to
discontinue.

One subj ect likened the lure to that of drug

addiction.
So I knew, you know, that there ' s probably a
problem out here somewhere but not a big enough
problem to stop making the money we were making.
So yeah, one time the local police came and
raided us. They had a complaint and they came
and they took all of our stuf f and everything.
And very strategically left our database, our
leads, which of course they seeded - - that was
the catch. We knew it, but you know, it was the
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equivalent to leaving a pile of drugs in the
corner for a drug addict , you know , sure we ' re
gonna take it. You know , you know we ' re gonna
take it. That was a smart move [by the state ] .
Retrospectively , many sub j ects perceived a gradual
crossing of the line from legitimacy to illeg itimacy.
Having crossed it , however , few retreated.
You take a little bit , go a little bit further
each time. I mean when you ' re first on the
phones , you know. The perfect example is like ,
when you first start pitching on the phones , and
the client asks you a question. And you don ' t
know. And they hang up on you. You ' re like , "aw
man , if I would ' ve just said such and such , even
if it wasn ' t r ight , who ' s gonna know ? " I
would ' ve got the sale , and it ' s not gonna hurt
the client. . . . And then finally , when they ask
you that question you go well " I ' m sure " -- real
quick , and you get the order. . . . And all of a
sudden that ' s part of the pitch now , doing it all
the time. It happens gradually.
Sim ilarly , another sub j ect reported that he became more
brazen as time went on.
I was good. I mean , when you ' re good at
something , you exploit i_t. And it j ust became
easier and eas ier for me to exploit it. And it
became less reasons for me not to do it and more
reasons for me to do it. It ' s not l ike you look
at these people , or you have to go to the ir house
and take the money from their hand , you know.
You ' re talking to them on the phone. And once
they send you the check , and you don ' t want to
talk to them , you avoid their phone calls. So ,
you know , it becomes easier and easier for you to
just keep on , you know , doing what you ' re do ing.
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With regard to crossing the line into illegitimacy , a
former ( legitimate) businessman of 26 years responded ,
"Absolutely .

I did , you know .

It was because it was easy

money and I didn't have the stress that I experienced for
13 years earning that kind of money . "

He went on:

And all the time not being familiar with the
industry and at that time it was my understanding
it was already going on for 1 8 or 19 years in Las
Vegas . And the longer I was in it , the more I
found out there's some very wealthy people in
this town . But no knowledge at all that these
people were committing crimes at that time early
in the game . Only later did I realize that yes
it is and still was at the time . Even when I
figured out it was illegal , I still stayed in . I
already crossed the line . There was no turning
bac k .
The allure of fast money distorted and gave a
distinctive cast to risk decision-making by many of the
subj ects :
[ I did ] order veri fication . . . , I guess , about
a year . And I kept asking for raises and the
owner , he goes , " I f you want a raise , become a
salesman . " He looked at me , he said , " you could
make 3 to $5 , 000 a week . " I thought , no , I can't
do that . I hated sales , I was an order verifier .
I knew they were lying to these people , you know ,
and I j ust , and I was like the policeman of the
company . . . . But it was amaz ing , it was like , I
can't believe I j ust did this . I j ust made $250
and it took me , what , 8 ½ minutes ? That was it .
It went o f f like a rocket . Because of my
experience with verification , I knew all the
obj ections . I was already a pro fessional
salesman , I didn't even know it , you know . So
after that I j ust took of f . I strictly worked
sales . .
. I learned how to ac quire leads . I
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learned how to go in to companies and extract
their database and take that someplace else and
make money for someone else . I learned how to
make my employers pay for my rent, buy my cars
and food and make sure I have drugs on the desk
you know - - all pretty cool .
The same subj ect later told me :
I had to go from how I was raised, from my
parents work ethic, to a different type of
person . And I remember thinking that . . . my
head was j ust separating, and I slowly but surely
went off into the realm of the salesman, you
know . .
. I really didn't understand why my
father worked his ass off all of his life . It
made no sense to me at this point . I'm thinking,
"my God, " you know, " he's j ust not a very bright
individual . He's j ust worked himself into a
grave for me, not making any money. " I mean .
. my father worked out of love, you know, and
honor . I worked out of greed and self
enhancement .
Another simply stated, that '' [ he ] needed the money and
j ust didn't really think about it after he got away
with it the first time .

So [ he ] did it again and

again until [ he ] got caught . "
When asked to compare himself with his friends
regarding his approach to life , ano ther subj ec t responded
directly in terms of risk .
He [ my friend ] was never like a risk taker, he's
not a risk taker . I think that's the big thing
they're not risk takers my friends . They're not
the type of guys that if there's a $ 1, 000 sitting
over there and there's a cop 10 feet away and
he's not looking right now, they're not gonna
take the chance to go grab that . Me on the other
hand, I take the chance . And it's not, I don't
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think that's a bad thing on their part . I don't
know , I think , you know , that's j ust the way we
are . I was never really as like you say , scared .
But you know I was the type of person that , you
know , hey . . . . it's worth it [ the risk ] . If
something goes wrong , you go "hey , at least I
came out okay . "
He went on to say , "So I mean it's like the carrot on
the stick , you know , right in front of you . . . . Yeah .
I mean I think that it's a numbers game with anything
in life. "
The maj ority of the subj ects indicated that they
never thought of leaving the business for another
vocation .

One subj ect's comment echoed that of

others , " [ I ] t's the only way I can make money .

It's

the only thing I know and it's what I'm good at . "
Despite the money they made as telemarketers , when
arrested , few of the subj ects had significant fiscal
resources ; most was spent in conspicuous consumption .
Some , however , did invest in efforts to avoid
detection and to contest criminal charges .

As one

subj ect stated ,
Actually I did save quite a bit . I j ust , I got
busted . I had to spend it . Actually we did have
quite a bit saved up inside walls .
inside walls, pictures , toilet bowls .
In the end , a maj ority of the subj ects reported that
they plan to return to telemarketing or a similar
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business after release from incarceration or parole.
In fact, some of the parolees had already returned to
employment in sales.
Although relatively few of the sub j ects candidly
acknowledged the criminal nature of their vocation and
most were reticent to discuss their decision -making in
terms of engaging in crime, there is ample evidence to
support that fraudulent telemarketers are very
deliberate.

To begin, like other white -collar

criminals , the sub jects employed a range of techniques
of neutralization in their denial of crime.

While

criminologists disagree on whether these techniques
precede criminal behavior { Sykes and Matza, 1957) or
occur after the fact { Hindelang, 1970), there is some
support for both contentions { Hirschi, 196 9) .

Viewed

in light of all of the attending circumstances,
including the organizational design, the ardent
defense of their actions suggests that the sub j ects
gave careful thought to the nature of their ac tions.
In the end, most admitted that they knew they were
walking a fine line.
More significantly, the owners organized and
carried out their illegal activities in a manner
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designed to shi eld them from responsibility .

The

subj ects called victims from other states in order to
avoid the involvement of local law enforcement
agencies and structured their organi z ations to
facili tate insulation from personal responsibility .
While they skillfully trained agents to commit the
actual fraud, they also relied upon the expectation
that victims would not complain .
Telemarketing fraud is a very lucrative cri me and
as such, the subj ects needed merely to determine the
costs involved in pursuing it.
rational approach.

The subj ects took a

They set up and maintained

businesses that mirrored legitimate enterprises and
built in li nes of defense within the organi z ati ons to
shield themselves from criminal responsibility .

The

longer the subj ects escaped detection, the greater
became their pursuit of profit and the less concerned
they became about the potential risks .

Analysis of

their j ustificati ons, organi zations, and personal
considerations reveals that fraudulent telemarketers
clearly are rati onal criminal decision- makers .
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Chapter 7
CONC LUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATION S
Structural changes in the nature o f economic and social
relationships have created new criminal opportunities for
individuals who desire to exploit them.

Fraudulent

telemarketers hail from middle class backgrounds and
embrace the societal goal o f capital accumulation yet they
rej ect legitimate means to attain it .

They exploit

ambiguity in the law and capitalize on the latitude
provided in sales transactions to perpetuate fraud upon
their victims.

Criminal telemarketers design their

operations both to facilitate large-scale fraud and to
defend against personal responsibility.

Their criminal

decision- making reveals that they are driven by the
substantial income the vocation provides and that they
believe their actions are defensible in light o f the law
and standard business practice.

In addition to crime

control ef forts , policy makers should address factors at
the cultural , legal and organizational levels and provide
better education to the public.
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Conc lus ion

Americans are encouraged to strive for success - to
pursue the Ameri can dream .

This refers to "a commitment to

the goal of material success , to be pursued by everyone in
society , under conditions of open , individual competition"
(Messner and Rosenfeld , 2000 : 5).

In other words , everyone

is encouraged to aspire to social ascent and everyone is
evaluated on the basis of individual achievement .

"An

important corollary of this universal entitlement to dream
about success is that the hazards of failure are also
universal" (Messner and Rosenfeld , 2000 : 63).
Sociological strain theory explicates the
criminological consequences of frustration in achieving
cultural goals and success.

In his theory of social

structure and anomie , Merton ( 1 938 ) devel oped a typo logy of
modes of individual adaptation : conformity , innovation ,
ritualism , retreatism , and rebellion.

Innovation occurs

when an individual continues to accept the cultural goal of
monetary success but rej ects the legitimate means to obtain
such success .

Merton ( 1 938) contends that crime results

when individuals are unable to get what they want through
legitimate channels , i . e. , innovation as a response to this
1 82

condition often takes criminal forms (Cloward and Ohlin,
19 60 ) .
The subj ects of this research aspired to and lived the
American dream .

They grew to adulthood in comfortable

material circumstances.

Despite their class origins,

however, they were unable to maintain the standard of
living provided by their parents.

As they reached early

adulthood, their directionless and lackluster performance
only heightened the felt need to identify and settle upon a
means of livelihood that would "pay off."

They had little

interest in occupations that require confining routines,
hard or sustained physical labor, or subordination to
others .

Acquisitive crime can appear as an acceptable and

attractive alternative to those in this position who place
a low value on hard work and a high value on· money and
pleasure (Agnew, 2000: 35 9 ) .
In the logic of sociological strain theory, the
subj ects share a structural vulnerability to innovative bu t
criminal solutions.

These mundane white-collar criminals

are not distinguished by close up familiarity with poverty
and disadvantage but instead by their anxiety either to
maintain the comfortable circumstances they have known and
now come to expect or "to climb closer to the top"
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( Weisburd et al . , 1991 : 18 5 ) .

In short , they found

themselves in economical ly precarious and frustrating
circumstanc es.
Despite the ir ambitions , most either had stal led or
were making l ittl e progress on conventional paths.

They

were mindful of the possibi lity of growing economic
marginal ity if they did not find and settl e upon a
satisfactory means of l i ve l ihood.

One subj ect said :

I got into te l emarketing , how it al l came about
is , I was working for a car wash , right up the
road here. And I ' d been there eight months , you
know. And I wasn ' t real ly making , I mean , I made
pretty dec ent money , what I thought was dec ent ,
you know. And . . . I see al l these peopl e
coming through driving these brand new cars and
al l this , you know. Younger peopl e , you know , a
l ittle bit older than me , but sti l l . · . . it
would be ni ce to do that someday , you know. And
most of them were in [ tel emarketing ] .
His remarks were echoed by another subj ect :
Yeah , I ' m not complaining but , you know , when you s ee
someone next to you and it ' s coming that easy for
them , you always want to work twi c e as hard. To get
everything twi ce as fast , to stay one step ahead of
him. And I think everybody , in l ife , has an
opportunity to go a different route. But a lot of
peop l e , they ' re scared. You don ' t know. But when I
saw that opportunity to go a different route that
would get there twi c e as fast as somebody else , I took
it.
Criminal te l emarketing provided opportuniti es where
the ir unimpressi ve work and educational experi enc es were no
handi cap.

Here there was l ittle interest in formal
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credentials and little need for venture capital.

Working

the telephones gave them a chance to show what they could
do, and in the process they became self confident,
interpersonally powerful, and self- indulgent models of
success.

Like street criminals , they committed crime in

order to maintain a style of living experienced as
satisfying.

Unlike street criminals , they construe

criminal decisions and construct criminal operations that
blend imperceptibly into legitimate ones.
The state provides wide latitude to parties in sales
transactions.

Part of the reason for this is that the

state chooses to favor its function of facilitating capital
accumulation over protection of its citi zens when faced
with placing prohibitive restrictions on economic practices
( O'Connor, 19 73).

The very nature of sales, in fact ,

permits a certain amount of puffery, which is itself a form
of deception.

The market economy operates under the notion

of ca vea t emp tor - let the buyer beware.

In essence, the

seller seeks to make the deal seem better than it actually
is and the buyer is left to determine the actual value of
the product or service.
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One o f the subj e c t s who wa s origina l ly from Engl and
made the f o l l owing ob s erva t i on about s a l e s prac t i c e s in the
U.S. :
The way I looked at i t i s , everybody here i s a c on
man . They con people into buying s tu f f and they tra sh
the i r oppo s i t i on to make an advert i s ing point , whi ch
i s i l l egal in Europe . You can ' t do i t in Engl and .
You can ' t s ay Coca Cola i s be tter [ than ] Pep s i , or There ' s law agains t that in Engl and . You c an ' t say
tha t on TV . You can ' t say i t ' s the be s t thi s . You
can say i t ' s probably one o f , but you can ' t s ay i t ' s
. The way adver t i s ing wa s , I saw in
the be s t .
Eng land when I was l i t t l e . Le t ' s say I had a l i t t l e
train , we l l they show a ·c l o s e up o f the l i t t l e choo
choo t rain . The train happens to be the s i z e o f a
pen , but they make i t l ook l i ke a s i z e o f , you know , 3
f eet l ong . But i t ' s on ly the s i z e o f a pen . And
tha t ' s mi s l eading to chi l dren . So they don ' t a l l ow
c omme rc i a l s l i ke that on TV peri od . You know , they
have to show wi thin the commerc ial o f the s c ope , the
s i z e , the ac tua l s i z e ha s to be repre s ented ac cura t e ly
wi th s omething tha t they show you for you to have an
i dea o f wha t the s i z e i s .
The subj ec t s ob served what they perce ived to be amb i gu i ty
in the law and s et out to exp l o i t i t , bo th in perpe trat ing
f raud upon the vi c t ims in the intera c t i on proc e s s and in
de f ens e of the i r ac t i ons to po t en t i al l aw en f o rcement
agency re sponse .
There i s a fine and at time s imperc eptible l ine ,
however , between good s a l e smanship and dec e i t .
Unfor tuna t e ly , i t rema ins somewhat unc l ear .
al .

( 2 0 0 1 : 9 ) no te :
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As Doocy et

Illegal telemarketing sales pitches come under the
general category of fraud, whi ch has been suc cin ctly
defined as "the art of de ception for gain. "
Nonetheless, the law does not specifi cally say what is
fraudulent behavior. One j udge noted, rather
pedanti cally, that the law "does not define fraud; it
needs no definition, it is as old as falsehood and as
venerable as human ingenuity. "
The sub j ects of this resear ch contend that the law is
ambiguous be cause as it does not clearly distinguish
between permissible and impermissible marketing practi ces .
Some sub jects who were business owners told me, for
example, that they set out to maintain a legitimate
operation, emulated the operations of their previous
employers and assumed, therefore, that their activities
violated no laws.

As one put it,

I thought, you know - - and that ' s the reason I ' m here
- - I thought I was in the ri ght. I thought I could
beat the government, and I thought there was a legal
way of doing this, and that I was intelligent enough
to find that legal way.
The sub je cts often sought legal counsel and approval from
regulatory agen cies prior to setting up their organizations
in an effort to maintain the appearan ce of a legal
operation.
Some of the sub jects suggested that their early
dealings with state regulators led them to believe that the
business was entirely legal.

The fa ct that many were

allowed to continue operating while investigators worked
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and the measures they took to give the appearance of
legitimacy contributed to this feeling of invincibili ty.
After hearing that the authorities were looking into his
business one indi cated that ,
[ I ] even invited them in to see the business , and they
said it was unnecessary. The next thing I know is
that there is a raid on my place. I didn ' t do
anything wrong , so I wasn ' t worried. Eighteen months
later I'm indicted.
Even one of the U. S. Attorneys that I interviewed did
not see the issue as cut and dry.

He contended that the

offenders were guilty of preying upon elderly people who do
not have the requisite faculties to make informed decisi ons
when confronted with high-pressure sales tactics.

When I

asked him what he thought if it was he or I that fell prey
to these practices , he replied , "Oh , well , yeah , we deserve
it .

If you or I spend a dime on this stuff , we , you know ,

we'd have to wonder what's happening to our brain . "

In the

end , indivi duals are prosecuted for fraudulent behavior ,
but the line of legitimacy in sales remains unspecified ,
leaving the field ripe for continued exploitation .
The subj ects contend that their decision to set up
formal businesses lies in their desire not only to abide by
the law but also to create, an operation that wi ll provide
them with revenue for a long time to come.
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Their

organizations , however , are designed not only to mount an
offensive assault on consumers , but also to provide a
complex defense strategy should the criminal nature of
their activities be detected.

Toward this purpose , they

are loosely organized with a diffuse management and
accountability structure , which allows deflection of
responsibility.
In order to capitalize on the criminal opportunities
presented by changes in the nature of economic and social
relationships , the owners employ individuals with good
interpersonal skills.

Their organizations are potentially

volatile , however , as fraudulent telemarketers are
extremely individualistic and their shared interest rests
solely in the pursuit of profit.

Criminal telemarketers do

not , by and large , share a cultural identity as they prefer
to b lend into society and thus are more prone to
distinguish themselves from others in the criminal
vocation.
While criminal telemarketers may be defined as a group
by their commitment to illegal economic activities , their
pursuits are decidedly individualistic , even within the
organizational setting.

In the end , they act independent

of , or in competition with , their fellow fraudsters.
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They

lo ok to def lect bl ame onto those that work beside them and
most anxiously await the opportunity to set up their own
businesses, taking the knowledge and leads from those that
trained them.
The picture of fraudu lent telemarketers that emerges
from this research is of persons whose backgrounds equipped
them with a generalized expectation that they wou ld be
successfu l somehow.

Pathways to success are no t identified

easily or confidently by the young, however, and the
subj ects dawdled or became distracted on what many wou ld
see as the road to marketable skil ls and credentials .
Lackluster preparation for conventional occupational
pursuits did litt le, however, to dampen either their
pursuit of the good life or their pragmatic approach to the
process.

Instead it heightened the fel t need to identify

and set t le upon a means o f l ivelihood that wou l d "pay o f f "
for them .

Chance brought them in contact with criminal

telemarketing, a way of earning money for which they
discovered they have a special talent.

I t provides them

with a high income and outward signs of success despite
their shortcomings of preparation and legitimate resources .
The knowledge and skills needed to expl oit criminal
opportunities vocational ly and successful ly do no t differ
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greatly from those required for success in the legitimate
world.

The blue-collar skills of an industrial society are

not equal to the challenge of exploiting contemporary,
increasingly white-collar, criminal opportunities.

The

technology-based and service-oriented economy instead
places a premium on interpersonal and communicative skills,
and it is the children of the middle-class who are most
likely to acquire these skills.

Exposure to

entrepreneurial skills and perspectives may be important as
well.
Wielding class-based presumptions and notions of
respectability, contemporary white-collar hustlers spend
their weekends on the lake, play golf, and have friends
over for barbeque.

Still, they waste their earnings on

drugs, gambling, fast living and conspicuous consumption.
Despite their apparent embrace of some of the trappings of
conventionality, they remain "marginalized middle-class
persons ll ( Doocy et al . , 2002).
Pol icy Impl icat ions

The complexity of telemarketing fraud and the fact
that victims usually are located in multiple jurisdictions
means that investigation and prosecution of these schemes
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can be an expensive and time -consuming undertaking.

Both

cooperative effort by state and federal law enforcement and
proactive enforcement strategies are required.

" Operation

Senior Sentinel, " for example, was initiated and co ordinated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation with the
cooperation of state authorities and the American
Association of Retired Persons .

Volunteer retired persons

secretly recorded calls from fraudulent telemarketers and
forwarded them to an operations center for analysis and
investigation.

The operation resulted in over 4 0 0 arrests

in more than 12 states (Federal Bureau of Investigation,
1997).
In 1994, the U. S. Congress enacted legislation
providing enhanced sentencing for offenders convicted of
telemarketing fraud.

The Senior Citizens Against Marketing

Scams Act ( SCAMS Act) - 18 U. S. C . section 2326, reads as
follows:
A person who is convicted of an offense under (1028,
1029), 13 41, 13 42 13 4 3, 13 4 4,
or a conspiracy ( 3 71) to commit such an o ffense, in
connec ti on wi th the conduct of telemarke ting :
(1) shall be imprisoned for a term up to 5 years
in addition to any term of imprisonment
imposed under any of those sections,
respectively; and
(2) in the case of an offense under any of those
sections that
(A) victimized ten or more persons over the
age of 55 ; or
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(B) targeted persons over the age of 55,
shall be imprisoned for a term of up to
10 years in addition to any term of
imprisonment imposed under any of those
sections, respectively.
As a result, stiff sentences were issued to those violators
that were detected by law enforcement.
Focused and aggressive policing aimed at illicit
telemarketing enterprises and operators has become
increasingly common.

Joint efforts and task forces have

operated in many U. S. cities.

The modus operandi of

telephonic predators adapts to changing circumstances and
challenges, however, and the boiler rooms that once
characterized telemarketing fraud are gradually giving way
to smaller and less permanent operations, operated
increasingly from off-shore and cross-border locations .
Reactive measures against illicit telephonic predators
have been matched by a variety of proactive efforts to
prevent fraud and sanction fraud offenders.

These

techni ques are consistent with those promoted by suppor ters
of situational crime prevention who contend that knowledge
of the fears and rewards of fraud can lead to improved
preventive measures.

Effective policy development requires

an understanding of these fears and rewards that can only
be obtained by understanding the decision-making process of
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fraudsters and how they manage the legal and organizational
contexts of their criminal enterprises.
The present method utilized to combat telemarketing
fraud is one of search and destroy.

While criminal j ustice

agency response has been widespread and impressive , its
procedures are time- consuming and costly.

Stil l , the

general deterrent effect remains unknown.

Additional ly ,

the task forces of the nineties have been disbanded ,
leaving local law enforcement agencies impotent to pursue
trans- state operations.
More efficient prosecution of telemarketing fraud is
needed to prevent further economic damage.

The present

method of enforcement requires long periods of surveil l ance
fol lowed by an even longer period of review before taking
legal action .

Although significant pri�on time has been

meted out to offenders , victims of telemarketing fraud have
been depleted of life savings that wil l never be recovered.
Safeguards are needed to sei ze the assets of fraudulent
operations in a more swift and efficient manner .

It would

be in the interest of the state to appoint a "receivership "
(i. e . , an individual overseer) to suspected operations to
monitor the financial activities of the business during the
investigation process.
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Despite past success in gaining convictions of criminal
telemarketers, the general deterrent effect of criminal
justice initiatives remains unclear.

When the federal

government enacted the SCAMS Act in 1994, it applied only to
telemarketing and merely set out sentencing enhancements for
those in violation of the fraud statutes. The legislation
neglected to address the underlying precursors that initially
led to the phenomenon.

As Chambliss (1993) notes,

[ It ] is the conflicts that create the dilemmas; and it
is the conflicts toward which state intervention is
directed. Rarely . . . are the basic contradictions
addressed. The contradictions create conflicts and
dilemmas, which people try to resolve. In the
resolution of conflicts and dilemmas other
contradictions are revealed and created, other
conflicts generated, and a multitude of dilemmas
ensue" (Chambliss, 1993: 15).
The fact that the statute applies only to
telemarketing offenses suggests that legislators were
concerned primarily with protecting elderly citizens
because of their presumed inability to decipher fraud.
Although the state is also aware o f the ambiguous nature of
sales in general and that telecommunications lends itself
well to the practice of deceit, it has failed to address
these issues.

The fact that the boundaries of sales

transactions are not obvious and that enforcement is once
again lax will reopen this criminal opportunity to the
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truly motivated.

The first course of action calls for the

state to enact more definitive statutes and regulations

governing the underlying contradictions.

Regulatory agencies have very little oversight of

telemarketing operations.

Currently, regulations require

only that telemarketers post a security bond, that the

script be approved, and that sales agents acquire a
"sheriff's " card.

While the subjects often sought to

comply with regulations, usually in preparation of defense,
they were not subject to agency supervision.

Legitimate

organizations expressed that they were unaware of any
"presence " from regulatory agencies.

Considering the

diffuse accountability structure of fraudulent firms, it

would be prudent for regulatory agencies to become more
involved in overseeing telemarketing operations .

The busi ness owners shou ld be required to provide a

model of their organizational structure and sign an

accountability contract stating that s/he is responsible
for the actions of employees if carried out in the

commission of their work.

A similar bill was passed in

light of the recent stock fraud committed by large
companies in the United States .

Additionally, the

regulatory agencies could conduct seminars on the "do's and
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don'ts" of sales transactions.

During these seminars,

participants would also be informed as to their individual
criminal liability for deceptive practices.
It may be necessary to revisit the cultural factors
that led to the proliferation of telemarketing and other
forms of fraud.

The market economy in the United States

presently operates on an opt -out rather than an opt-in
basis.

Under the opt-out policy, consumers who make

purchases or enter promotions are automatically placed in a
data bank operated by marketing agencies.

These consumer

information profiles are then sold and resold to businesses
- legitimate and illegitimate alike.

As a result,

consumers are inundated with sales promotions for products
and services from countless businesses.

If a consumer

desires to be removed from these lists, s / he must submit in
writing a request to be removed from each one.

In other

words ; s / he must opt out.
The justification for having an opt-out policy is that
it is supposedly good to inform the consumers about what is
available to them - in marketers' terms, "what they need. "
To prevent contact by fraudulent, as well as unsolicited
companies in general, would be to allow the consumer to
opt-in and thus decide for him or herself whether or not to
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participate in a particular segment of the market .
Unfortunately , the state would find such a policy too
restrictive on economic exchange , which consequently would ,
it is alleged , have a negative impact on the economy .
Thus , it will remain the burden of the consumer to opt-out
and otherwise avoid fraudulent solicitations .
Recently , a national do no t call list was placed into
effect with the end goal of deterring telemarketers from
placing calls to listed consumers (www . donotcall . gov ) .

In

the first day of the five-day campaign , over 800 , 000
citizens filed for relief .

In response , telemarketing

supporters have begun to argue that the impact on the
economy and employment will be stifling.

It remains to be

seen whether this law has a significant impact on halting
telemarketing fraud or hampering legitimate businesses .
The Direct Marketing Associa tion ( 200 3 ) estima tes tha t
there are approximately 6 . 5 million people that work in
telemarketing and that 2 million of them may suffer loss of
employment due to the do not call list .
Educational methods employed to date have not been
successful in training potentia l victims to protect
themselves against fraudulent telemarketers .

To tell

citi zens to " j ust say no " ignores the reasons why they
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engage in these conversational transactions in the first
place.

It would be helpful to educate the targeted

audience about the soci al-psychological ploys used by
fraudsters to carry out their scams .

It is important to

understand that the majority of vulnerable victims
parti cipate because of deep-sea ted trust and adherence to
social norms, enticing promises, and often diminished
mental acumen.

To educate the publi c about the social

psychological methods employed may enhance their ability to
disti nguish between legiti mate and i l legiti mate
telemarketers.
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A

Introduc tion and Description of Research Proj ect

My name is Glenn Coffey, and I am a research assistant in
the Department of Sociology at the University of Tennessee
in Knoxville, Tennessee .

We are conducting a study of

persons convicted of participation in telemarketing fraud
in the U. S . since 1994 .

The obj ectives of the study are to

gain a better understanding of the risks, the rewards, and
the organi zational arrangements used to commit
telemarketing fraud .
We are using two procedures for the study.

First, we

are conducting interviews with a sample of persons
convicted of telemarketing fraud .

Each interview will last

approximately one and one- half hours and will be tape
recorded so it can be analyzed later .

The purpose of the

interview is to secure each person ' s own description of
past involvement in telemarketing fraud and aspects of it
that caused them greatest fear and concern about arrest.
Second, we are examining pre- sentence investigation reports
prepared on each person we interview .

We hope the result

of this study will give us a better understanding of
telemarketing fraud through the eyes of those who have
participated in it .
224

We believe the risks and discomforts for you from
participating in the research are minimal.

Perhaps you

will experience some psychological discomfort at telling
about some of your earlier experiences ·in crime and in the
criminal j ustice system.

Otherwise, we do not believe

there are any risks from your participation in the study .
Benefits of the study are possible improvements in the way
telemarketing fraud is controlled, in order to minimi ze the
financial toll to victims and the wider society.

There are

no direct benefits to you from participating in this study.
All information given to us will be handled in the
strictest confidence.

The results of the study will be

published in the form of a book ; however, no individuals
will be identifiable in it or in any reports from the
study .
Your participation in the study is completely voluntary
and you may end participation at any time without penalty
or prej udice.

I will be happy to answer any questions you

have about the study .

Should you have questions later, you

may call me at # 8 65 -300-25 5 5 or the principal investigator
(Professor Neal Shover) at the Department of Sociology,
University of Tennessee ( 8 65 - 974 - 6021).
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B

Informed Consent

I , _________________ understand the study
enti tled "Telemarketing Fraud:

An Exploratory Study " as

explained on page 1 , and I consent to partici pate in the
study.

My participation is completely voluntary.

I

understand the purposes of the research and also that any
information gi ven to the researchers will be treated in a
stri ctly confidential manner.

It will be used only for the

purposes of the research explained to me.

I understand

that in the course of the interview I will not be asked
about and I will not answer questions about specific past
crimes.

Further , I understand that if I do divulge

information about specific crimes I have committed , the
investi gator is bound to make this informati on known to
criminal j ustice officials .

I also understand that I may

withdraw my participation in this study at any time ,
wi thout penalty or prej udice .

I consent to the following

procedures (initial what you agree to , and cross out what
you do not agree to ) :
I authori ze the staff at
to release the information specifi ed below to the
22 6

researchers only for the purpose of this study and only
unti l the completi on of this proj ect.

I understand that I

may revoke this consent in writing before the information
is disclosed .
1.

Initials
I consent to participate i n an interview .
Initials

2.

I consent to have the interview audi otaped.
Initials

I understand that al l research information (with the
exceptions menti oned above ) wi l l be handled in the
str ictest confidence and that my partici pati on wi l l not be
individual ly i dentifiable in any reports .

I understand

that participation or non-parti cipation in this research
proj ect wi l l not affect my release date or parole
el igibi l ity.

I further understand that there is no penalty

or prej udice of any kind for withdrawing from or not
participating in the study.

(Signature )

(Date )

(Witness' Typed Name and Signature )

2 27

(Register Number )

(Date )

C

Topical Int erview Guide

Demographics and Family Background
Age
Race
Parent (s) ' Occupation While Growing Up
Type of Area in Which Reared
Marital Status (how many times married? )
Employment History
Early
First Job?

Age ?

Other Jobs
Later Employment
Positions Held and Length of Time
Expectat ions
Experiences
Longest Period and Place of Employment
Telemarketing Experi ence
First
Age and Circumstances
Subsequent
Age and Circumstances
22 8

Po s i t i on ( s ) , Length o f Time and Inc ome
Likes and Di s l i ke s
Te l emarket i ng Organi z a t i ona l Emp l oyers
How Many and C i rcums tanc e s
Who Wa s in Charge
Hi erarchi cal Arrangement and Number of Emp l oyee s
Mode ( s ) o f Operat i on
Organi z a t i onal Cul ture
Emp l oyee Compens a t i on
How Much
How Used
Typ i c a l Workday ( de s cribe )
Lei sure Time and Ac t ivi t i e s
Knowl edge /Awarenes s o f Culpabi l i ty
At trac t i ons and Fears
Principal At trac t i ons of Tel emarke t ing Work
Awarene s s of Culpabi l i ty and C i rcums tanc es
Great e s t Fear ( s ) and C i rcums tances
Feel ings o f Invinc ibi l i ty ?
Nature
Origin ( s )
Why ?

229

Arrest /Conviction / Penalty History
First
Age and Place
Circumstances
Outcome
Subsequent
Age (s) and P lace (s)
Circumstances
Outcome
The Crimina l Justice System
Po lice
Jail
Courts
Prison and Confinement
Expectations
Experience
Principa l Prob lem (s)
Unanticipated Aspects
Typica l Day
Post -Release Plans
What?
Why?
Optimistic?
2 30

Why ?
Fears or Apprehension?
What?
Origins

2 31

D

Revi sed Interview Guide

Demographics and Family Background
How Parents earn a Living?

What Learn?

Points of Distinctiveness: Parents / Siblings / Friends
Primary Motivation: List of Importance
(e . g. , money / respect)
Employment History
Early
Long Term
Mobility
Telemarketing Experience
Recruitment
Early Employment
Present Experience
Personal Attributes / Quali f i c ations
Positions / Lengths / Income Averages
Likes and Dislikes
Most Abandon ; Why Persist ?
Describe Li festyle
Typical Day in Telemarketing/ Money Spent
Te l ema rketing Organi zation
Start Up

232

Finances / Regulations
Product / Service / Pitch
Mode of Operation
Hierarchy / Division of Labor
Management vs. Agent
(Authority / Responsibility / Knowledge)
Employee Compensation / Incentives
Employee Lifestyle
Fears / Risks
Attractions to Business
Concerns about Business
Concerns about Culpability
Circumstances / Reactions
Feelings of Invincibility
- Nature / Origin /Now?
Increase with Time / Knowledge / Looseness?
- Caught Up in Success / Inertia of its Own
Consideration of Changing Vocation (Why? /Why not ? )
Comparison to Legitimate / Illegitimate Business
Rationalization for Present Operation
How Get Around the Law?
Lega l Process
Knowledge /Awareness of Culpability
233

Where does the Fault Lie ?
How much Money on Attorneys ?
Reaction to Arrest/ Prison / Conviction
How Compare Self to Common Criminal (e.g. , rape ) ?
Prior Criminal History / Personal Trouble
Personal
Personal At�ributes (Success / Failure)
Variations in Lifestyle: Prior / Preferred
/Modification?
Post -Release Plans
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